POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

Managing Editor
DUMAS MALONE

Associates
SHEPARD B. CLOUGH
HERBERT H. HYMAN
PHILIP C. JESSUP
CARL S. SHOUP

Assistant to the Managing Editor
GRACE H. GERBERICH

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a non-partisan review. Every article is signed and represents the personal view of the writer. Manuscripts, books for review, and communications regarding articles and exchanges should be addressed to the Managing Editor, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

Copyright 1958, by the Editors of the Political Science Quarterly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DECEMBER ISSUE

WILLIAM C. MALLALIEU, Professor of History at the University of Louisville, is the author of *British Reconstruction and American Policy, 1945-1955* (1956).

CAROLINE ROBBINS is Chairman of the Department of History at Bryn Mawr College. She has written on parliamentary history and British political theory, and is the author of a forthcoming book, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman.*

JAHANGIR AMUZEGAR is Associate Professor of Economics at Occidental College. He has taught and written in the field of economic development and is interested in the rôle of technical assistance in the development of underdeveloped areas. He has served in various capacities in the Iranian government and was recently an economic advisor to the Iranian Plan Organization.

J. B. STEWART, Assistant Professor of Government at Barnard College, is working on a study of the political theory of David Hume.

ANDREW GALBRAITH CAREY, former business executive, headed the Industry Division of the Mutual Security Agency's Italian Mission in 1953.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY, former Assistant Professor of Government at Barnard College, is now a member of the Executive Committee of the Foreign Policy Association and is presently writing on Italian government and politics. During the session of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in Salzburg, Austria, in the spring of 1957, she was a Professor in residence. Mr. and Mrs. Carey's article on "The Varying Seasons of Italian Politics, 1956-57" appeared in the June 1957 issue of the QUARTERLY; and one on "Oil for the Lamps of Italy" in June 1958.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Volume LXXIII *December 1958* *Number 4*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE ORIGIN OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

A STUDY IN POLICY FORMATION AND NATIONAL LEADERSHIP *

WALTER LIPPMANN has declared that the American people generally give a negative answer to a new foreign policy proposal. But he admits that the adoption of the Marshall Plan was an exception to this rule.[1] Other exceptions might be cited. A leading historian believes, in fact, that " the American people have been remarkably wise and well-balanced in their general view of policy." [2] Perhaps it would be fair to say that American citizens are capable of making reasonable decisions when policies are presented to them in a clear form and with adequate explanation of the consequences of acceptance and of rejection. At any rate, this statement may be taken as a working hypothesis, to be checked against the facts now known regarding the formulation and enactment of the unprecedented policy of peace-time foreign aid.

The international situation in 1947 presented the Truman administration with a double dilemma as to political and economic policy. The popular desire for a return to normalcy had already caused a rapid disbanding of military forces and a dismantling of economic controls. The election of a Republican Congress seemed to forebode a tendency to isolationism. This tendency was overcome in the considera-

* Most of the information in this article is based on unpublished State Department records.

1 *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Boston, 1955), p. 23.

2 Dexter Perkins, *The Perkins Lectures* (Pasadena, 1956), pp. 33-41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of the Greek-Turkish aid bill by emphasizing the menace of Communist aggression. But this attitude alienated liberal sentiment, especially in Europe, and threatened to block a broader assistance policy. Similarly, American economic policies calling for free, multilateral trade and exchange seemed to preclude regional coöperation for reconstruction. European governments were puzzled to be asked to assure sound investment, efficient production, and greater intra-European trade, when, at the same time, their representatives in the Geneva Conference on Trade and Tariffs were being urged to recognize the advantages of private enterprise and multilateral trade. The particular form which the European Recovery Program took has been subjected to much criticism from economists and others.[3] Some of these criticisms may be valid; some probably are not. In any case, it is our purpose here simply to show how the Program evolved out of the decision of the Truman administration to obtain Congressional authorization of aid for European reconstruction.

The adminstration decided during March 1947 that foreign aid would have to be continued for at least another year. But it was undecided as to the form and manner of a proposal for Congressional action. As Marshall said later, " It is easy to propose a great plan, but exceedingly difficult to manage the form and procedure so that it has a fair chance of political survival." [4] Considerations of political strategy determined not only the apparently simple suggestion in the Harvard address, but also the handling of the question of Soviet participation and the guidance of the Conference on European Economic Co-operation.

The year 1946 was largely taken up with negative reactions to Soviet policy. In January, President Truman in a memorandum to the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes) urged firm resistance to Soviet expansionism. " I'm tired of babying the Soviets ", he concluded.[5] During February, the

[3] The most important of these critics were: Jack N. Behrman, *Foreign Aid as a Technique in Attaining United States International Objectives* (University Microfilms), 1951, and W. A. Brown, Jr., and R. Opie, *American Foreign Assistance* (Washington, 1953).

[4] Interview quoted by H. B. Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (Ithaca, 1955), p. 25.

[5] William Hillman, ed., *Mr. President* (New York, 1952), pp. 23-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

State Department began a reassessment of policy toward Russia in the light of Stalin's February 9 address and of a long dispatch from George F. Kennan, the American chargé in Moscow.

The President had originally recommended further aid for several nations in Eastern as well as Western Europe. But in September 1946, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy agreed that "we must help friendly countries, particularly Turkey and Greece, in every way and refrain from assisting countries who, either from helplessness or otherwise, are opposed to our principles." [6] Because of the belief that relief supplies were being used in Eastern Europe to gain support for the Communist party, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was disbanded before rehabilitation was complete. Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of State, announced that no further relief would be given nations which "cannot prove their needs or which maintain large armies and divert manpower and facilities away from production." [7] This negative policy not only abandoned Eastern Europe to Communist control, but also failed to assure economic and political stability in Western Europe.

Both George F. Kennan and Averill Harriman, the ambassador to the U.S.S.R., recognized the importance of the economic situation in Western Europe. Harriman felt that "the only hope of stopping Soviet penetration is the development of sound economic conditions." [8] Kennan urged "less hysterical anti-sovietism" and more attention to "the health and vigor of our society." Resistance to Soviet policies should be accompanied, he thought, by active leadership of the free world:

> We must formulate and put forward for other nations a more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see. . . . It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples . . . are tired and frightened by experiences of the past and are less interested in abstract freedom than

[6] Walter Millis and E. S. Duffield, eds., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), p. 210.

[7] *New York Times*, August 28, 1947.

[8] *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 134-140.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able to give them this. And unless we do the Russians certainly will.[9]

Secretary of State Byrnes and Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, had agreed informally on economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey. But no definite action was taken in Washington until February 21, 1947, after alarming reports of Communist activities were received from American representatives in Athens. On the same day the British ambassador gave notice that Britain would have to withdraw her troops and financial aid for Greece within a few months.

During the next three weeks, speedy action in the State Department and White House resulted in the President's message to Congress (March 12) recommending immediate economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey. A group of leading Senators and Representatives met in the White House to hear Marshall's summary of the situation. They were more impressed, however, with Acheson's presentation of the danger of Communist aggression in the Near East. They agreed to support aid for Greece and Turkey, provided (as Senator Vandenberg put it) that the President would lay the grim facts of the world situation on the line. The State Department Public Information officers recommended a program "to portray the world conflict between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government" in order to make the American people recognize the importance of the Greek crisis.

The American press immediately took the cue and emphasized that part of the President's message which they labeled the "Truman Doctrine": "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."[10] Some members of the State Department staff thought that insufficient attention was given to the part of

[9] Excerpts from Kennan dispatch of February 22, 1946 (Department of State).

[10] Joseph M. Jones, who drafted Truman's message under Acheson's direction, says that this whole section was taken almost word for word from a public information report of a State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee subcommittee. *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955), pp. 134-170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the speech which stated that American aid should be primarily economic. Robert A. Taft, the Republican leader in the Senate, opposed the Greek-Turkish aid bill because its military provisions might lead to war with Russia, he thought. Yet the bill had been passed, another senator said, because "Truman scared the pants off us." European opinion had also to be considered. Many members of the British Labor party criticized the Truman Doctrine. Ernest Bevin had repeatedly said he did not want to see Europe divided into two hostile camps. In France a moderate Cabinet needed Socialist votes which might be lost if its policy antagonized the Soviet Union. Likewise plans for reconstruction of Germany might alienate conservative deputies influenced by nationalistic or economic motives.

Meanwhile, a broader aid policy was being studied. Following a suggestion from the Chief of Staff (General Eisenhower), the War Department urged that an estimate of world needs be made. With the approval of the War and Navy Departments, the State Department suggested to the British ambassador that informal conversations on economic aid be begun. If such conversations took place, they apparently had no definite results. At Acheson's suggestion the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee secretariat undertook a detailed study of the "policy, procedure, and costs of assistance to foreign countries."[11] Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was concerned with the necessity of getting support and advice from business men. The President appointed a committee of five cabinet members to communicate the facts to leaders throughout the country, including a selected group of business men.[12]

The preliminary report of the SWNCC special committee (April 21) recommended that aid programs in different countries be closely coördinated so as to take advantage of possibilities of mutual assistance on a regional basis. The committee put special emphasis on the revival of production in Germany and Japan. In Europe, priority should be given to democratic countries, but Soviet satellites might be assisted when such action would provide essential commodities, such

[11] Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-202.

[12] *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 248, 252.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as coal and wheat, for Western European countries.[13] The economic staff of the State Department had sometime previously reported to the President that economic progress in Europe would be accelerated by removal of barriers to intra-European trade.[14] Later they suggested to the Policy Planning Staff that American aid should be used to support a coordinated European recovery program, in which the Soviet Union and its satellites might be included, if they were willing to coöperate. Will Clayton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, favored an economic federation of Europe. These discussions were carried on in great secrecy with no public intimation until Acheson's speech at Cleveland, Mississippi (May 8). The Undersecretary, substituting for President Truman, tried to make the public aware of the serious situation in Western Europe. There was need for continuation of American aid for one or two years more, he declared.

In April, during the Moscow Conference, Marshall had an interview with Stalin, in which the Generalissimo held out hope for final agreement, remarking, "After people had exhausted themselves in dispute they then recognized the necessity of compromise." But Marshall rejected the idea of "compromise through exhaustion." Upon his return to the United States, he reported that the Russian attitude had made agreement on Germany and Austria impossible. He added: "We cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected here. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."[15] Although the Secretary stated that some progress had been made, he actually believed that the Soviet government was stalling for time and hoping that the European situation would become worse.[16] He had decided that some effective action must be taken, to prevent a catastrophe. Shortly after returning from Moscow, he set up the Policy Planning

[13] Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-205.

[14] *Memoirs by Harry Truman* (Garden City, 1956), vol. II, p. 111.

[15] James Reston, *New York Times*, April 29, 1947; Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, 1950, pp. 57 *et seq.*

[16] Interviews with Marshall quoted in Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Staff headed by George F. Kennan. Its first assignment was the policy and procedure with respect to American aid to Western Europe.

The report of the Policy Planning Staff (May 23) was largely based on that of the SWNCC staff and an outline of the incomplete report of the Foreign Aid Committee of the State Department.[17] The strategy recommended by the Policy Planning Staff included: (1) a frank statement to the American public that deterioration of physical plant and spiritual vigor in Western Europe was the root of difficulties there, not Communist activities; (2) a short-term plan to halt disintegration and create confidence by solving serious bottleneck problems, such as coal production in the Rhine Valley; (3) a long-term rehabilitation program initiated and formulated in Europe and involving a linking of national programs (such as the Monnet Plan of France for reëquipment of industry). The improvement of intra-European trade was said to be very desirable, including greater trade between Eastern and Western Europe. In the Economic Commission for Europe (recently established) a recovery program for all Europe might be proposed with such conditions as would make the Soviet satellites reject it or else agree to "abandon the exclusive orientation of their policies." If the proposal were blocked in the ECE, the key countries of Western Europe might confer separately. The program should provide Western Europe after a definite period with a tolerable standard of living on a self-supporting basis. There should be joint assurance that aid was used as effectively as possible. The cost to the American government should be kept as low as possible and reimbursement should be made as far as was economically feasible. The Soviet Union was not mentioned in the report; apparently it was not expected to agree to the proposed program.

The Policy Planning Staff's report and a memorandum from Clayton on his observations in Europe were the bases of Marshall's decision, announced in his Harvard address (June 5). He avoided detailed specifications, stating that "the initiative must come from Europe," but that the United States would be willing to give "friendly aid" in drafting a

[17] Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-249.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recovery program supported by "a number, if not all, European countries." He later cleared up the ambiguity of the last phrase by saying that any country wholly or partly in Europe would be eligible.[18] Privately he feared the results of Soviet participation. Kennan suggested that, since the main problem was Western Europe's need for raw materials and foodstuffs, the Russians should be asked which of these commodities they could contribute. They would then have to agree to make a real contribution or else decline to participate.[19] A statement along these lines was issued by Clayton as Acting Secretary. Since the Soviet Union did not have the same import needs as Western Europe, he suggested that it should help other countries which were in need.[20]

During June, the State Department was concerned with the delicate balance of American, Russian, British and French attitudes. When the British and French showed interest in Marshall's statement, the American government was very cautious and noncommittal. It stated that there was no "Marshall Plan", but only a suggestion that European governments should show why previous American aid had not been enough to restore their economies and what they could do to help themselves with minimum help from the United States. American authorities expressed their belief that Congress would authorize further aid only on the basis of an integrated program covering a definite period of time. They made it clear that the European governments should not allow fear of Russian obstruction to prevent action. The British and French were reported agreed on making no concessions to the U.S.S.R. which would endanger Congressional approval.[21]

When Bevin came to Paris to discuss the Marshall suggestion with the French foreign minister (Bidault), the latter invited Molotov to participate. The French told American diplomats that they were not weakening, but that for internal political reasons they could not appear to favor exclusion of

[18] *New York Times*, June 13, 1947.

[19] Interview with Kennan quoted in Price, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[20] *New York Times*, June 19, 1947.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet government. The French Cabinet was dependent on the votes of Socialist deputies who favored coöperation with the Communists. Urged by the British to accept the invitation, Molotov expressed an interest in the conference. He was then formally invited and further proceedings were suspended while his reply was awaited. It was understood, however, that discussions would continue even if Molotov refused to take part. Bevin was cheered by the House of Commons when he declared appeasement of the Soviet Union ended, even if this meant ideological conflict. The Soviet government accepted the invitation, but expressed grave doubts of an integrated recovery program.

Clayton, on his way to attend the Conference on Trade and Tariffs in Geneva, conferred with British Cabinet members. They were fairly optimistic about their own economic situation, believing that the American loan would see them through the year, provided the United States gave aid to continental countries. They apparently expected these countries to buy British goods in considerable quantities. The outcome was very different. During July and August Britain's American credits were nearly exhausted and her gold reserves badly depleted. Only after sharp divisions within the Cabinet were measures of austerity adopted.

The American government had no representative in the Tripartite Conference (June 28-July 2, 1947), but kept in close touch through the British and French foreign offices. At the first meeting, Molotov tried to find out what additional information the British and French had as to American intentions. Being told there was none, he proposed to ask the American government how much money it was prepared to advance. The British representative replied that Marshall's speech had not contained an offer, but only a suggestion that European governments formulate a constructive plan. The French representative proposed asking what assistance the United States was willing to give in the drafting of a European plan.[22] The American observers in Paris felt that the French were weakening and letting Bevin take the lead in dealing with Molotov's objections. But

[22] *French Yellow Book* (*Conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics*) (Paris, 1947).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French tactics may have been right, since Molotov was being unusually mild and trying to avoid giving a pretext for a break.

In the second session Molotov criticized the French proposal for a comprehensive European program as an infringement on national sovereignty. He wanted coöperation of European governments confined to a joint statement of requirements, with priority to countries which had suffered from German occupation, leaving German reconstruction for consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The French and Soviet proposals, as later modified, were not very far apart. In both, the Committee of Assistance would have been dominated by the Big Three, with most European governments having only a consultative rôle. The French seemed to be trying to conciliate the Russians by proposing that a statement of needs and resources be based on voluntary information and that the United States give advice in drafting the final report. In reply to Molotov's questions about German reparations, Bidault was evasive. He wanted to avoid premature discussion of German reconstruction, which might alienate nationalistic members of the National Assembly. The chief Communist organ in France, *L'Humanité*, declared that Bidault's proposals offered a basis of agreement. The French Communist party was therefore discredited when a TASS dispatch indicated Soviet rejection.

The British feared that the press might get the wrong impression and overlook the important differences between the French and Russian proposals. Bevin set the British and American correspondents right on the issues involved, and presented a "stripped down" version of the French proposals, stressing self-help and intra-European coöperation.[23] The British secretly welcomed the anticipated deadlock, believing that responsibility would be laid at Moscow's door.

During the afternoon session of July 1, Molotov received a partially decoded telegram (apparently the Kremlin's reply to the French proposals). A bump on his forehead suddenly swelled, indicating emotional strain.[24] This suggests that he may have regretted Stalin's decision to reject the proposals

[23] *New York Times*, June 30, July 1 and 2, 1947.

[24] Interview with Acheson quoted in Price, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outright. In the final session, next day, his manner was much more aggressive than before. He charged that the proposed steering committee would force participants to follow policies profitable to Britain and France and to provide outlets for American surplus commodities. He declared that if the Western governments should go through with the plan there would be grave consequences.

There was much speculation as to the real reasons for Soviet opposition. Molotov's charges of imperialism were mere propaganda. The Soviet government may well have feared loss of prestige from disclosure of Russian dependence upon East German and satellite industry.[25] Moreover, as Molotov pointed out later, the American proposals emphasized the reconstruction of Western Europe and offered little, if anything, for the Eastern countries which had been devastated by the Germans.[26]

The real mystery is why the Soviet government did not agree to participate and try to gain political advantage from dissensions within the Committee of Assistance. Stalin's miscalculations may have been due to overconfidence in Communist power in Western Europe and reliance upon a rigid interpretation of Marxist economics. According to communist doctrine, American capitalism was approaching a crisis, which would cut off foreign aid, leaving Europe to fall into the hands of the Communists. In reality, Soviet intransigence caused Communist parties to lose influence in France, Italy, and other countries. In Britain the Labour Party Conference united in support of the European Recovery Program. Marshall had been astute, a British diplomat said, in allowing Russia to exclude herself. More than that can be said: he had been wise enough to get the Western European governments to see the real situation for themselves.

After the adjournment of the Tripartite Conference, the French government announced its intention of continuing collaboration with all countries wishing to act on Marshall's suggestion. With the British they issued an invitation to twenty-two European governments (omitting only Spain and

25 See "Why Molotov Said No", *Spectator*, London, July 18, 1947, by G. B. Thomas (said to be the pseudonym of a BBC correspondent).

26 "Soviet Note to Sixteen Nations", July 8, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union) to send delegates to a Conference on European Economic Co-operation. Poland and Czechoslovakia had shown interest in the proposal, but under Soviet pressure they refused the invitation. All other Communist-dominated governments in Eastern Europe did the same.

The American government congratulated the French and British negotiators on their patient efforts to find agreement with the Soviet government, thus removing an uncertainty in the working of the recovery program. American authorities gave assurance that the United States would do all in its power to support genuine and constructive efforts toward restoration of economic health in Europe. Mr. Clayton spent three days in Paris, discussing with French leaders their economic problems and answering some of their questions concerning the Marshall proposal.[27] In Washington, the Secretary of State held a secret conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[28]

American policy was still rather vague. As explained to the principal governments of Western Europe, the administration at this time was thinking of grants to provide basic commodities and essential foods, and International Bank loans to finance reconstruction of industry. American representatives in Europe emphasized that the final report of the coming conference should include an analysis, understandable by the American man in the street, of the reasons why Europe had not made more progress with the large sums of American aid given during the two preceding years. The report should also provide for a sound production program to put Europe on its feet in three or four years, and a form of economic federation (or, at least, definite steps in that direction). Regarding the alleged conflict with the trade charter being negotiated at Geneva, American representatives expressed the opinion that the charter would not prohibit customs unions among contiguous countries.

The French financial situation was very weak and French officials suggested that massive imports of consumer goods would stop inflation. But American spokesmen declared that balancing the national budget was the proper method of checking inflationary pressure. The French were also

[27] *New York Times*, July 8, 9, 10, 1947. [28] *Ibid.*, July 12, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concerned over the part Germany would have in the program. They wanted permanent control of the Saar and did not see the necessity of a large increase of German steel production. They asserted that their own steel mills could supply all of Europe's needs if assured of sufficient coke from the Ruhr. It was understood that German questions were not to be brought up at the conference, but it was also agreed that solution of the German problem within a year was an important condition of the success of the European Recovery Program.

Diplomats from sixteen nations convened in Paris on July 12 and established the Committee for European Economic Co-operation. This Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks, set up a series of technical subcommittees and an executive committee. On consideration of a questionnaire to be sent to participating governments, the Swedish representatives, backed by the Dutch and the Swiss, proposed that questions be confined to the short-term aspects of recovery, leaving long-term problems to the Economic Commission for Europe. But the French and British insisted that only a comprehensive four-year program would satisfy the United States. The representatives of the smaller countries declared they could not proceed on the basis of information not available to all. The American embassy straightened out the tangle by explaining why Clayton had been unable to visit all countries and arranging for him to confer with most of the other governments. The American government kept in close touch with the proceedings of the Conference through its Paris embassy (headed by Jefferson Caffery) in collaboration with Clayton whenever he was in Paris.

Meanwhile, announcement of a new directive to the American Military Government in Germany (July 15) had aroused apprehension and criticism in France. The French government could not at that time depart from its announced policy of favoring a weak German government and permanent international control of the Ruhr. They had given up the "pastoral" approach to Germany, but still wanted to provide for future security by "pulling out Germany's industrial teeth." Almost any decision on the future of Germany would put the French government in a difficult political situation. At the same time, the British urged revision of economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

controls in Germany in order to end the burden on their dollar reserves. The American government wished to confine discussion to the coal situation and connection with plans for general European recovery. Tentative Anglo-American agreements on coal and steel production caused the French to warn that decisions made without consulting their interests would make fusion of zones more difficult. The Communists had charged that the Marshall Plan meant putting Germany first. If this view should be confirmed, the French Cabinet might not survive. After fighting off criticisms from 180 Communists and 120 Socialists regarding the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Cabinet might not be able to stand the additional burden of explaining the new German policy. The American representative assured the French that the Ruhr management would not be independent of Allied control and that no final decision on ownership of the Ruhr industries had been made. At his suggestion, the American government ordered a halt in the Anglo-American discussions in Berlin and agreed to a tripartite conference on German industry. The French National Assembly voted confidence in the Bidault policies regarding Germany and the Marshall Plan. In the CEEC technical committee the French refused to accept the Bizone estimate of 10,000,000 tons of steel in 1951, but agreed to a statement that this amount was expected, but it would depend on decisions made elsewhere.

In August the three Powers agreed that measures to be taken in regard to German industry should not give priority to German reconstruction. The American and British governments agreed to consider French proposals for greater export of German coke, but did not accept French objections to their level-of-industry policy. Their announcement on August 29 provided for retention of German industrial equipment, not suitable for military production, in sufficient amount to permit resumption of normal production and export in order that West Germany might become self-sufficient and also contribute to the recovery of Western Europe as a whole.[29]

[29] *Germany, 1947-1949*, pp. 356-359; *New York Times*, August 22, 28, 29, 30, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Anglo-American policy in regard to Germany was supported by the smaller Powers in the Committee for European Economic Co-operation, especially the Benelux group. They feared that France with her ambitious Monnet Plan might get the greatest share of American assistance. They preferred greater use of German resources and increased trade with Germany. German Bizone estimates were called for in the questionnaire sent out by the Conference as a statistical form to guide participating governments in drawing up their separate national reports. Besides reciting the efforts each nation had made and the assistance it had given others, the reports were to outline the efforts each proposed to make in the next four years (1948-1951). Assuming that there would be no shortage of exchange after 1951 and that standards of living could be maintained without further outside aid, the national programs should show the amount of American aid necessary to assure an approximate balance of international payments in 1952.

The American government was still hesitant about giving guidance to the Committee. The State Department wanted to be able to tell Congressmen and Senators that no commitments had been made. The most they could say at this time was that the United States (subject to Congressional approval) might supply necessary food, clothes, medicines, etc., but there was no prospect of an international dole. The American representatives in Paris agreed to meet with the Executive Committee so that the American government's views might be given on a confidential basis. It was made clear that the American government was thinking in terms of concrete measures by participating governments, not mere agreement on general principles. It was also stated that the United States was not prepared to finance a system of intra-European currency clearance. Such proposals confused symptoms with the disease; the real problem was revival of production, it was declared. The American representative also opposed a suggestion that an American public relations counselor be employed to make the Conference report attractive to the American people. In regard to trade barriers, the American representative suggested a series of tariff reductions ending in elimination of barriers at a definite time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He opposed allocation of products as a move in the direction of cartelization.

Mr. Clayton and the American ambassadors in Paris, London and Berlin conferred on problems related to the assistance policy.[30] They felt that the situation in the CEEC made it imperative that the United States give the "friendly aid" in drafting the recovery program which Marshall had promised in his Harvard address. Since the American government was not yet ready to make specific decisions, its representative in Paris was instructed not to make suggestions in such a manner as to appear to commit the United States. In fact, he had said repeatedly that the President and Secretary were not committed until they could examine and approve the completed report. Even then Congress would have the final decision.

Later the State Department expressed the opinion that the Committee was giving too little attention to self-help and mutual aid. Unless the European nations were ready to adjust to basic changes which had occurred, no aid from without could be really effective. In regard to bottleneck industries such as coal mining and agriculture, some new capital equipment might be necessary, but chief emphasis should be upon efficient use of existing capacity. The Department was ready to study the first draft of the Committee's program informally so as to facilitate presentation to the American government and Congress. But the American representative in Europe stated that without guidance from the United States, the Committee would present a simple statement of needs together with expressions of good intentions for the future. He urged emphasis upon freeing of trade, which would get support from European liberals and strengthen the case in Congress. The opportunity to help Europe out of bilateralism and restrictionism would probably never return again, he thought.

On the other hand, a British diplomat felt that the Americans were taking an oversimplified view of the situation. The word "integration" had become somewhat of a catchword. Actually European nations had traded actively with

[30] *New York Times*, August 3, 4, 6, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one another in spite of tariffs. The greatest barriers were quantitative import restrictions and these would be relaxed gradually with economic progress. A customs union could not be negotiated in less than five or ten years. He suggested setting up study groups, with which the United Kingdom might be associated, as well as a special working party on regional customs unions. The American government was not insisting upon immediate union, but believed definite commitment to eventual elimination of trade barriers would make a more favorable impression in the United States than mere intention to explore. A central organization of participating countries would not have to be continued beyond the period of assistance, the American representative thought.

By this time (August 22) it was apparent that the United States must clarify its policy and give the Committee more definite guidance. The Policy Planning Staff report of July 23 and the reports of State Department economic experts had not been officially adopted as a departmental position. It was especially necessary to eliminate differences between the home staff and the representatives in Europe. The latter had put great emphasis upon lowering of tariffs and formation of a customs union. But the economic staff stated that the greatest trade barriers were restrictions on imports to protect currency. The Policy Planning Staff believed that increase of intra-European trade might require a multilateral clearing system based on a special dollar fund. They also felt that a grouping of recipient nations would give assurance that American aid would be used to the best advantage.

A special meeting of Department experts recommended that the Department's position be established as soon as possible and that the CEEC report be reviewed even if this involved a form of negotiation. They urged that the method of presenting the report to Congress be determined and that a special memorandum on public relations be given official consideration. They also suggested that differences between Department attitudes and those of its representatives in Europe be cleared up, possibly by sending certain Department officials to Paris.

The Department decided to send to Paris George F. Kennan, chief of the Policy Planning Staff, and Charles Bone-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

steel, special assistant to the Secretary of State, to give the CEEC guidance in the completion of its report and to point up the broader political factors influencing American thinking.

Meanwhile, an outline of policy in regard to European recovery was sent to American representatives in Paris. This statement put emphasis upon short-term programing to restore full use of existing capacity, although it did not exclude long-run capital development. The essential elements of such a program were said to be correlation of national programs on an area-wide basis, allocation of agricultural products and basic industrial materials, and expansion of intra-European trade (involving possibly American support for a currency-clearing system and looking, if possible, to an eventual customs union). A continuing central organization was thought necessary to recommend distribution of American aid and make international allocations. But the United States would retain the right to modify aid allotments. In spite of the importance of trade with Eastern Europe, the American government could not provide direct aid to Eastern countries, because of their political unacceptability, but would consider international measures (such as World Bank loans) to expand Eastern industry where such action would benefit Western Europe. The American government favored the greatest possible use of United Nations agencies so long as such use did not interfere with the progress of the program. The American authorities assumed that most of the aid from the United States would be in the form of specified commodities. Hence the amount of untied dollar assistance should be minimized or left open. The United States did not intend to satisfy the entire world's appetite for dollars under the guise of a European recovery program, but did not exclude some expenditures outside the United States.

The chief American representatives (Clayton, Kennan, Caffery and Douglas), conferring with the Executive Committee of CEEC, expressed disappointment that the provisional report was not in a form to convince Congress and the American people that its proposals were sound and practicable. They especially stressed the importance of internal financial stability, reduction and eventual elimination

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of trade barriers, and a central international organization to review progress. The American economic experts stated that the estimate of necessary outside aid ($29.2 billion) was unrealistic, too high for available commodities and not adjusted to necessary changes in standards of living. European consumption of meats, dairy products, and other protective foods could probably not be restored to pre-war levels, partly because of world shortages of food and feedstuffs. The Americans stated that they were not trying to dictate, but merely giving their view of what was necessary to win approval by the American people. The probability of acceptance would be greatly enhanced if Europe would plan for continuous progress toward a workable economy at the end of four years. To achieve this purpose a partial delegation of sovereignty to a central organization might be necessary. Without joint review of production and consumption the result might be a watered-down version of a potentially constructive program.[31]

After a great deal of technical criticism from Washington, the financial experts of the Committee undertook to revise their estimate downward. Recognizing certain errors and discrepancies, they stated that no reliable estimates for the period after 1948 were possible. But by assuming falling prices as commodities became more plentiful and assuming increasing exports to America, they estimated a deficit in the neighborhood of $22.7 billion in trade with the Americas during the four years (1948-1951, inclusive). A surplus of payments with the rest of the world would leave the participating countries with a deficit of $19.8 billion. This included a deficit of $1.7 billion in 1951, as low an estimate as the experts felt could be honestly defended.[32]

The American government, feeling that a satisfactory outcome of the conference was unlikely and knowing that the economic situation was rapidly deteriorating in France, Italy and Britain, urged participating governments to authorize

[31] Clayton's seven-point summary of American "conditions" was given to the press by Sir Oliver Franks. *New York Times,* September 3, 1947.

[32] In the final report, the four-year deficit was given as $22.44 billion, of which $3.13 billion was assumed to be financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more positive steps of self-help and mutual aid. Meanwhile, it was hoped that the Paris conferees would draw up a preliminary report by September 21, giving the main lines of policy for future discussion. Thus an improved report might be ready in skeleton form by November and in complete form for presentation to Congress in December. The French government wanted early agreement on a report, even if presented as preliminary; otherwise the impression would be given that the conference had been a failure. The British government was much disturbed at the possibility of postponing final action; this would give opportunity for critics to do harm. It suggested that some reassuring statement be issued in Washington to restore confidence and indicate that the Committee would be allowed to complete its work without external pressure. The United States was unable, however, to endorse the report as it stood. Any optimistic comments not only would be contrary to fact, but might also "take the heat off" the conferees and have a harmful effect in the United States.

The American representatives in Paris urged the Executive Committee to postpone calling the whole conference together until the report could be rephrased so as to indicate its preliminary or tentative character. The members of the Executive Committee felt that such action was politically impossible, but were willing to designate the report as "provisional in some respects," not implying that it was to be replaced by a new report. They were also ready to make certain adjustments short of major policy decisions by their governments. They felt that there was no possibility of agreeing on an integrated plan involving an over-all agency to regulate basic economic activities, although consultations to review progress would be possible. A British diplomat remarked that some people in the American government seemed to favor a directed economy. The American representatives thought that such an opinion was held only by a few, and urged their own government to drop the proposal for allocations, which might lead to interminable arguments or to international cartels.

The Americans consulting with the Executive Committee suggested six specific changes which would make the report acceptable to the American government:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1) a statement of obligation to attain production targets for key commodities;
(2) assurance of early action to restore financial stability;
(3) commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate intra-European trade barriers;
(4) segregation of capital items which could be financed without American aid;
(5) postponement of formal conference until September 20;
(6) firm commitment to form a multilateral organization with power to review performance.[33]

In the Executive Committee the Benelux representative proposed that the report be further considered during the coming week and then issued as a "first report". The Americans concurred in this suggestion in order to keep the group moving as rapidly as possible in the direction of their basic objectives and to give home governments time to reconsider their policies. The Conference voted to postpone its final session until September 20 or 22. There were reports of a "small revolt" against British leadership. Most countries were said to be willing to comply with American suggestions. Four of the six points were adopted with little difficulty. The American representatives were willing to accept an agreement to set up a merely consultative central organization. They were unable to get a commitment for elimination of trade barriers, but finally thirteen countries agreed to set up a Customs Union Study Group. The British were to consult the Dominions in regard to lowering trade barriers in Western Europe. The document they had been working on for two months was to be called an "initial report", allowing for the possibility of supplementary reports. The chairman was authorized to call the conference together again if further action were found necessary.

The American representatives congratulated the members of the Conference on accomplishing their difficult task in such a limited time and on having blazed a new path in the history of Europe. But the American government was somewhat disturbed that the Conference was to adjourn without

[33] *New York Times,* September 13 and 14, 1947. These points are substantially the same as the earlier seven "conditions". *Ibid.,* September 3, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

definite provision for continuance of its work. The Executive Committee was invited to Washington for consultations, but it was suggested that it keep its technical staff as small as possible, so as not to detract from the Secretary's statement about European initiative. The principal reasons for further action were to revise the balance-of-payments estimates and to set up a central organization in order to back up the Department's request to Congress for interim aid. In the end, the State Department made its own estimate of Europe's needs, reducing the maximum to $17 billion. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation was established in April 1948 as the central review and consultative agency for the sixteen countries and the western zones of Germany, in the fulfillment of the European Recovery Program.

To summarize: the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in a joint assessment of resources and needs simplified the task of American leadership, but did not eliminate all political problems. French fear of German resurgence was overcome by safeguards for legitimate French interests. Later American pressure for European integration brought British resistance. This did not prove fatal to the Program because the State Department was willing to compromise on its most advanced proposals. The important thing was to impress Congress and the American people with Western Europe's determination to make the best use of American assistance. To do this, the American government believed that the European Recovery Program must have the following features:

(1) The amount of American aid expected must be within reasonable limits.
(2) A definite time limit must be set.
(3) Europe's needs must be stated in concrete terms, mostly definite commodities and equipment items available in the United States.
(4) Participating countries must take immediate and effective measures to check inflation.
(5) There must be assurance of effective use of aid to be given.
(6) The participating countries must be willing to give and receive aid to and from one another.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There were grounds for questioning the validity of some of these specifications. The CEEC financial experts pointed out that estimating Europe's needs for more than a year in advance was largely a matter of guesswork. Fixing a date when international payments would be balanced was even more precarious. Nevertheless, the Europeans had to accept the American position on these two points. In regard to sources of supply, the United States was willing to permit a limited amount of "off-shore procurement". What Europe needed most was "free dollars" to purchase its necessities in any part of the world. But the outcome of the British loan had made the Americans wary of trying to fill an apparently bottomless pit—the world's need of dollars. The American government also rejected a proposal for building up European bank reserves.[34] All participants agreed to immediate measures to check inflation. Unfortunately these often included restriction of imports from other participants. The later agreement on intra-European payments, with limited support from American funds (conditional aid), reduced somewhat the barriers hampering European monetary exchange.

The most serious questions were raised regarding American proposals for removal of trade barriers and for establishment of a central recovery organization. Removal of all trade barriers and establishment of a customs union were changes too great to be adopted in a few weeks. The cautious recommendations of the Study Group were never put into effect. The American authorities themselves were not agreed on the functions of the proposed central organization; they accepted an Organization for European Economic Cooperation with merely advisory powers. Yet these two proposals in the CEEC report may prove in the end to be the most important. The OEEC became the seedbed of European integration. It brought about the establishment of the European Payments Union and reduction of trade restrictions. And now some of its member governments are considering a common market and a free trade area.

The third and final stage in Marshall's strategy, winning

[34] The State and Treasury Departments discussed this proposal; any chance it might have had was ruined by Bevin's tactless reference to Fort Knox gold. *New York Times*, September 3 and 4, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public and Congressional support for the European Recovery Program, cannot be fully described here.[35] After revising the Paris report in consultation with certain members of the CEEC, the State Department sent its recommendations to Congress where they were given full consideration by House and Senate committees. Although leaders of public opinion, including prominent business men and journalists, quickly came to the support of the proposal, the general public remained averse or indifferent until early 1948. The Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) apparently tipped the balance toward the plan. In April, polls indicated that a majority of the citizens favored the new policy, including two thirds of those who knew something about it. Marshall could not have forseen the Soviet reactions to his moves. But by having a plan ready he could take advantage of Stalin's errors and bring public opinion to a decision before the European situation became critical. By taking the initiative in 1947, he avoided a policy of " too little and too late " in 1948.

WILLIAM C. MALLALIEU

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

[35] A condensed account, based on State Department public opinion studies, is given in *British Reconstruction and American Policy, 1945-1955,* by William C. Mallalieu (New York, 1956), pp. 62-64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"DISCORDANT PARTIES"

A STUDY OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF PARTY BY ENGLISHMEN *

I

WHEN and in what way was party accepted by Englishmen as an inevitable and necessary development in a popular government? Two rather general answers may be suggested. First of all, increasing numbers during the long reign of George III took party for granted and regarded it as respectable. That period stretches between the publication of Edmund Burke's famous definition and defense of party in 1770, in *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents,* and John Cam Hobhouse's equally well-known invention of the phrase "His Majesty's opposition" in the House of Commons in 1826 six years after the death of the old king.[1] The political groups of that period lacked much that distinguishes those of the present day such as discipline and organization based on a nation-wide electorate. Yet, as Sir Lewis Namier has reminded us, the closed arena of the eighteenth-century parliament dominated by court and country contained the forerunners of modern parties in its center.[2]

Secondly, investigation of the two centuries before Burke's work appeared reveals that some commentators and a larger number of participants in English political life had realized the existence of parties, had accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm or fatalism the rôle of parties in a free state, and had developed theories about their function and to a lesser degree their control. These men, it should be emphasized, were many fewer than those who condemned party and faction, advocated uniformity of opinion and praised nonpartisan public service. The latter are well known to all students

* The title "Discordant Parties" is taken from a writer in *Applebee's Journal* in 1723. See note 74.

1 Hobhouse, later Lord Brougham. See note 20.

2 Lewis B. Namier, *Monarchy and the Party System* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 29-30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of English history. The former deserve some further consideration.

The subject of party is vast and controversial. Definition of the limits of any study is essential. This paper concerns only concepts and recognition. No attempt will be made to touch upon some most interesting and important aspects of party history. Monarchs and ministers commonly practiced, though with varying degrees of success, the management of public opinion and of deliberative assemblies. The maneuvers of Charles II, the Earl of Danby and Sir Robert Walpole and the intricacies of connections in the days of Anne, the Pelhams and George III are enormously interesting, and details about them illuminate the periods in which they took place, but such descriptions would serve only to confuse the present more general discussion. Nor are the listings and statistical analyses of cliques, gangs, cabals and connections or the kaleidescopic changes in parliamentary groups relevant.[3] Attention will be focused upon a developing public consciousness of party and some degree of resignation to its existence.

For this purpose the printed and reasonably accessible material has been searched. Investigation of manuscript collections might well uncover other reflections and judgments on party, but the obvious and available sources utilized here sufficiently document concepts current in the two centuries considered. Those records have been parliamentary debates, pamphlets purporting to discuss party history, essays and treatises upon government including the governments of other countries and periods, most notably the states of the ancient world, and observations by foreigners on English institutions and customs.

By way of preliminary to an account of the acceptance of party, the opposite and commoner attitude will be briefly illustrated. Some evidence will then be offered to support

[3] On such aspects of party history see, among others: W. C. Abbott, "The Origin of English Political Parties", *American Historical Review*, XXIV (1919), 578-602; Andrew Browning, *Danby* (Glasgow, 1951); Robert Walcott, *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1956); Keith Feiling, *History of the Tory Party* (Oxford, 1924); J. B. Owen, *The Rise of the Pelhams* (London, 1957); L. B. Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London, 1930), *Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London, 1929), and others.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the statement that party and opposition had become respectable during the reign of George III. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to an examination of the opinions of some seventeenth-century politicians and lastly to the comments and reflections of men of the eighteenth century on party and faction in England.

II

Englishmen of all sorts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries deplored party and expatiated in speeches, pamphlets and histories on the evils of faction. The parliamentarians were self-confessed supporters of ancient English liberties; the Cavaliers, of equally sacrosanct laws and establishments. The Whigs and their predecessors denied that they were party men; only their opponents were guilty of partisanship in supporting popery and arbitrary government. On the other side the Tories reiterated endlessly charges that the Whigs created discord, promoted faction, sought court preferment and ignored the true voice of the country. Unity was an ideal, uniformity a discipline and a bulwark of security. Good men, "men to no faction sworn", should find it easy to agree on measures to ensure the well-being of their country. Heresies in religion led to anarchy in the state. Factions among politicians provided opportunities for the increase of tyranny. Management by ministers led to a decline in public spirit. Combinations among citizens might foment conspiracy and strife.

Bolingbroke, in *A Dissertation upon Parties* (1734) and *The Spirit of Patriotism* (c. 1740), combined all sorts of arguments against party and sought to show that his own coterie represented the true patriots, the country, the disinterested. He never convincingly presented a picture of the partyless state. Modern politicians both in England and America have been known to suggest that their opponents were ambitious for power, unscrupulous about methods, and desirous only of forwarding the interest of a clique or faction. By contrast they have claimed to support policy above party and dictated only by the needs of the country. The importance of condemnation of party in any period may be exaggerated. The sincerity of detractors may be doubted. Use and abuse of terms may lack precision. It might be well for those em-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phasizing their superiority to partisan politics to recall that, though our own age more than any perhaps has developed the one-party or more properly the partyless state, it has little to boast of in its achievement.

Long ago Jonathan Swift described with merciless clarity the utopia of the Horses and the conditions among them whose great maxim was, Gulliver observed, to cultivate reason. "Neither is reason among them a point of problematical as with us, where men can argue with plausibility on both sides of a question; but strikes you with immediate conviction, as it must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured or discoloured by passion and interest." "I remember," Gulliver continued, "it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word 'opinion', or how a point could be disputed, because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain." In the state of the Houyhnyms,

> Every fourth year, at the vernal equinox, there is a representative council of the whole nation, which meets in a plain about twenty miles from our house, and continues five or six days. Here they enquire into the state and condition of the several districts, whether they abound or be deficient in hay or oats, or cows, or Yahoos; and wherever there is a want (which is but seldom) it is immediately supplied by unanimous consent and contribution.[4]

Swift ridiculed everyone. His noble animals suggest as much of the irrational and fantastic as his miserable Yahoos. Halifax, the great trimmer, deplored party more soberly and the "martial law" it maintained in times of peace.[5] Sir William Temple left public life admittedly because he could not escape party strife.[6] Bolingbroke's Patriot King was to be above party himself and to unite the whole country under his rule.[7] This was cited as late as 1779 by a writer who argued that with George III on the throne party strife no

[4] Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels* (Oxford, 1904), pp. 253, 256.

[5] *The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax*, ed. W. Raleigh (Oxford, 1912), pp. 25-26.

[6] William Temple, *Works* (London, 1770), II, 537.

[7] Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *A Dissertation upon Parties*, in *The Craftsman* (London, 1784), *passim*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

longer was of use or significance.[8] James Burgh in his *Political Disquisitions* (1774) declared in no uncertain terms—though the emphasis betrays awareness of other attitudes—that "it is an old and a vulgar error that opposition and party are necessary in a free state."[9] John Adams writing about 1780 averred that there was nothing he dreaded so much as a division of the rising new republic into two great parties, each under its leader and concentrating its fire upon the other. He wrote: "This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil in our constitution."[10] George Washington voiced similar sentiments. Admonitions of this kind were constantly in the minds of the makers of the American Constitution, though theory and practice have not always kept pace with each other and it may be entirely desirable that this is the case.

Defending his country in 1786 against prophets of gloom in England and elsewhere, Benjamin Franklin brushed aside talk of parties and discords. "Such will exist wherever there is liberty; and perhaps they help to preserve it."[11] Political light is obtained by the collision of different sentiments when all aim at the public good. Adams nearly thirty years later admitted the inevitability of division.

> The same parties which now agitate the United States have existed through all time. Whether the power of the people or that of the ruler should prevail were questions which kept . . . Greece and Rome in eternal convulsions. . . . The terms of whig and tory . . . denote the temper and constitution of mind of different individuals.[12]

Nevertheless he failed to suggest any remedy for those excesses he continued to bemoan. James Madison, however, recognizing both the existence of party and the greater mis-

[8] *A Short History of the Opposition* (London, 1779), B. M. pressmark 1051 (1) of the *Idea of a Patriot King* (London, 1749), p. 148.

[9] James Burgh, *Political Disquisitions* (London, 1775), III, 331.

[10] *The Works of John Adams,* ed. Charles F. Adams (New York, 1854), IX, 511.

[11] Verner W. Crane, "Franklin's 'The Internal State of America 1786'", *William and Mary Quarterly,* April 1958, XV, 214-227.

[12] *The Correspondence of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Paul Wilstach (Indianapolis, 1925), p. 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chief of attempting its suppression, sought to control the effects of the warring interests by constitutional expedients.[13] What chiefly distinguishes the English and American patterns of party behavior and theory is in the persistence of these checks and balances in the Republic and in the absence of any formal control in the Monarchy. In some ways England has developed more drastically from an eighteenth-century qualified recognition of party to a powerful party system than has America. The praise, moreover, that has been bestowed on party and on healthy political rivalry during the past century has come largely from English rather than from American commentators.

III

Though Englishmen have imagined a good many utopian chimeras, they have also throughout their history accepted the hard facts of political life as flatly and as realistically as they have endured weather, individual eccentricity and criticism from abroad. Edmund Burke absolutely denied the validity of prejudices current in his day and vividly described by himself in 1756. The idea, for example, that loyalty to a party involved a degree of servitude to which no worthy man could submit was absurd. No statesman could implement policy without a connection. Burke's definition of party must be quoted once more:

> Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principles in which they are all agreed. . . . It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out the proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect . . . without the proscription of others, they are bound to give their own party the preference in all things . . . such will easily be distinguished from the lean and interested struggle for place and emolument.

[13] James Madison, *The Federalist*, No. X, *passim;* and see Douglass Adair, "Hume and the Tenth Federalist", *Huntington Library Quarterly*, August 1957, XX, 343-360. See also Geoffrey Marshall, "David Hume and Political Scepticism", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 4, July 1954, pp. 247-257. Marshall claims that Hume preceded Burke in acceptance of party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Radicals like Mrs. Macaulay and Joseph Priestley disliked Burke's acceptance of the fact of party. The *Present Discontents* confirmed their earlier misgivings about the quality of the Irishman's whiggery. Like Burgh they refused to believe in the inevitability of divisions.[14]

Yet, before another half-century had gone, Burke's view prevailed. Mirabeau when he visited England in the eighties noticed the respectability of the leaders of the opposition.[15] Edward Gibbon in his "General Observations on the Fall of Rome" was careful to indicate that "Party-Spirit, however pernicious or absurd, is a principle of union as well as of dissension."[16] Lady Holland, writing her memoirs between 1794 and 1811, took for granted her husband's attendance at court, for, "if a man is in opposition he opposes the Ministers and government not the King personally."[17] Her husband, Henry Vassel, third Baron Holland and nephew of Charles James Fox, defended "the necessity of a well connected or party government in a limited monarchy and popular constitution."[18] Bertrand de Moleville in a long history of England written before 1816 wrote to the same effect:

> There is still, however, and there ever must be, an opposition party in the parliament as the only means to maintain the full confidence and submission of the nation to the decision of these assemblies; but there is not less loyalty among the members of the opposition, or rather the antagonists of the matter though they style themselves whigs, than among their opponents though they are called tories.[19]

14 Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, 1770 (Morley's Universal Library, London, n.d.), p. 98. *Cf. A Vindication of Natural Society* in *Works* (Boston, 1826), I, 54-57. Frank Thomas Herbert Fletcher suggests that Burke was ironic in the *Vindication* and that his mentor on party was Montesquieu. *Montesquieu and English Politics* (London, 1939), pp. 166-167. See note 62 *infra*.

15 Mirabeau, *Letters* (Engl. tr., London, 1832), p. 200.

16 Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*—the "General Observations" follow chapter 38.

17 *Lady Holland's Journal*, ed. Lord Ilchester (London, 1908), p. 253.

18 Henry Vassel, Lord Holland, *Memoirs of the Whig Party* (London, 1852), II, 85.

19 A. F. Bertrand de Moleville, *History of Great Britain* (Eng. tr., London, 1818), III, 396. Thomas Somerville accepts a two-party pattern in English history of the late seventeenth century. *The History of Political Transactions and of Parties* (London, 1792).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Czar Alexander observed in 1814 that he had long decided that an opposition was an excellent thing for Englishmen. It needed only Lord Broughton's epithet to pass out of controversy in England altogether. In April 1826 in a debate about the salary of an official, Hobhouse (not yet a peer) opposed the statement that an adverse vote would be hard on the government by suggesting that the reverse would be much harder on "His Majesty's Opposition". Tierney, a colleague, praised the term. He could not, he said, "have invented a better phrase, for we are certainly to all intents and purposes a branch of his Majesty's Government." [20]

Such testimony reveals a recognition of the right of resistance to official policies and along with this the respectability of combining to defeat or to implement measures. With the enlargement of the franchise to a nation-wide electorate, party extended its discipline to organize numbers rather than connections. The ministers were to be controlled by popular opinion channeled into convenient parties rather than themselves to attempt the regimentation of their noble friends and active associates in the Houses of Parliament. The old trinity of King, Lords, Commons had been changing out of all recognition during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was now to discover that the people, whose name they had so often invoked, were indeed their sovereign. But the whole English constitution was arranged so that men might quarrel, declared Lord Balfour.[21] The English genius is for conflict, a more recent writer has maintained, and expresses itself in the battle of parties.[22] Walter Bagehot claimed that party was of the essence of the House of Commons as he knew it, which lived "in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. Therefore party is inherent in it, is bone of its bone, breath of its breath." [23] Party has become praise-

[20] J. C. Hobhouse, Lord Broughton, *Recollections of a Long Life* (London, 1909), I, 145; Czar's remark in 1814, III, 129-130. On debate see Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1827, new series XV, 135-149.

[21] Quoted in C. B. R. Kent, *Early History of the Tories* (London, 1908), p. 2.

[22] Roy Jenkins and Henry Fairlie, "A Genius for Compromise", *Encounter*, London, March 1956, No. 30, pp. 5-18—the thesis of Fairlie, pp. 12-13.

[23] Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (Oxford, 1927), p. 125.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worthy. According to Graham Wallas, it is "the most effective political entity in the modern national state . . . the most vigorous attempt which has been made to adapt the form of our political institutions to the actual facts of human nature." [24]

IV

The enthusiasm of a Bagehot or a Wallas contrasts very vividly with the elusive and guarded acceptance of party in earlier centuries even though historians then and since have been known to regard party as an early and persistent phenomenon of English life. Some eighteenth-century writers traced the ancestry of Whig and Tory, for example, to the divisions between regal and popular interests they discovered in the Middle Ages.[25] Others discovered in the religious differences of the sixteenth century the forerunners of later factions.[26] Many looked to the disputes of Roundheads and Cavaliers as the earliest manifestations of party distinctions. Others again saw their origin in the latter years of the reign of Charles II. It seems likely that, in earlier as in later political wrangles, cliques and coteries attempted concerted efforts to control or to oppose specific policies, but evidence remains sparse and unsatisfactory, before the seventeenth century. By that time, certainly, statesmen were aware of variety not only in religious but in political ideas and men were realizing the importance of organization and publicity. Parties were distinguished by names and interests as well as by seating arrangements in the House of Commons. Before the century ended, English party divisions were being compared to those of Florence and ancient Rome, and some men at least saw in them an explanation of the maintenance of English liberty and of English representative institutions.[27]

Evidence multiplies after the meeting of the Long Parliament in November 1640. Before that time it is scanty but interesting. Sir John Neale has discovered a "choir" of

[24] Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (London, 1919), p. 8.

[25] For example, William Cowper, "An Impartial Account of Parties", in John Campbell, *Lives of the Lord Chancellors* (London, 1846), IV, 427.

[26] Mirabeau, *Letters*, I, 256.

[27] See notes below and *cf.* Gilbert Smythe, *A Memorial* (London, 1815).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politicians in the days of Elizabeth I.[28] At the end of the great queen's reign Hayward Townshend noticed the obstructionists in the Commons seated then, as now, to the left of the speaker, or, as he put it as a member facing the chair, "in the rebellious corner in the right-hand of the house."[29] Lord Bacon observed the turbulent spirits of the next reign and noted the groups which they formed. He identified "popular" and "opposite" in a way familiar to all students of the latter half of the century. A memorandum of advice to the King reveals understanding of the relationship of monarch and party. The opposition of the last Parliament is almost dissolved: Yelverton, won; Sandes, fallen off; Crew and Hyde to be sergeants; Nevill with hopes, and Martin with money. They cannot but feel more and more the vanity of the popular course, "specially your Majesty having carried yourself in that princely temper towards them, as not to persecute or disgrace them, nor yet to use or advance them."[30] This is not very different in tone from Lord Cowper's advice to George I or that of the author of the *Mischief of Cabals* to Charles II. This last advised the King to balance factions and encourage emulation among them:

> Besides when a prince has several factions, whether religious or civil in his dominions, as protestant and papal, guelf and gibelline, which he cannot easily reconcile, in his interest, by employing them indifferently according to their parts and loyalty to keep the balance as equallibration [*sic*]: that while they are at enmity among themselves, they shall have no aversion to him . . . and shall strive to outdo each other in service.[31]

On the eve of the Long Parliament Charles lacked any adviser of Bacon's wisdom but the "opposite side" was being organized by John Pym and his friends. Both Pym and

[28] John Neale, *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559-1581* (London, 1953), pp. 91-92.

[29] Marjorie B. Blatcher and A. F. Pollard, "Hayward Townshend Journals", *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,* June 1934, No. 34, III, 1-31, 20.

[30] Francis Bacon, *Works,* ed. James Spedding *et al.* (London, 1869), IV, 370, V, 181-188.

[31] *The Mischief of Cabals* (London, 1684), p. 26. For Lord Cowper see note 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hampden are said to have ridden up and down the country during elections to stir up support for their associates [32] and to have discussed strategy in a house in Westminster. That theirs was among the "partie or sides" in the Commons referred to by William Chillingworth in December 1641 cannot be doubted though the minister was roundly rebuked for his scandalous allegations.[33] Clarendon thought that demonstrations by the London crowd in this same period were engineered by Pym to bolster claims made in the name of the "people of England": it was certainly in part to discourage such tumultuous assemblies that Charles II kept guards at Whitehall after his restoration in 1660. With the outbreak of civil war in 1642, though divisions in the country multiplied, it becomes impossible to talk of political parties as such, civil commotions having changed to military contests. The war and the anarchy were to strengthen arguments for uniformity, while the accompanying freedom of speech, press and experiment encouraged the habit of diversity.

One of the services of the Protector was to tolerate this diversity that the age had produced. A government could stand "paper-shot", he argued, against demands of others for a new censorship.[34] Milton's admiration for Oliver was due in part to this sturdy indifference to criticism. Andrew Marvell who helped Milton in the secretary's office watched the conflicts and the peace imposed among different kinds of people by a ruler strong enough to maintain a balance. His lines to Cromwell present very clearly a picture of the workings of mixed or balanced government:

> The Commonwealth does through their Centers all
> Draw the Circumfrence of the publique Wall;
> The crossest Spirits here do take their part,
> Fast'ning the Contignation which they thwart;
> And they, whose Nature leads them to divide,
> Uphold, this one, and that the other Side;
> But the most Equal still sustain the Height,

[32] Thomas Carlyle, "An Election", in *Works—Critical and Miscellaneous Essays* (London, 1888), III, 437.

[33] *The Journal of Simond D'Ewes,* ed. Willson Coates (New Haven, 1942), pp. 232-233.

[34] Thomas Burton, *Diary,* ed. J. T. Rutt (London, 1828), I, cxliv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> And they as Pillars keep the Work upright;
> Where the resistance of opposed Minds,
> The Fabric with Arches stronger binds,
> Which on the Basis of a Senate free,
> Knit by the Roofs Protecting weight agree.[35]

In this picture the patriot Protector does not abolish variety but knits together divergent elements in a stronger structure.

While Cromwell ruled, James Harrington wrote and published in 1656 his *Oceana*, a plan which the great man might be induced to consider and perhaps to implement. Many of the constitutional devices he advocated were to be supported by his disciples as measures of security against both tyranny and the anarchy of faction. Nevertheless Harrington quite specifically defended the right to form parties in opposition to government. No one, he maintained, is truly a commonwealthsman who excludes any party. Force may be necessary to suppress conspirators against the state but under ordinary circumstances in a free country party must be allowed.[36]

References to party in the sixties after the return of Charles II were generally of a derogatory nature. The " old gang ", the " court ", the " presbyterians ", the " country " were noted by the diarist Milward.[37] Marvell, who served for Hull for twenty years, described the pattern of the Commons in his *Last Instructions* written in 1667. The opposing sides of the House were compared to those of a game like chess or backgammon:

> Draw next a Pair of Tables, op'ning then
> The *House of Commons,* clatt'ring like the Men.
> Describe the *Country* and *Country,* both set right,
> On opposite points, the black against the white.[38]

Different sides and parties were again referred to by Marvell in a letter written in 1670 [39] to his favorite nephew William

[35] Andrew Marvell, *Poems,* ed. H. M. Margoliouth (London, 1954), p. 105.

[36] James Harrington, *Oceana* (London, 1737), p. 74.

[37] *The Diary of John Milward, 1666-1668,* ed. Caroline Robbins (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 100, 266 (Cavalier); 20, 21, 25, 29, 47, 320 (court); 127, 153, 221, 230 (Dissenters, etc.); 128, 16 (" old gang and old Parliament gang ").

[38] Marvell, *Poems,* "Last Instructions ", p. 143.

[39] Marvell, *Letters,* ed. H. M. Margoliouth (Oxford, 1954), p. 305, 28 Nov. 1670.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Popple about the defection of some members who, when the *Last Instructions* was composed, had been leaders of the opposition to the court.[40] The King was at this time applying himself to management as Clarendon had done earlier though with more blatancy and frankness. The Chancellor had, since he well knew the suspicion Parliament entertained of such maneuvers, taken care to gather his coterie together privily. After his fall the Cavaliers met to draw up a program, and Lord Sandwich preserved it in his notes.[41] The enemies of Arlington had organized and produced manifestos which they scattered in the Parliament house "to relieve the King and rescue him from his ministers."[42] Yet the Commons continued to resent references to "sides in its midst." Sir Thomas Meres made such a reference in February 1672-3, speaking "of this side of the house and that side", and he was criticized for "his labour to make some distinction in the House between country gentlemen and courtiers, whereas there were none nor ought to be none."[43]

In 1665 and in 1675 unsuccessful attempts were made to impose an oath against all alterations in church and state. On both occasions the debates became warm. On the earlier, the old Earl of Southampton helped to secure the defeat of such an oath by his declaration that he by no means wished to live under a government like that of the Medes and the Persians.[44] Had the oath passed, loyal opposition to any government policy as well as all reform movements would have been constitutionally impossible. The idea of a public stand against alterations persisted and was defended vehemently by Heneage Finch in 1675.

40 *Calendar of Venetian Papers,* ed. A. B. Hinds (London, 1939), No. 32, 27 March 1672.

41 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, in *Selections,* ed. G. Huehns (Oxford, 1955), p. 583. E. R. Harris, *Life of the Earl of Sandwich* (London, 1912), II, Appendices, F, pp. 311-312 (for meeting of Cavaliers), and G, pp. 313-317 (for Lord Sandwich on party).

42 *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, for Charles II* (London, 1897), 20 October 1669, vol. 266, No. 152, pp. 541-542.

43 Edward Deering, *Diary,* ed. Basil D. Henning (New Haven, 1940), pp. 128-29. See Anchitell Grey, *Debates* (London, 1763), II, 48, 51-53.

44 Caroline Robbins, "The Oxford Session of 1665", *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,* 1948, XXI, pp. 214-224—Treasurer, p. 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Away with those ill-meant Distinctions between the Court and the Country, between the Natural and the Politic capacity! And let all who go about to persuade others that there are two several Interests have a Care of that Precipice to which such Principles may lead them: for the first men that ever began to distinguish of their Duty never left off, till they had quite distinguished themselves out of their Allegiance.

Finch fiercely distrusted anything but uniformity; yet without some such difference, commented a contemporary, in the *Growth of Popery* (1677), "there would be no law nor reason left in England." [45]

England had developed a wide variety of opinions, William Penn pointed out in *England's Present Interest* in 1675. It was doubtful whether new ideas could be suppressed or prevented. Nor should a government where there are many minds, unless some one party "hath all the wisdom, wealth, number, sober life, industry and resolution," prefer one party and depress and deprive the rest. If this be attempted, hatred will be created; insecurity will increase. True wisdom would maintain a balance between parties who will owe their tranquillity to it and will return love and loyalty for it. "Many inquisitive men into humane affairs have thought that the concord of discords hath not been the infirmest basis government can rise or stand upon." Hannibal's army of many nations had less sedition and disturbance than the Roman legions that were only of one people. In nature all heat consumes, all cold kills; but "two degrees of cold to two of heat make a poise in elements and a balance in Nature." [46]

Whether regarded as beneficial or the reverse, differences between side and side deepened as the third decade of Charles's reign began. Whig and Tory (after 1680) fought over exclusion and came near to civil war rather than a balance of party in 1683. Their excesses led to a new burst of criticism of party. Temple's nonpartisan council failed. He refused compromise. Parties could agree, he thought, in nothing but to bring things to "the last extremity". The

[45] A. B. Grosart, *Works of Andrew Marvell* (London, 1875), IV, 307. *Lords Journal,* XIII, 38-39, 15 February 1676.

[46] William Penn, *England's Present Interest* (London, 1698), pp. 98-99, 100-102.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basis of good government was opinion, yet Temple saw no need to organize or marshal this nor did he realize the implications of unanimity.[47] Halifax more realistically admitted that it might be necessary in some emergencies to choose the less objectionable side, a precept he followed himself in 1688.[48]

The Revolution was the work of a coalition. Party played no rôle in it. The great majority of Englishmen desired simply the removal or incapacitation of a man whose religion they disliked and whose arbitrary and unconstitutional acts they feared. Thereafter, however, the Whig theorists could provide a rationale for resistance to tyranny where the Tories were at a loss for logical justification. Neither could claim their party had won but the one party could then regard the event as entirely consonant with their principles as the other could not. Parliamentary government was now assured and the limitation of monarchy made plain. The very agreement over so much of the settlement that was achieved encouraged the development of party since, as John Trenchard was to write a quarter of a century later, party worked more smoothly when differences are not great; shears cut best when closest together.[49]

Yet the success of the Revolution discouraged innovators and critics of a now generally admired "liberty" and seemed to increase the emphasis on uniformity on the established pattern. The opponents of measures put forward by William and his ministers were dubbed Jacobites—that is, friendly to the King across the water—or commonwealthsmen —that is, supposed proponents of principles that might upset property and order and bring back the anarchy of mid-century.[50] It took courage for the author of *The State of*

47 See note 6 *supra*.

48 See note 5. In 1688 after vainly attempting compromise to save James as he had saved his inheritance in the Exclusion struggle earlier, Halifax took a leading part in negotiations with William.

49 *Cato's Letters* (originally published in the *London Journal* by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, London, 1721-1723—ed. cited, 1733), III, 157.

50 *Letters of the Earl of Shaftesbury to Robert Viscount Molesworth* (London, 1721), p. xv (Introduction by John Toland), "Jacobite" for opposition Whigs. On necessity of uniformity see William Hay, "Essay on Government", in *Works* (London, 1794), I, 85; Anthony Ellys, *Tracts on Liberty* (London, 1763), pp. 116-182, "A Plea for Sacremental Test"; and Thomas Burnett, *An Essay on Government* (London, 1716), pp. 28-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Parties in 1692 to admit that Whigs and Tories would both be loyal, though he tempered this by commonplace reflections upon the evils of faction.[51] Robert Molesworth in his *Account of Denmark* forcefully put forward a moral story for the times of a country ruled by an absolute monarch where there were no seditions, mutinies or libels. The result as he pictured it was stagnation, poverty and submission. He wrote:

> The vast convenience to any Prince of having all his subjects of one Opinion is visible in Denmark; where there are no Factions, nor Disputes about Religion which usually have a great influence on any Government; but all are of one mind as to the way of salvation and as to the duty they owe the Sovereign. This cuts off occasion of rebellion and mutiny from many who otherwise would desire it.

All the clocks he noticed in Copenhagen chimed in unison with the Palace clock.[52] Whatever Molesworth's fears about uniformity were, they were not justified in the event. Party and faction continued to enliven the English scene.

V

Between the Revolution and the early years of the reign of George III the virtue of party strife was remarked on by two foreign observers of the English scene. Englishmen continued to criticize faction, but also with increasing frequency to point out the value of dissidence in politics, the criminality of being neutral when important issues were to be decided, the importance of securing the balance or equilibrium in the constitution, and the fact that party was both the effect and the support of liberty. Certain practical politicians continued to manifest resignation to party or acceptance of its functions in a popular government. There were parties in England. These were not simply Whigs and Tories, though most Englishmen called themselves by one or the other name, and many made it a matter of importance if a change was to be effected, as when the younger son in *Waverley* decided to abandon belief in passive obedience and go into the city.

[51] "The State of Parties", 1692, reprinted in William Cobbett, *Parliamentary History* (London, 1809), V, Appendix 5.

[52] Robert Molesworth, *Account of Denmark* (London, 1694), pp. 250-251.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There were connections, interests and groups of many kinds. Principles became confused, and at times the Tories seemed the popular and the Whigs the authoritarian faction. At all times the simplest division might be between those in and those out of office, though no one discussed the virtue or the reverse of a two-party system. There were many more than two and they were not systematic.

Nevertheless party existed. Cowper, as already noted, advised the first George about the virtues of the Whigs as contrasted with Tories but he was careful to urge moderation to men of both sides. "Whichever party shall have the lower degree of His Majesty's trust ought nevertheless to be used by those in power with very great tenderness and affection." [53] Lady Cowper noticed with satisfaction that George had learned his lesson well and kept her husband's manuscript always by him.[54] Hervey and Queen Caroline talked about the opposition gathered round her much-disliked son and heir, and agreed that this association would at least clear these politicians of the imputation of Jacobitism.[55] Lord Chancellor Hardwicke deplored a public and declared opposition, yet admitted the resistance rights of the people, and held a just idea of the value of connection even when vulgarly called by the "odious name of faction".[56] Speaker Onslow's attitude was similar, though he distinguished between selfish faction and opposition from principle! [57] Thomas Pownall saw in "true" party divisions and contests a mechanism of necessary change, while he deplored all trivial differences.[58]

The advantages of party in England were noticed by for-

53 Cowper, in Campbell, *op. cit.*, IV, 427.

54 *Lady Mary Cowper's Diary, 1714-1720* (London, 1864), p. 32.

55 *Memoirs of John, Lord Hervey,* ed. Romney Sedgwick (London, 1931), III, 679-681.

56 Philip C. Yorke, *Life of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke* (Cambridge, 1913), III, 496, 515. In *The Reply of the Country Gentleman* (London, 1752), the author defends the "connection with a minister" and boasts he is proud to wear a "livery".

57 Onslow Manuscripts, *Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports* (London, 1895), XIV, 458-573, Appendix 9. Note especially pp. 460-461 on opposition and 469 on "both parties".

58 Thomas Pownall, *Principles of Polity* (London, 1752), Dialogue I, *passim.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eign observers. Like Trenchard and other commentators they also remarked on the similarities of moderate Whigs and moderate Tories, though "Cato" was inclined at times to exaggerate the simplicity of differences.[59] Rapin-Thoyras published a dissertation on the Whigs and the Tories in the early years of the reign of George I. It was translated in 1717 by Ozell and later appended to Nicholas Tindal's continuation of *The History of England*—until Hume's work, the standard authority. Rapin traced popular and regal divisions back to the Middle Ages. He was careful to distinguish between the extreme and the moderate Royalists, the republicans and the parliament men of the seventeenth century, and he commented upon the closeness of center groups. His account of accusations made by side and side against the other is eminently just. Evil though party animosities may be, he concluded, the different factions achieve a balance and prevent either extreme from winning.[60]

Some ten years after Rapin's dissertation, Caesar de Saussure made a tour of England and wrote letters describing his impressions. Like Rapin he noted the dissensions among politicians. "It is certain that this nation would be the happiest and most enviable in the world were it not divided by sects and different parties." After explaining the principles of Whigs and Tories he concluded with the reflection that, though many regard these parties as a misfortune, others on the contrary think they contribute to the maintenance and privilege of the people; for, say they, "were there in the country neither whig nor tory the tendencies of the court would be blindly followed . . . despotism would soon be established." On the other hand, if everyone followed the principles of the Whigs, the country would soon be in a state of anarchy. Numbers of prudent politicians who are not blinded by foolish prejudices or by their own particular interest are convinced that this form of government is the happiest in the world and they sometimes side purposely with the weakest party so as to preserve the country's whole-

[59] *Cato's Letters*, III, Nos. 80 and 96. See also *Party no Dependence* (London, 1713), p. 2; *A New Test of the Church of England's Loyalty* (London, 1702), p. 7. Alexander Pope felt he could pray for the "opposition" in 1715 —*Works*, ed. J. Wilson Croker (London, 1871), p. 19.

[60] Paul de Rapin Thoyras, *History of the Whigs and the Tories* (London, 1717), and *cf.* essay preface to *History of England* (London, 1732), pp. iv-vi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some equilibrium.[61] In somewhat similar vein Montesquieu declared:

> The hatred which arises between the two parties will always subsist, because it will always be important. These parties being composed of freemen, if the one becomes too powerful for the other, as a consequence of liberty this other is depressed; while the citizens take the weaker side, with the same readiness as the hands lend their assistance to remove the infirmities and disorders of the body.[62]

Bolingbroke and Hume were by all odds the most distinguished writers on party in the eighteenth century. The former argued that the old distinctions of Whig and Tory were no longer valid and endeavored to create, for the country party, the reputation of guardians of the liberties of the constitution reinforced by the Revolution of '88. Bolingbroke nowhere reflected upon the convenience or virtue or inevitability of party in a free state as some of his contemporaries did. Nor did he, like Trenchard, whose letter on the anachronisms of party names his argument followed, examine with any penetration the irrational element in factional strife. Trenchard in another of *Cato's Letters* dwelt on the fact that

> foolish causes often misguide and animate the Multitude. One may at any time gain an interest in a Mob with a barrel of beer, or without it, by means of a few odd sounds, that mean nothing or something very wild and wicked. Let any Party watchword be invented and pronounced in such a tone and such a posture, it soon becomes sacred and in the highest esteem.[63]

Bolingbroke displayed a dazzling wit in controversial writing. He was the most brilliant polemist of his age. He showed extraordinary acumen in his selection of a base for attack—his charge that Walpole sought to corrupt and divide. But it is, I think, exaggerating his contribution to suggest either that he developed a philosophy of conservatism or, more relevant in the present context, that he produced a rationale of opposition.

[61] C. de Saussure, *A Foreign View* (London, 1902), p. 35.

[62] Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (Hafner Library, New York, 1949), Bk. XIX, ch. 27, pp. 308-309.

[63] *Cato's Letters*, IV, 248.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In *A Dissertation upon Parties* Bolingbroke analyzed with some subtlety the three kinds of divisions in politics as in any way applicable to the existing situation in England. The first division or party could be found in that group which was angry with the government but wholeheartedly supported the constitution: its members, the members of the true country party, represented the nation seeking a king above faction and a parliament independent of corruption. The second party might—but he dismissed it as unlikely—be averse to both government and constitution. The third and his real target was a division or party supporting the government, that is, Walpole and his methods of manipulation and administration—and yet subversive of the true liberties of the constitution. Chievers, Charles V's minister, had corrupted, divided and thus weakened the old Spanish Cortes.[64]

This popularized and perpetuated for a generation or more Walpole's reputation for unscrupulous and interested political maneuvering. Hume on the other hand, in his two essays " Of Parties in General " and " Of the Parties of Great Britain " as well as elsewhere in his *History* and in his reflections upon government, though critical of the animosities and pettiness of party strife, nevertheless went straight to the heart of the matter. He saw in the government itself a source of division and party which no administration could avoid. The just balance between republican and monarchical parts was so extremely delicate and uncertain that different opinions even among persons of the best understanding were bound to arise.

> Those of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favorable sentiments of monarchy than men of bold and generous spirits, who are passionate lovers of liberty and think no evil comparable to subjection and slavery.

All agree to preserve the government; though some will incline to trust greater powers to the crown than others who are terrified of despotic power. Hume examined more carefully than Bolingbroke the statement that real differences

64 Viscount Bolingbroke, *A Dissertation upon Parties* (London, 1786): divisions, p. 137; Chievers, p. 226 and *passim*. On Bolingbroke and opposition, see Kurt Kluzen, *Das Problem der politischen Opposition* (Munich, 1956). I am very much indebted to Dr. Gerald Stourzh for help with this topic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between Whig and Tory were lost at the Revolution. He discovered that remnants of old Levellers and old Tories could be found, that curious combinations like that of Dissenter and Hanoverian Court, and country clergy and opposition existed, and he concluded that some "bias" in the constitution confused parties. Party was an extraordinary phenomenon baffling analysis. "To determine the nature of these parties", he wrote, "is perhaps one of the most difficult problems that can be met with, and is proof that history may contain questions as uncertain as any to be found in the most abstract sciences." [65]

The crime of neutrality was proclaimed by Solon, and his wisdom was to reinforce arguments for party loyalty, for taking sides, from Shaftesbury in his *Characteristicks* to Edward Montagu in his *Ancient Republics* (in spite of his rather commonplace criticism of party per se later in the same volume) [66] and Edmund Burke. The *New Opposition* pointed out that everyone should take one side or the other. Such action need not be regarded as disloyal. You may in fact betray the government you serve, help the one you oppose, and plenty of examples from England's history in the last hundred years may be produced to attest this. There is all the difference in the world between opposition led by honest men and patriots and factions led by seekers after personal aggrandizement only.[67]

The virtues of party were pointed out by writers from John Toland on through the century. Toland's *Art of Governing by Partys* (1701) was little more than a restatement of earlier complaints about the evils of Stuart corruption and divisions and an attack on a government he distrusted. In it he drew attention once again to the "peculiar sides and corners" of parties in the House of Commons.[68] But in *The*

65 David Hume, "Of Parties in General" and "Of the Parties of Great Britain", c. 1741-42, in *Essays* (World's Classics, London, 1903), pp. 54-74; quotations, pp. 63 and 68.

66 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (London, 1727), I, 90, 113; and see Edward Wortley Montagu, *Ancient Republics* (London, 1758), p. i.

67 *The New Opposition* (London, 1744), pp. 1-2, 56 and *passim*.

68 John Toland, *The Art of Governing by Partys* (London, 1701), p. 63; and *cf.* Cobbett, *op. cit.*, X (1804), 13 April 1738, for "Gentlemen over the Way" referred to thus in a debate over freedom of press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

State Anatomy of Great Britain, written about 1716, he developed an idea he had put forward in the *Memorial of the State of England* (1705) that a great variety in opinion was a certain sign of a free government.[69] "Every division", he wrote in *The State Anatomy*, "is not simply pernicious since parties in the state of like nature with heresies in the church, sometimes they make it better and sometimes they make it worse, but held in their bounds, they always keep it from stagnation."[70] Another writer about 1713 remarked that it was as well the Revolution had not destroyed parties.[71] Yet another boasted that the English were and would remain as various as their climate.[72] Walter Moyle in "An Essay on the Roman Government" asked with no doubts as to the answer, "who is there that would not prefer a factious liberty before a settled Tyranny?"[73] In May 1723 a writer in *Applebee's Journal* maintained that "discordant parties" were sometimes the safety of states.[74]

In the thirties when Bolingbroke was writing, the chorus about the inevitability of party swelled. Sectaries and parties must be expected where freedom and liberty prevail.[75] Though there was no inherent virtue in opposition as such, another reminded his readers, there can be no sense in trying to suppress all differences. "General opposition" should be avoided. But "to persuade us we are all of a party"—as Bolingbroke sought to do—"is only an artifice of party and of the warmest party-men as the best way of raising their own party . . . as to their distinction between a Court and a Country party, 'tis a distinction as old as men and government and will last as long."[76] Walpole's biographer, Archdeacon Coxe, reported the Prime Minister's denunciation of a Tory declaration that in a free country "Party is an essential

69 John Toland, *Memorial of the State of England* (London, 1705), p. 44.

70 London, 1717, preface, p. 2.

71 *Party no Dependence*, p. 2.

72 *The Political Sow-Gelder* (London, 1715).

73 *Works* (London, 1726), I, 112-114.

74 William Lee, *Daniel Defoe's Uncollected Writings* (London, 1869), p. 135, 18 May 1723, *Applebee's Journal*—Defoe's authorship uncertain.

75 *The Freeholder's Alarm to his Brethren* (London, 1734), p. 8, attributed to Henry Fielding?

76 *Opposition no Proof of Patriotism* (London, 1735), p. 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

requisite." [77] The sentiment was echoed and elaborated by Sandys, another member who in 1740 said that in absolute monarchies rebellion could be resorted to only for redress of grievances, whereas in England Parliament existed for this purpose.[78] Two or three years later a very learned antiquary, Edward Spelman, in prefacing *A Fragment out of the Sixth Book of Polybius*, outlined a comprehensive program of reform for England. In the course of his remarks he stated that parties in all free government ever will be the effect and support of liberty. He denied that party destroyed freedom. Liberty was diminished by extinguishing party and upsetting the balance preserved by it.[79]

The author of *Party Spirit in a Time of Public Danger Considered* (1756) declared that in times of tranquillity parties were useful and perhaps essential to the constitution, although if the country was threatened by a foreign enemy, divisions should be forgotten.[80] A tract of the same period was even more emphatically for party. "If ever there was any one governing principle in the affairs of this great Universe . . . it is the spirit of opposition." It provides a balance in political affairs. To the opposition between leaders of parties we are indebted for a spirit of jealousy which is ever watchful over the conduct of our administration. This kind of opposition by whatsoever motives inspired is the foundation upon which a great empire can be raised. In Rome trouble developed when the divisions between patricians and plebians were destroyed. A tranquil union of political sentiment among citizens inevitably brought weakness in its train. Liberty was ardent. Unanimity in Parliament was undesirable and would weaken it. Opposition ever inspired oratory and the author hoped would always continue criticism.[81]

77 William Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole* (London, 1798), I, 212. Walpole reproaches Wyndham and attacks Bolingbroke. It is not certain which he declares thinks party an "essential requisite."

78 *Ibid.*, p. 645. Also *cf. Some of the Factions detected by the Evidence of Facts* (London, 1743), p. 1; and a speech by Lord Hervey, in Cobbett, *op. cit.*, XI (1812), 50-51.

79 London, 1743, p. vi and *passim.*

80 London, 1756, p. 11.

81 *The Opposition* (London, 1755), pp. 1-12, and *cf.* James Marriott, *Political Considerations* (London, 1762), p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is not easy to disentangle distinctions between party, faction and opposition in the pamphlets of this period. Some writers, like Hume and Bolingbroke, differentiate party from faction in a manner derogatory to the latter. Others distinguish between faction or party and opposition, the design of the former being only to bring those who composed it into power, that of the latter being nothing more than obliging others to act right. Opposition, indeed, it was argued, was legalized in the right of subjects to petition the crown.[82] Some writers even began to treat the whole question of party flippantly. "In all governments which are in any degree popular, faction must take as necessarily and unavoidably a part as trumps do in the game of whist, but whether those trumps are called spades or diamonds, are black or red, is not at all essential to the game." [83]

More sententiously, "The Fool of Quality" (circa 1770) in Henry Brooke's moral story was allowed to describe resistance rights and party divisions as he showed "how England hath come, after the wrecks and ruins . . . to survive, to recover, to grow sounder from her wounds, and mightier from discomfitures, and to rise superior to all future external and internal attempts, hath been owing to the peculiarity of her constitution." In other words, as Voltaire had remarked long before, England's civil wars all ended in liberty. The Fool noted that the constitution was not yet quit, perhaps never ought to be quit, of some intestine commotions.

> For though liberty has no relation to party dissension or cabal against government, there is yet a kind of yeast observable in its nature, which may be necessary to the fermentation and working up of virtue to the degree that is requisite for the production of patriotism and public spirit. But when this yeast of liberty happens to light upon weak or vapid tempers, they are immediately affected like small beer casks, and rave and boil over in abundance of factions, sputter and turbulence.[84]

The existence of party in a free state and some of its uses were appreciated. The ways in which on the one hand evil

[82] *The New Opposition* (London, 1744).

[83] *An Essay on the Constitution* (London, 1765), p. 57.

[84] Henry Brooke, *The Fool of Quality* (London, 1906), p. 265.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effects in the constitution could be controlled, and on the other the connection of party and public opinion could be adjusted to the implementation of policy by Parliament, were not as yet clearly laid out.

"To cantonize is natural", wrote the third Earl of Shaftesbury at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The spirit of faction is the abuse of social love.[85] Men have "such a propensity to divide" into personal factions that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them.[86] The "pied parliament" became a commonplace of English political life in spite of abuse and exhortation, and rationalization followed the fact. Only Hume sought to control party by constitutional balances and he was to be followed by Americans like Madison but not by his fellow countrymen. Englishmen were to depend for the control of party excesses on the national temperament, on the checks afforded by the individual's propensity both to combine and to escape from regimentation. Discordant parties could be the safety of free states. This being so, a measure of sovereignty could be more readily accorded to state and government and could be relied on to bind together "opposed" minds. Resistance rights were always reserved to Englishmen who, possibly because of this seldom exercised prerogative, were prepared to obey both minister and party chieftain so long as liberty and property were secured to them. A revolutionary potential ensured ultimate concession from cabinet and monarch and prevented prolonged tyranny. A dislike of anarchy and indecisiveness permitted increasing powers to a sovereign legislature controlled by public opinion and national parties organized to change it as occasion demanded.

CAROLINE ROBBINS

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

85 Shaftesbury, *op. cit.*, I, 110-115 ("Of Wit and Humour"); *cf. Encyclopédie* (Paris, 1780), XXIV, Part 2, 218.

86 Hume, *Essays*, p. 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POINT FOUR: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECT

THE dramatic enunciation of the Point Four program in President Truman's inaugural address in January 1949 inspired interest and enthusiasm throughout the world that few other pronouncements in the annals of post-war diplomacy have paralleled. For much the same reason, perhaps, few other United States foreign economic policies have in recent years been subject to as many polemics as has Point Four. Although the program continues to enjoy the support of many, its initial popularity, and its importance as a cold war weapon, seem to have declined. Criticism of the program, once an exclusive prerogative of old-fashioned Republicans and ultra-nationalists, has in recent months become bipartisan and nation-wide.

The protracted and widespread attacks in and out of Congress on it,[1] and the reported decision to reduce American technical staffs in the Middle East and in South-East Asia,[2] may thus be construed to reflect American dissatisfaction with this program and a setback for this segment of United States foreign policy. If this interpretation is valid, it is appropriate to explore the causes of this cold war retreat. The timeliness of such a review is further evidenced by the fact that the Soviet bloc is reported to have in the last three years increased its technical assistance offensive in the underdeveloped world.[3]

Point Four operations particularly in the Middle East and South-East Asia have been criticized on political, economic and administrative grounds. Politically, the program has been accused of supporting undemocratic and nonprogressive governments. Economically, it has been criticized for

[1] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1958*, 85th Congress, Second Session, particularly pp. 837-892, 1381-1447.

[2] *New York Times*, December 29, 1957, p. 1.

[3] *New York Times*, January 5, 1958, p. 1; United States Department of State, *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, May 1958.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hasty planning, poor selection of projects, and inadequate coördination among assistance activities. Administratively, it has been charged with inefficiency, waste and irregularities.

It is the contention of this paper that, in the nature of the case, these and other deficiencies of the technical assistance program have been unavoidable and that no other program of this nature could have escaped many of the foregoing criticisms. Beset by the importunity of its conflicting objectives and pressed by the compelling necessity of selective fulfillment, the program could not have achieved much more than it has.

A Program of All Things to All Men

Point Four was presented to the world community as an American device to help the people of economically underdeveloped areas in their efforts to develop their resources, increase their productive capacities and raise their standards of living. The social and economic welfare of these peoples was in turn expected to serve the enlightened interests of the United States, that is, its national security, material prosperity and altruistic aspirations.

Trust in the ability of the Point Four program to promote these mutual interests was based on three assumptions, all considered axiomatic at the time. Assuming that totalitarianism in general, and communism in particular, would thrive where ignorance and poverty prevailed, American technical assistance was expected to help combat these ills and to counteract Communist promises and propaganda. Believing that mutually beneficial trade would flourish among expanding economies, technical aid was meant to promote profitable markets for American exports and productive sources for American imports. Expecting altruism to result in friendship and gratitude, American philanthropic generosity was meant to demonstrate the willingness of the United States to share its wealth with its needy neighbors.

The realities of the mid-twentieth-century politics, economics and ethics showed that these assumptions were largely aspirationally conditioned and somewhat unrealistic. The correlation between poverty and susceptibility to communism did not withstand the test of time. Despite the reported post-war rise in the levels of income and consumption

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and perhaps also Iraq were more rapidly drifted toward the East, and the hostility to communism in the rest of the region was also somewhat attenuated. The forces of nationalism, protected industrialization, and the continued shortage of hard currencies in the underdeveloped areas represented a great stumbling block to the expected expansion of world trade. There was hardly any real improvement in the bilateral trade of these areas with the United States: their exports to the United States remained the same, and the slight rise in their imports was financed chiefly by direct American aids. Nor did United States prestige and popularity in the Middle East and South-East Asia increase in the period after Point Four. From hitherto "pro-Western" Lebanon and Jordan to "neutral" Laos and Indonesia, anti-American demonstrations were intensified and fewer grateful friends were won.[4]

Why has the Point Four program fallen so patently short of expectations? Why has it not won stronger and more grateful friends for the United States? What has been the nature of its difficulties? What impact have these difficulties had on its operations? Many answers may be sought. Some are offered in this paper.

The essence of Point Four difficulties, it seems, should be sought in the elusiveness of its concept, the paradoxical nature of its objectives, and its involvement in some "unresolved dilemmas" of American foreign policy. The Act for International Development[5] which established the technical assistance program declared it to be the policy of the United States to "encourage the flow of technical knowledge and capital to countries which provided conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living." These, to be sure, were vague objectives and undefined terms. Neither the Congress nor the President tried to spell out the "necessary conditions" for economic progress or a rise in living standards; nor did they ever attempt to clarify the exact purposes that the program was designed to achieve.

[4] *Cf. Wall Street Journal*, May 26, 1958, p. 1; *The State Journal* (Lansing, Michigan), May 4, 1958, p. 4.

[5] Public Law 535, 81st Congress, 2nd Session.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interpreted literally, and from a purely economic standpoint, the countries most qualified to receive such assistance would have been those of Western Europe and the Commonwealth. Instead, technical aid was offered to countries which, economically speaking, did not quite meet the basic prerequisites of economic growth. Political instability, social upheavals and economic imperfections of a serious nature were hardly conducive to rapid economic development in the countries to which Point Four was offered.

Adding to the ambiguities of the 1950 Act, the Congress, under the Mutual Security Act of 1951,[6] amended the foregoing objectives of the Point Four program in favor of providing "military, economic and technical assistance to friendly countries . . . to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States." The emphasis was thus noticeably shifted from raising standards of living in countries where conditions were conducive to economic progress to helping countries which would "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." A year later, under the Mutual Security Act of 1952,[7] the noneconomic nature of the Point Four program was reëmphasized when Congress made it explicit that "no country shall receive any assistance hereunder unless it takes decisive action to marshal its resources collectively and participate in programs which promote collective security in the appropriate areas." Soon afterward, responding to widespread criticisms for having incorporated the technical and military assistance in one package, the Congress, in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, tried to separate the sheep from the lion by adopting again the statement of policy, and using the identical language, of the 1950 Act. This move did little to reduce the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the program because again in less than two years the Mutual Security Act of 1956 [8] declared it to be "the policy of the United States to continue as long as the [Communist] danger to the peace of the world and to the security of the United States persists to make

[6] Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, 1st Session.

[7] Public Law 400, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session.

[8] Public Law 726, 84th Congress, 2nd Session.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available to free nations . . . assistance of such nature . . . as the United States deems advisable. . . ." The new act thus made the Communist threat a requirement for receiving United States aid.

In most of the underdeveloped world, and particularly in the periphery of the Sino-Soviet axis, the rationale of the short-range policy of the United States was thus to obtain *political* and *strategic* gains. Economic and philanthropic considerations were ancillary and incidental. Although the search for overseas sources of raw materials, the establishment of markets for "surplus" exports, and the discovery of outlets for "excess" savings were always sought, the main intent of the United States in helping uncommitted areas was to seek reliable allies in the cause of peace, democracy and also probably free enterprise. Economic development in the words of Mr. Acheson was simply a "material means to a non-material end."

Most underdeveloped areas, on the other hand, in so far as they welcomed it at all, welcomed United States aid in the hope of resolving their immediate *economic* problems. The ideals that the United States stood for, that is, peace, democracy and free enterprise, had little value for the illiterate, poverty-stricken and deprived masses of the Middle East and Asia. These people were not then, and are not yet, prepared to appreciate the virtues of American democracy; nor were they especially keen on the promises of free enterprise. Peace they knew they could not enjoy as long as the cold war continued, no matter which camp they were in. Their main concern was to improve their unenviable and stagnant life. They knew little, and cared even less, about power politics. They felt no real urge to get themselves involved in the East-West conflict. Having emerged from Western colonialism, many of them had little sympathy for the Western cause. Within the framework of their own values they were willing to accept *any* helping hand which was extended to them. What they really wanted was a quick way out of their misery and a short cut into a richer and fuller life. They did not perhaps realize the price that they would eventually have to pay for such short cuts. But for the moment they did not seem to consider this price too high. Sacrifices of personal liberty, political freedom and economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice which Western societies associate with regimented planning could not be strongly felt by these people. They had not enjoyed these freedoms long enough really to appreciate them, and in some cases had never enjoyed them at all. To them, the *road* that the rival camp showed them was not always to *serfdom* but sometimes *from* it.

Conflicts of Standards

The standards set for the program thus flowed from more than one hierarchy. There were also conflicts among standards set within each hierarchy. Guided by political and strategic interests of the United States, as one hierarchy, Point Four had to achieve two basic objectives: (1) to serve as part of a *political* program designed to convince the people in the uncommitted areas that their interests lay in siding with the West; and (2) indirectly to assist a *military* program designed to strengthen the defense of the areas against the threat of Communist aggression or internal subversion. The social and economic interests of the underdeveloped areas, championed by a different hierarchy, demanded that the program (1) pay greater heed to improving *social* and *economic* conditions, and (2) meet these objectives through the least possible interference with the existing political and social orders. In so far, therefore, as the American political objectives of containing communism and the recipient countries' desire for a quick rise in their planes of living could not be simultaneously satisfied, the Point Four program faced some serious and almost insoluble political, economic and administrative paradoxes.

Increased defensive strength in the Middle East and South-East Asia was, for instance, necessary to undermine the Communist threat of aggression or subversion, but further use of manpower and material for military build-up would mean a sacrifice in the production of badly needed consumer and capital goods. A concrete improvement in the national standards of living was needed to counteract Soviet promises of abundance-for-all under communism, but an increase in living standards would mean fewer resources for development and would thus entail a slow rate of economic growth. Basic changes in the existing political and social institutions were required to promote both military strength and civilian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic progress, but such changes would involve the risks of creating hazardous political vacua. Of necessity, the Point Four program tried to move in all directions at the same time. The result of this ambivalence was that none of the paradoxes was adequately met.

Paradoxes of Policy

Underlying most Point Four difficulties was thus a basic rivalry among conflicting political and economic objectives. A political program designed to check the spread of communism may require certain practices which, although politically justified, cannot be vindicated on purely economic grounds. Often enough, a particular line of action which is perfectly rational from the political viewpoint of the aiding country may not be in the long-run economic interest of the recipients. Ambitious highway and/or airfield projects in Afghanistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Vietnam are cases in point: although of great military and strategic value to the defense of the free world, these projects have admittedly had little value to the economies of these countries.[9] Sometimes, also, some "radical" steps which must be taken to help the recipient nations solve their long-run economic problems may have to be ruled out because they might injure the immediate political interests of the donor. The alleged support by the United States of dictators and unpopular leaders, its tolerance of corruption and malpractices in the recipient governments, and its contribution to the enrichment of the "exploiting" rich are examples.[10] In the context of the coexistence struggle, again, it may be deemed essential to give special favors to a technically incompetent but friendly local élite. Or it may be advisable to spend sizable funds on psychologically effective but economically wasteful public relations activities. Or it may be expedient to employ tactful and amiable but professionally inferior "experts". None of these actions is wrong *per se*

[9] See "Responses by ICA to Questions Compiled by the House Foreign Affairs Committee relating to Criticisms of the Mutual Security Program" in *Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1958*, pp. 847, 849, 851, 867, 870.

[10] United States Senate, *A Review of United States Foreign Policy and Operations*, by Senator A. J. Ellender, Document No. 78, 1957, particularly pp. 85-86 and 140-141. See also *Wall Street Journal*, August 9, 1958, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because it does not fall within the dicta of economic rationalism. All of them, however, are more or less beyond the scope of an economic development program. The favors reportedly granted to political and government leaders in Laos to keep them "friendly" toward the United States,[11] the profitable rate of exchange given Iranian students in the United States, and the dispatch of good party-goers or party-givers as technical experts are of this category.[12]

Other paradoxes of this sort have loomed large in the operation of the Point Four program. In order to achieve quick, tactical and strategic results—that is, to impress the recipient nations with American dynamism and to show Congress returns on its investment—the program was forced to sponsor or support certain projects which could not be given priority on their economic merits—projects which later on proved to be of very little value. Examples can be cited of industrial projects which failed to operate because of "poor planning and faulty engineering",[13] dams which did not hold water, fancy schools, hospitals or resorts having little to do with development, complicated instruments left in the hands of untrained operators.[14] Electronic microscopes sent to the regions of the Philippines where no power existed for their use, a sugar refinery provided for Iran where beet supplies were short, and a ferry system established for Laos, whose revenues lag behind her expenses by four-fifths, are projects of this sort.

The Point Four program was also hampered by another political paradox. On the one hand, its success as a program of action, the economic growth of the recipients, and the long-run interests of the United States were based on the introduction of a number of economic reforms, political changes and social disturbances in aid-receiving countries. On the other hand, American short-range political objectives, and the very acceptance of the program by the host govern-

11 *Wall Street Journal,* April 9, 1958, p. 1.

12 See *Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1958,* pp. 848-871; *Wall Street Journal,* April 9, 1958, p. 1.

13 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, *United States Aid Operations in Iran* (Washington, 1957), p. 4.

14 See Senator T. F. Green, *Technical Assistance in the Far East, South-East Asia, and Middle East* (Washington, 1956), p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments in the Middle East and the Far East, required a cautious and conservative stand on many of these issues. The rôle of the United States technical missions in these processes of change and adaptation, therefore, was most delicate, quite complicated, and often controversial. Although traditionally and philosophically sympathetic to certain basic changes in the structure of beneficiary countries, the United States found itself in the uneasy position of agreeing to preserve the political and economic *status quo* while trying to achieve the kind of economic progress which was almost impossible within the existing social and political order.[15] It was clear to most Point Four officials that in order to launch a self-sustaining program of economic development they needed the enthusiasm, support and genuine coöperation of the people—the peasants, the workers, the rank and file. They also were aware of the fact that in order to receive such active participation, they had to assure these people that the United States was interested in serving *them* and not necessarily the interests of their élite few. It was further evident that in many fields of operation, pure technical assistance within the framework of existing institutions could not offer such an assurance. Yet Point Four was unable to do much toward changing, for example, land tenure practices, tax systems, public administration and the like. Ostensibly unwilling to be accused of political interference, but in effect avoiding the creation of a dangerous political vacuum, the United States refrained from undertaking, or even advocating, such reforms as might tip the balance of power against the professed anti-Communist ruling classes. It has been frankly admitted that Point Four's reluctance to "speak out for any principles of social justice" should be traced "not so much to any opposition to reform, or lack of awareness that reforms might be needed, as to a fear of offending those in power."[16]

Economic Dilemmas

The *economic* dilemmas that the program faced also involved choices among competing objectives. A quick and noticeable rise in the standards of consumption and living

[15] Green, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[16] Jonathan B. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy* (New York, 1954), p. 216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(upon which the popularity of the program stood) was incompatible with both a rapid rate of economic growth and a strong military preparedness. A rise in the consumption of goods and services can be achieved in three ways: a shift in domestic income distribution in favor of the low-income groups; the diversion of a larger portion of public and private efforts into the production of more consumer goods; and the importation of consumption goods from abroad. All three alternatives work against the objective of maximum investment for long-run development.

A "consumption-oriented" redistribution of income may result in a fall in national savings available for productive investment and may hence impede maximum net capital formation. Even if such a redistribution could affect only money hoards and not current savings, the increase in consumption would occur at the expense of potential savings, with similar dangers for maximum growth. The allocation, furthermore, of a larger portion of the aggregate expenditure to consumer goods may mean a reduction in government expenditure. This would involve either a cut in government welfare service such as health and education, or a reduction in defense spending. Reduced public services would hardly result in a net increase in national consumption level as it would simply mean a transfer of some welfare functions from the public sector to the private sector. The only alternative would be a cut in military spending. But a reduction in the defense budget large enough to affect the consumption level would threaten the recipient countries' national security and thus run counter to the very objective of the American assistance. In fact, to the extent that the association with the Western camp necessitates a greater military preparedness by the recipients against Communist retaliation, they may actually be compelled to increase, rather than decrease, their defense budgets. Finally, a swift and measurable rise in the consumption level can be effected by exports to the beneficiary countries of consumer goods or by using foreign aid for imports of these goods from third countries. Grants can be used, for example, to import essential food, clothing and drugs to be distributed among the population. But again, the import of consumer goods is achieved at the expense of more urgently required capital goods.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The multiplicity of these objectives and their inherent inconsistencies worked against the success of the Point Four program. In most countries to which assistance was offered, a genuine process of sustained economic growth involved a good deal of belt-tightening at the outset. People had to consume less and divert a good share of their income into productive investment. This bitter fact few people in these countries realized, and fewer still wished to acknowledge. Often the very nature of economic underdevelopment in these countries implied that consumption was already too high to spare enough resources for a rapid rate of growth. In such cases, and in the absence of foreign investment capital, economic development actually required an initial cut, instead of a rise, in aggregate consumption. Under the pressure of circumstances, however, advocating such a policy was out of the question. Asking for more "sweat, blood and tears" was obviously not the best way for the United States to "win friends and influence people." Nor was this a policy which Point Four could squarely recommend. In order to win popularity among the deprived masses of the Middle East and South-East Asia, the United States had to promise, and deliver, quick and effective rises in the national levels of consumption. Such promises were indeed freely, and sometimes imprudently, given. But the delivery proved difficult. Without exception, the expectations that were raised and the hopes that were created in these areas proved far beyond the technical and financial ability of the United States to meet. Many naïve officials and the majority of people in these countries really believed that for "the first time in history" humanity possessed "the knowledge and skill" to relieve their sufferings.[17] Interpreting these words literally, they widened the horizons of their anticipations to such an extent that no feasible amount of American technical or financial assistance could ever completely satisfy them. The result was not gratitude but widespread dissatisfaction with the "inadequacy" of United States aid.

Economic counsels to the underdeveloped areas also exhibited conflicts of policy on two other accounts: inconsistency between development and trade policies, and compe-

[17] President H. S. Truman's Inaugural Address, 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tition between private and government enterprise. In most of the underdeveloped countries, Point Four missions placed special emphasis on further specialization along "comparative advantage" lines; they counseled increased production of agricultural and primary commodities. At the same time, the missions favored diversification in the recipient economies through the development of import-competing industries. These counsels were not only inconsistent in themselves but were also in conflict with other United States economic policies. An increase in the output of agricultural export crops would, of course, have been advisable if trade were free the world over. But since almost all major industrial countries, and especially the United States, had severe restrictions against their agricultural imports, Point Four advice could only result in larger agricultural surpluses in the recipient nations. Burmese rice and Egyptian cotton surpluses are cases in point.

The encouragement of product diversification, on the other hand, while somewhat at odds with the emphasis on agriculture, would involve the adoption of strong protective measures. No attempt by the underdeveloped areas to produce substitutes for imports, and, *a fortiori*, industrial exports, could succeed under the competitive pressure of foreign industrial giants. Tariffs, exchange control, quotas and similar restrictions were indispensable to the survival and success of these "infant" industries. The Point Four advocacy of protectionism, however, was in conflict with the United States post-war policy of freer multilateral trade and the reduction of trade barriers.

The competition between private and public planning was no less serious. Every underdeveloped area which asked for assistance was engaged in deliberate governmental planning for economic development, and expected the Point Four mission to help it in this effort. The anomaly of the situation was indeed curious. The Point Four personnel, indoctrinated as they were in the principles of private enterprise, were asked to practice and preach what they neither preached nor perhaps practiced at home. Although lip service was given to the idea of encouraging private free enterprise, missions in almost all recipient countries were driven

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the promotion of governmental planning and the expansion of government control and/or operation.

Administrative Problems

The alleged inadequacies of Point Four administration, that is, waste and irregularities, hasty planning, and insufficient coördination among selected projects, also had to be expected. A system of conflicting objectives necessitates selective achievement of some at the expense of others. Administrators must, of necessity, decide which objectives to meet. Once the priority among competing standards is known, agents who deal with executive decisions cannot be expected to adhere to rigid procedures. If "getting the job done" under certain circumstances warrants deviation from certain formal rules, they should be expected to disregard formality. This "flexibility" in operational decisions, however, is what many critics of Point Four in and out of Congress have refused to accept. A former director of the operations in Iran, for example, was called to task, and severely reprimanded, by a congressional committee for following unorthodox procedures, although the committee agreed that he had accomplished his mission. The recent hue and cry over the International Cooperation Administration's allegedly providing "bathtubs for Egyptian camel drivers", sowing wild grass along Lebanese highways, and flying Moslems to Mecca [18] are also cases in point. In these instances the administrators of the program evidently believed that close adherence to specific accounting or operational procedures should be sacrificed in favor of attaining the program's over-all objective; and since the objective of containing Communists was the most likely standard to be invoked in appraising a mission's performance, they did not hesitate to disregard low priority objectives, or to by-pass formalized procedures, whenever advantageous. Any action which appeared to counteract Communist propaganda effectively and immediately was given priority over other actions.

Hasty planning and ineffective operation, too, were the result of the pressure put on the program to expand itself all over the Communist-threatened world. Point Four opera-

[18] *New York Times*, March 5, 1958, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions at the end of 1956 covered some two thousand projects scattered over more than fifty-five countries and overseas territories.[19] Consequently few of its technical assistance missions were reasonably equipped to perform a coördinated task. At times it was necessary to tailor projects to the qualifications of the available staff instead of procuring qualified technicians for more urgently needed projects. To some extent, too, the lack of coördination was the result of the familiar administrative rivalries among local state agencies and within the Point Four administration itself. Every government agency in the recipient country, as a rule, tried to get a share of Point Four funds, whether it really needed them or not. With project priorities not worked out beforehand, and with Point Four's obligation to "coöperate" with local agencies, the results, in many cases, were waste and duplication. Similar jealousies and rivalries were also reported to exist within the missions themselves. At times, the staff of a single mission reportedly consisted of technicians representing some forty-five separate United States agencies and departments.[20] Although this was probably the exception rather than the rule, the heterogeneous make-up of the missions and the somewhat divided loyalty of the staff were frequently inimical to coördinated work.

No less important among the administrative barriers to a successful operation of the program was the precarious and short-run nature of United States foreign policy. The assistance that Point Four volunteered to offer was admittedly a long-range type of activity and required a long-term approach. It was not and could not be treated as an emergency, crash program. The scientific knowledge which was to be transmitted, the new methods which were to be introduced, the training which had to be accomplished, and reforms which were to be instituted would all require time, and would need adequate planning and careful coördination. Yet, the Point Four program lacked both such long-range consistency of planning and continuity of operation. Although

19 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Overseas Economic Operations*, A Report to the Congress, June 1955 (Washington, 1955), p. 52.

20 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Technical Assistance Programs* (Washington, 1955), p. 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considered as a "permanent" arm of American foreign policy, the program was given only a year-by-year authorization and appropriation. As projects were to be presented to Congress and justified on an annual basis, Point Four's programing was frequently piecemeal and unbalanced.[21] Handicapped by the insecurity of future objectives, hampered by the uncertainty of congressional appropriations, and motivated by a desire to please the host governments, Point Four missions often limited their activities to the mere "putting of patches on the sick economies" rather than offering the recipient countries what they really needed.[22]

Prospect for Success

The foregoing analysis has emphasized some policy dilemmas which resulted from several basic conflicts among Point Four objectives. It has examined the implications of the alternative policies. It has shown the decisions made at each juncture and the difficulties that the program has run into. A word or two should now be said about the course that the program might take in the future. Should it be "junked" as Secretary Dulles suggested in 1952? Should it be "pressed vigorously" as President Eisenhower recommended in 1954? Or should it be "pared drastically" as Vice President Nixon is alleged to be advocating in 1958?

In all fairness to the Point Four idea, the guiding criteria for making a rational choice among these alternatives should not be sought in the accomplishments of the past, but possibly in the promises of the future. A positive answer to the question of whether or not the program should be "vigorously pressed" depends upon the extent to which it promises to serve the long-run economic interests of the underdeveloped areas for which it was initially designed.

An objective evaluation of the rôle of Point Four in the development of the underdeveloped world should be made in the light of two concrete and sobering lessons that past experience has taught the United States and the recipient countries. The United States has realized that technical as-

[21] *Hearings on Technical Assistance Programs,* p. 91.

[22] United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Technical Assistance,* Final Report (Washington, 1957), p. 273.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sistance is not a good method for obtaining short-term political and strategic objectives. Military assistance, defense support and information services are quicker, more effective and less cumbersome ways of accomplishing immediate ends. Underdeveloped countries also have recognized the fact that their problems of poverty and economic backwardness cannot be solved by the Point Four assistance alone. Pure technical assistance can solve neither all their major economic problems in the long run, nor any of their major problems in the immediate run. Even if these countries experience a net rate of growth comparable to that of the Soviet Union in the last four decades—an unlikely occurrence under their present political, economic and demographic trends—it would be no sooner than the year 2000 when they may have a per capita real income one third as high as that of the United States today.

If the American Point Four program is to become an effective instrument in building up underdeveloped economies, it ought to be offered with a greater degree of farsightedness and patience than it has been in the past. For some time to come, the United States should be prepared to expect no other gain from its technical assistance than a promise of long-run peace, domestic political stability and economic progress in the aid-receiving countries. Past experience seems to indicate that Point Four would be far more effective if its operation were divorced from political and strategic programs and particularly if its administration were separated from the Department of State. The technical assistance portion of United States foreign aid could be most advantageously used if administered by an independent, nonpartisan agency responsible to Congress. Active interests and increased participation of American universities in helping universities and governments of the underdeveloped areas suggest an exploration into the possibility of making greater use of their facilities and personnel under a unified administration. Technical assistance is nothing but a process of "education" over time. And this may perhaps be provided best by institutions of higher learning.

University people as a whole are likely to be more qualified for overseas assistance than most of the present experts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They can do a more disinterested job for underdeveloped countries and they will be more welcomed, respected and listened to. The cost to the American taxpayers of technical assistance provided by universities is also likely to be less for a number of operational economies. University people generally receive lower pay than their counterparts in the government; they can be more readily inclined to take foreign assignments; since their position at home is secure, they could be more easily induced to accept a temporary duty abroad, and many of them knowing at least one foreign language can converse better with their counterparts and need less interpreting and translating help.

The underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and South-East Asia also are likely to receive greater benefits from the United States technical assistance if they are ready to pay the full "costs" of their economic development. A substantial overhauling of old taboos, antiquated institutions and harmful attitudes is a part of these costs. A frank realization of the necessity of such changes is not a radical viewpoint. A demand for outside technical help and guidance is *ipso facto* an admission of the technical superiority of the donors. Yet if this technical superiority is eventually to diminish or vanish, it is not enough simply to imitate the techniques, but to bring about the atmosphere which has created these techniques in the first place.

Now if Point Four is expected to do a better job than it has in the past, it should be offered and accepted as a modest long-range program designed to solve some basic long-range problems. It should not be regarded either by the granter or the grantee as an emergency plan to produce short-term results. The United States should be willing to offer and administer this portion of its foreign aid on a sound economic basis, hoping to reap some political and strategic rewards in the future. This is a calculated risk that America should be willing to take. It is only within such a framework that Point Four aid is worth giving and perhaps also worth receiving.

JAHANGIR AMUZEGAR

OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE
LOS ANGELES

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HOBBES AMONG THE CRITICS

THOMAS HOBBES longed for the pacification of England. The practical aim of his political theory was to reveal the follies to which he traced the troubles of the Great Rebellion. He was a *politique*, one of the peacemakers. Only in a body politic—so he held—can men live securely; and peace is the health of a body politic. Accordingly, the great principle of all popular and all official political thinking should be: Seek concord within the commonwealth in every expedient way; be not enthralled by other goods, for they are inferior; endeavor always—quieting, appeasing, adjusting, compromising in all things—to prevent the death of the commonwealth. Any other rule is absurd.

One of the cardinal tasks of a government, he held, is to insure that its subjects know the principles of morals and politics. And because this task had been neglected, England was racked by dissidence and strife. Pestilential notions, spreading out from the universities, those "fountains of civil and moral doctrines," and infecting men in all ranks, had become the presuppositions of popular opinion, with the inevitable result that many of the inhabitants were caught up in rebellious factions headed by arrogant men lusting for fame and power. That private conscience is the true guide for religious practice; that a man's rights, especially to economic goods, are ultimate and unalterable; that under the fundamental law of England political power was divided among the Commons, the House of Lords, and the King—the prevalence of fancies such as these, argued Hobbes, had permitted a few "hellish spirits" to roil emotions, to enlist followers, and to disrupt the peace. The masses, too long left in darkness with "no rule of equity but precedents and custom," were giddy, easy prey for malcontents swollen with avarice. To Hobbes the lesson is plain: Since apart from the principles of commonwealth there is no foundation for obedience save the sword, rulers too foolish to assure that their subjects are diligently educated in those principles are "ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cessories to their own, and the public damage." Hobbes's works on politics are primarily an explanation, a demonstration, to his readers of the theory of civil obligation.

He would have viewed the recent disagreements among scholars about his theory of obligation as a scandal.[1] He believed that, starting from premises that no intelligent and honest man could wish to deny, and proceeding with impeccable reasoning, he had set forth the principles of politics clear beyond misunderstanding. His exposition was simple and perspicuous; and, as for the substance, would not even the vulgar receive what " is so consonant to reason, that any unprejudiced man needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? " Yet now he is characterized as a Kantian deontologist, as a believer with Paley in a divinely ordained social harmony, and as the author of a profoundly skeptical doctrine which finds the only solution to man's earthly predicament in will and coercion. To understand and evaluate these diverse interpretations we must remember both Hobbes's aim and his argument.

His aim was to demonstrate the " true and only moral philosophy ", the science of politics. Hobbes was writing moral and political *philosophy*, and had his own view of what philosophy is. He distinguishes between registers of fact (histories) and books of philosophy (demonstrations of the sciences). Both are useful. A man in making up his mind, in

1 This lack of agreement has now been brought to a head by a study of Hobbes by Howard Warrender of the University of Glasgow. His work has been published as *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Oxford, 1957). This book, unlike the other important volume on Hobbes published recently, that of Professor Raymond Polin of the University of Lille—*Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes* (Paris, 1953)— focuses directly on the problems in Hobbes's theory of obligation. Statements of the other views dealt with by Mr. Warrender are: (a) Michael Oakeshott, " Introduction " to *Leviathan* (Oxford, 1946), pp. vii-lxvi; (b) A. E. Taylor, " The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes " in *Philosophy*, vol. XIII (1938), pp. 406-424.

The thesis of Mr. Warrender's book has been questioned by Professor John Plamenatz in his discussion of " Mr. Warrender's Hobbes " in *Political Studies*, vol. V (October 1957), pp. 295-308.

A spirited exchange brought on by Professor Oakeshott's famous " Introduction " appeared in *Political Studies* as follows: (a) J. M. Brown, "A Note on Professor Oakeshott's Introduction to the Leviathan ", vol. I (February 1953), pp. 53-64; (b) Dorothea Krook, " Mr. Brown's Note Annotated ", vol. I (October 1953), pp. 216-227; (c) J. M. Brown, " Hobbes: A Rejoinder ", vol. II (June 1954), pp. 168-172.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deliberating before an act, weighs the good and the evil consequent to it, now inclining one way, and now the other, until finally he decides. The last phase of his deliberation is his will. In deliberating a man may rely for information either on experience or on science. The former is knowledge of facts. It is historical knowledge. The more experience a man has had, the more conjectural signs he has on which to base a guess about the future. A mistake in presumption or guessing is called an error. The latter, science, is very different. By naming things and processes men build up a language—and thereafter they reason, or think. That is, they bring forth, by adding and subtracting the meanings of words, the initially hidden implications of their language. Language has many provinces; and each province—geometry, meteorology, politics—is a science. Reasoning is analytic. Consequently, there is only one correct conclusion to any line of reasoning. Every man who begins with the same apt words, and then makes no blunder in his reckoning, necessarily always reaches the same conclusion. A mistake in reasoning is no mere error. It is a self-contradiction, an absurdity.[2] The utility of thought (right reasoning) necessarily is always conditional, for it depends on the validity of two assumptions: that initially the language described the order of the world accurately, and that thereafter the order of the world did not change, that is, that it remained an order. In none of his political works, except *Behemoth*, did Hobbes undertake to narrate facts. Throughout, his aim was to show the nature and the value of commonwealth, and to show these as unavoidable conclusions from incontestable premises.

The individualism and egalitarianism of his suppositions suggest their nominalist and Protestant origins. Instead of beginning by assuming the existence of a body politic held together by a general cause, purpose, or will, and then pro-

2 "Now when a man reasoneth from principles that are found indubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right reason; but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any evident truth whatsoever, then is he said to have concluded against reason: and such a conclusion is called absurdity." *The Elements of Law* (London, 1889), p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceeding to describe men in terms of their different (that is, unequal) offices as members of that body, Hobbes starts with the self-dependent individual. For him the final purpose or end of each man is his own felicity, and his own preservation, the prerequisite of felicity. By nature every man is an equal individual, not an unequal member. But each individual lives near other individuals who have the same self-regarding aspiration. Each wants goods that are scarce, security from invasion by his neighbors, and glory. Here there is no natural (that is, uncontrived) social order; for, since the weakest can destroy even the brawniest by a stratagem, all are virtually equal. And behavior is not guided by a moral social order, for as yet there is no incorporating general will.[3] The result is a chaos in which there can be no fixed possession, no considerable industry, no arts or learning, no civility, but instead only "continual fear, and danger of violent death."

Hobbes, let us remember, is writing philosophy. He is not mistaking the order of logic for the order of history, and so proposing that once, in remote early times at the dawn of history, there was a period as disorderly as his "State of Nature". Rather his view is that the causes of a war of all against all are present always, and that unless the leaders and people of a country think correctly—and ignore the zealots, the "authors of spiritual darkness", and the men who stand resolutely on principle—their culture may subside or crash into barbarism at any time.[4] When he calls such a condition the "State of Nature", he does not mean that it is "natural" (or suitable) for men. Instead, what he is saying is that society and governments exist as *institutions*, that their existence (unity), unlike that of animals or mountains, depends constantly on the concerted wills of men, that is, that they exist by human design or artifice. And, contrary to Rous-

[3] The difference between an incorporating general will and a divisive common will is nicely illustrated by the reply said to have been made by Francis I when he was asked what basic disagreement existed between himself and Charles V. His reply was: "None whatever. We agree completely. We both want Milan."

[4] In this Hobbesian view of human society M. Bertrand de Jouvenel finds "a serious lesson for our modern democracies." See his *Sovereignty* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 231-246.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seau's interpretation, he does not mean that men naturally are evil. He means that unless they restrain their desire to achieve their own goals, whether these be economic, moral, or religious, each man must rely solely on the fitness of his own mind and body.

Since there is no social order, and since, on the contrary, everybody is free and equal, there are no rights whatsoever in the State of Nature. There is no propriety of any kind, so no act is improper. Each man behaves according to his natural will, and expects all his enemies to do likewise. Since there are no moral or political restraints, nobody has liberties; but instead everybody has a complete and blameless liberty. Hobbes describes this liberty in legal terms as the "Right of Nature".

Implicit in this situation, however, are the Laws of Nature. Like the theorems of any science, provided the data remain unchanged, these are eternal and immutable; and any man cognizant of the truth that he and all others compete because they have the same divisive goals can know them at any time by right reasoning. As presented by Hobbes, these Laws, unlike those of traditional natural law theory, are absolutely individualistic. So expressly are they means to the basic goals of the individual that conditionally they direct him to use "all helps, and advantages of war" to promote his self-preservation and mundane felicity. However, they do show him that it is better strategy to resort to peace if the necessary conditions exist. Indeed, the Laws of Nature are primarily "convenient articles of peace", a set of terms and rules of compromise by which self-regarding men can overcome their destructive competition, live quietly together, develop a high culture, and establish a seemly worship of God. Knowledge of these Laws, that is, knowledge of the science of politics, extends the individual's deliberations beyond what otherwise would be his will. When a man observes the Laws, we may say that rational obligation is restraining his thoughtless desires, or, what is the same thing, that his greatest interest, as discovered by thought, is overruling his short-run, specious interest.

The fundamental law of politics is, "Seek peace, and follow it." From this is derived a second Law obliging each man to be contented with as much liberty against others as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he would allow them against himself. The modification of his absolute liberty (Right of Nature) required by this egalitarian Law is to be made chiefly by covenants. And the third Law is "that men perform their covenants made." Hobbes then goes on to argue that this third Law is the origin of Justice, which is impossible without propriety (ownership in the broadest sense), and that, "Where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust."

On the principles we now have before us, a social order might be constructed. In it each man would make covenants limiting his conduct, and then would keep them conscientiously. No new kind of obligation would be introduced. The society would be a web of covenants, and these covenants would be kept by every covenanter because he would know that it was in his interest to keep his covenants. Hobbes, however, envisages no such social system. This order would not be what he calls a "commonwealth". Highly rational men are rare. And even such men sometimes are overtaken by passions. Moreover, for each individual, the conduct of each other man is merely a matter of fact. He may know the articles of peace himself, but he has no way of ascertaining that the others also know them, or of ascertaining that they are aware that he knows the articles. His only safe assumption, therefore, is that for them "covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." Besides, ultimately he does not care whether they know the Laws or not. What a rational individual needs from others is not that they too shall be rational, but that they shall act as if they are rational. A government by threatening to coerce can help to produce such action. And since a government cannot produce virtuous intentions by commands, a system of specific prohibited acts and specific required acts is needed. The elementary domestic function of governments, according to Hobbes, is the elaboration and maintenance through rewards and punishments of a system of positive rights.

His government is a sovereign will to which all men within its jurisdiction subject their own natural and rational wills. This subjection is founded on two, or perhaps three, of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Laws of Nature. The second Law obliges each rational man to limit his liberty by transferring, "to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind". Each man transfers a right to govern to the same man or group. If the establishment takes place by acquisition (conquest), as in the case of the Stuarts, whose title Hobbes traced to the Norman Conquest, or as in that of Cromwell, to whom Hobbes himself made submission upon his return from Paris in 1652, each vanquished man is given his life and corporal liberty in return for a promise to obey the conqueror as his governor.[5] The conqueror performs immediately, and thereafter the conquered has an unquestionable obligation. If the establishment takes place by institution, those creating a government have to agree and covenant among themselves as to whom they will obey.[6] In either case, the establishment is by covenant, either tacit or overt. The third Law, as we have

[5] *A Dialogue of the Common Laws* in the *English Works*, vol. VI, p. 74.

[6] Hobbes's use of covenant as the instrument for establishing a government has been criticized from opposite sides. Mr. Warrender argues that "it is, perhaps, unfortunate that Hobbes began his account of sovereignty with a description of sovereignty by institution rather than of sovereignty by acquisition, where his essential argument appears in a clearer form." He finds the description of sovereignty by acquisition more felicitous because in that case Hobbes makes the ruler a party to the covenant. (*Op. cit.*, p. 128; and see pp. 133 and 138.) Professor John Plamenatz, on the other hand, thinks that the covenant adds nothing to Hobbes's theory, and hides the need for a more exact explanation of obligation. (*Loc. cit.*, pp. 303-305.)

Assuming that Professor Plamenatz is correct—as I believe he is—we must ask why Hobbes fumbles in this way. He had undertaken to relate two very different conditions: the "natural" condition of men, in which the science of politics is neglected, and the "artificial" condition, in which that science is put into practice. When he assumes the presence of a conqueror, his problem is to explain the origin of the obligation to obey that conqueror. But where the "state of nature", wherein all men are actually quite equal, is used as the starting point, he has two problems: first, to show how equal individuals can establish a *de facto* government, and, second, to show when and why each individual is obliged to obey that government. (Since his main undertaking is to describe the transition from a "state of nature" to a commonwealth, it is no accident that he begins his account of sovereignty with a description of sovereignty by institution, rather than of sovereignty by acquisition.) Reasonably enough, to solve the first of these two problems he resorts to a covenant made among all the equal individuals. But, unfortunately, he then proceeds to use the covenant as if it were also the solution to the problem of the origin of obligation.

The use made by Hobbes of the idea that William I was a conqueror, and the reasons why such an argument was not used by royalist writers, are discussed in the excellent book by Dr. J. G. A. Pocock on *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 149-151 and 162-170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seen, requires that covenants be honored. It may be that the fourth Law, requiring gratitude for benefits received from another out of mere grace, gives additional support to government by acquisition.[7] All these Laws oblige because they are the means to peace.

By the establishment of a government the mere dissolute multitude of individuals becomes a "people", a society, a commonwealth. Thereafter, they are a body politic. This, however, is an artificial body. It has only a "visible" unity. It is united by no general will, but only by a common interest in peace as a means to private good. The Leviathan is a useful monster, but still it is a monster, a *persona ficta*.

Yet even if a commonwealth is a creature of consent, while it remains one commonwealth its members are controlled ultimately by one will. If any will—that of a baron, a bishop, a presbytery, Edward Coke, or a man of prophecy—able to overrule the government emerges, then is the commonwealth on the verge of dissolution, or that new will takes over as the sovereign will. (This is a science; it has no place for adventitious shifts of power within the machinery of government.) The sovereign will, whether it is embodied in a democratic assembly, an aristocratic supreme court, or a king in parliament, has been installed as the one interpreter of the ways of common peace. As such it has the right to create an entire social order, an entire system of propriety (rights), to ordain all manners, ways, or mores. Or, at any time, it can change the existing order in any way or to any degree. In short, the entire moral order is directly or indirectly ordained by the sovereign. Hobbes makes it clear that there are to be silences, long silences, in the positive law, that the government is to make only such laws as are needed. While many moral and political obligations (and rights) are assigned by the government, many additional obligations (and rights) can be introduced within the framework of the enforced rules of the game by private men and companies.

We can now state Hobbes's theory of obligation. The rational man always knows the articles of peace, and, if thereby he does not endanger his life, he follows them. This

[7] Warrender, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obligation we may call "rational obligation". The establishment of a body politic incorporates men into a social and political order, and thereby imposes constraints and restrictions on all, the rational and irrational alike. Thereafter, they are restrained either from doing what they want to do, or from doing it in their own way. The rational man acts conformably to these new controls, even if he himself would have set them up differently, because he knows that social and political order is impossible when everybody insists that the order be the one judged best by himself. The irrational man respects the controls, as he generally does, because of coercion and custom.

Most men, indeed all men, are not completely or always rational. They overestimate their own power, and refuse to recognize all others as their equals. This pride predestines them to ignore the Laws. Yet by the threat of coercion most citizens can be obliged both to obey the government and to keep their own private contracts. In the same way, a perfectly rational government would live up to its rational obligation to make laws that are "needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous." On the other hand, presumably, the possibility of resistance and revolution will have a salutary effect on almost any less ideal, but prudent, government.

Professor Michael Oakeshott finds that in Hobbes's theory three different kinds of obligation combine to bind the citizen to obey the positive laws: "rational obligation", "moral obligation", and "physical obligation".[8] The last, compulsion, is external. The "rational obligation", the obligation to follow the Laws of Nature, is internal. Both of these, both coercion and reason, exist even when there is no commonwealth. And neither is a moral obligation, for until there is a source of rights, a government, every man may do what he wills without doing moral wrong. It is the establishment of a government that introduces "moral obligation". Among individuals there is no natural concord, only competition; and while this can never be eliminated, it can be restrained. A solution of the human predicament is at-

[8] Oakeshott, *loc. cit.*, pp. xxxvi-xliv and lviii-lxi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained when men, motivated by their great fear, and enlightened by reasoning, contract to act not as prompted by their own private deliberations, but as commanded by a single representative will. "Moral obligation" is not an expression of the sovereign's coercive power; rather it is the restraint imposed on the many, diverse and conflicting wills of real persons by the commands of the one artificial but common will. In Professor Oakeshott's account, the Laws of Nature bind only rationally, as efficient means to a desired end, not morally, until they have been made positive laws by the sovereign. Similarly, the laws of God given in the Scriptures become morally binding only when, and because, the government has established an authorized interpretation of them in its positive law. The emphasis of Professor Oakeshott's reading is on the contrast between the natural and the civil conditions of men. It is on the fierce war that rages when natural liberty prevails. It is on the importance of human reasoning in the attainment and improvement of a tradition of civility. Oakeshott reveals the mighty saving works of the mortal god, the King of the Proud, the incomparable Leviathan.

A very different explication has been provided by the late Professor A. E. Taylor, and is now given by Mr. Howard Warrender. Their basic argument is that for Hobbes all obligation, except physical obligation, is moral obligation. The obligation to obey the Laws of Nature, most noticeably the obligation to create a commonwealth, is a moral obligation. At no point in the structure can it be said that moral obligation is absent, or begins; instead, moral obligation rises from tier to tier in a great pyramid, rises from the slightest by-laws, to statutes, to the laws of the constitution, to the Laws of Nature, and then perhaps beyond. The function, or rather the moral duty, of governments is to make it possible for the citizenry to observe the eternal moral law. Here the emphasis is on the social constitution always readily available in the Laws, and on the power of those Laws to command respect. Governments, although indispensable, and certainly not as inactive as in full-blown Liberal thought, are depicted as serving mainly to remove obstacles.

But there is an important difference between the explanation of moral obligation in Hobbes's theory given by Mr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warrender and that given by Professor Taylor. The latter maintains that *Leviathan*, an occasional work which scintillates and moves with polemic drive, has obscured the ethical doctrine in Hobbes's more deliberate and more balanced works. He argues that Hobbes's answer to the moral question—How ought I to behave?—is based on "a very strict deontology" built around the principle that inconsistent behavior is immoral. By inconsistency the individual feigns two wills where (from the definition of the "individual") only one is possible, and thus denies his own claim, or negates his own act. For example, it is immoral for a man (unless he has a special right under positive law) to make a claim that he is not prepared to allow to every other man. The fundamental principle of morality is egalitarianism; and it may be summarized in Hobbes's own words as: "Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself." [9] Taylor finds that Hobbes anticipates "Kant's attempt to reduce all really wrong willing to the irrational attempt to will both sides of a contradiction at once." [10]

Now, Taylor continues, Hobbes's theory is that it is by covenants, which cannot be broken without inconsistency (moral wrong), that men create the innumerable moral ties that shape a society. But the Laws of Nature, which require the honoring of covenants, are laws of "reciprocal obligation". They always "oblige *in foro interno* . . . but *in foro externo;* that is, to the putting them in act, not always." [11] One is not obliged to act peaceably if this imperils one's life. To provide the condition for the honoring of covenants in

[9] *Leviathan*, p. 103. See also *De Cive* (edited by S. P. Lamprecht), p. 55.

[10] Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 409. In *The Elements of Law*, p. 82, Hobbes wrote: "There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called *absurd* in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction." For similar statements see *Leviathan*, p. 86, and *De Cive*, p. 44.

[11] *Leviathan*, p. 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general, a government is created by a covenant whereby the subjects promise each other to bear strict obedience to a sovereign. The sovereign, too, is morally obliged; for, although he is not one of the covenanters, he accepts the proffered post, "and in accepting it must be supposed to understand and accept the provision that the powers transferred to him are to be exercised for the preservation and commodity of all of us." [12] Taylor's basic argument is that the Laws of Nature, especially as they bear on covenants, are morally obliging *because* they are rational. It must be noted, however, that toward the end he shifts his ground radically, and there submits that Hobbes "meant quite seriously what he so often says, that the 'natural law' is the command of God, and to be obeyed *because* it is God's command." [13] This amendment brings him close to Mr. Warrender.

Mr. Warrender, too, finds that for Hobbes civilization depends less on human artifice than Professor Oakeshott would have us believe. The eternal, immutable and detailed constitution of a moral order is at hand in the Laws. If the Leviathan were destroyed, the plight of men, we may deduce, would be much less sorry and desperate than on Oakeshott's account. A social order would not have to be devised. A tradition would not have to be begun, and then carefully nurtured. The Laws require not merely that one keep one's promises meticulously, as Taylor by his concentration on covenants seems to suggest, but that one behave sociably generally, that one integrate oneself into harmonious association with one's fellows. In short, they oblige one to will peace, and to act peaceably. It is true that while this obligation applies always *in foro interno*—we are to will peace always—its operation *in foro externo* is conditional. We are never, either in the State of Nature or in civil society, obliged to act peaceably if we are in an "insecure position" and according to our own consciences "justly and reasonably afraid." This, however, is no irreparable flaw, for the Laws of Nature themselves oblige men to bring about their "validating condition", that is, to create a government either by institution or by acquisition. And once this has been done,

[12] Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 417.

[13] Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 418.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Laws truly come into their own. Although they still apply only *in foro interno* among sovereigns, domestically they provide a moral obligation to obey the government, prescribe the positive laws somewhat by fixing the duties of governments, and guide the conduct of the subject in the ways between the hedges of the positive laws. Hobbes's sovereign "is concerned with the fulfilment of validating conditions of obligation, in a system of rights and duties that he does not himself control or create except in the most trivial sense." [14] Now—and this is the prime difference between Taylor's main account and that given by Warrender—at the apex of this vast moral pyramid, reaching from the daily chores of private citizens to high eternity, is God. The subject is to obey his ruler, and both he and his ruler are to obey the Laws of Nature, not because those Laws are rational—their rationality serves only to make them knowable—but because they are the commands of a will entitled to obedience, the will of God. Mr. Warrender cannot say from the evidence whether Hobbes thought that men are morally obliged to obey simply because He is God, or because of the sure rewards and punishments He assigns. But in either case there is no doubt that there will be rewards and punishments. These perfect Hobbes's system. For, while otherwise private interests and public interests might conflict, the effect of these divine sanctions is to assure that one's duty, that is, obedience to the Laws of Nature and the positive laws, coincides exactly with one's ultimate private good (salvation).[15] Hobbes believed, Mr. Warrender is telling us, that God ordains, underwrites and enforces a social harmony.

These commentators are using key words with somewhat different meanings; yet it does not follow that a pact about the use of "obligation" and "moral" would remove the differences in their interpretations of Hobbes's social and political theory.

Is it Hobbes's view that there is a single, eternal, and correct social and political order? Or is it his view that the manners, processes and institutions of men are mainly the result of uncertain (historical) human choice? Both Mr.

[14] Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 and 322.

[15] Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-277.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warrender and Professor Taylor interpret Hobbes as finding in the Laws of Nature a great permanent constitution defining the moral duties and rights of rulers as well as subjects. Thus, as Mr. Warrender says, Hobbes is given a place in the long tradition of natural law thought.[16] Professor Oakeshott disagrees. For him the Laws of Nature are but theorems of reason, while moral rights and duties are the results of human will. Accordingly, he places Hobbes in the tradition of "Will and Artifice", not that of "Reason and Nature", and assigns *Leviathan* a prominent place at the very inception of modern political thinking. For us the first question is, How extensive is the creative power attributed by Hobbes to governments?

Are governments needed only to fortify the Laws of Nature and thereby to bring forth a social constitution always implicit in those Laws? Hobbes makes it clear that the Laws and positive laws are very different. The former are "eternal and immutable". They are propositions of logic, conclusions in a science, and as such any man can know them by right reasoning. Because positive laws deal with matters of fact, with matters logically indifferent, and so could be otherwise, and are laws only because a particular will has authority to make them, not even the most rational man can know them until they have been promulgated. Again, although the Laws show the value of "qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience," they do not describe the social or political order that men are to accept peacefully and obediently.[17] The advantage of Professor Oakeshott's distinction between "rational obligation" and "moral obligation" is that it shows that Hobbes did not tether public

[16] Warrender, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

[17] Hobbes never doubted that the discretion of the government would, and should, result in changes in the laws. For example, in comparing forms of government, he wrote: "Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws; concerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that the laws may be altered, according as men's manners change, or as the conjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth shall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it proceedeth from the change, not of the occasion, but of the minds of him or them, by whose authority the laws are made. Now it is manifest enough of itself, that the mind of one man is not so variable in that point, as are the decrees of an assembly." *The Elements of Law*, pp. 142-143.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy so closely to changeless Laws that it could not be altered drastically from time to time to suit new circumstances. Oakeshott's analysis does not hide the vast power to shape and reshape the economic, religious and political mores attributed to governments by Hobbes.

But—forgetting Oakeshott's use of "moral obligation"—can it be said that the Laws of Nature are morally obliging in Hobbes's theory? Mr. Warrender says that they are, for they are the commands of God. Undoubtedly, Hobbes thought that to call God a king, the king of kings, is to honor Him.[18] But worshiping is not reasoning; and what is appropriate to our worship must not be allowed to impede our philosophy. The evidence of willing is action (or initiation). The making of a command is an act. The Laws of Nature, however, are "immutable and eternal". And although neglect of the Laws is followed by painful consequences, those consequences are in this world, and are invariable.[19] From the human viewpoint, therefore, the Laws cannot be regarded as a set of commands. Rational men know them as propositions to be heeded because, the world being as it is, they describe the best means to self-preservation and felicity. They do not know them as imperatives to be heeded because they are expressions of an authorized will.[20] Hobbes allowed analogies no place in philosophical method. He does not use the will of God as the unifying apex of a moral system. It cannot be shown that Hobbes's science of commonwealth is a study of the constitutional law of a real body politic embracing all or a part of mankind. This impossibility, and Hobbes's insistence that a science is always conditional, make it incorrect to include Hobbes in the natural law tradition.

The same difficulty ruins Professor Taylor's main analysis. The Laws oblige men to promote peace by acting in a self-

18 The ambiguous passage in *Leviathan*, p. 105, should be read in the light of *De Cive*, p. 59; and this in turn should be read in the light of *Leviathan*, p. 308. It hardly can be doubted that even if "the same theorems" are considered as "delivered in the word of God," it is the ruler's command that gives them their quality as "laws".

19 *Leviathan*, pp. 96 and 241.

20 "It is not wisdom, but authority that makes a law." *A Dialogue of the Common Law*, p. 5. See also the definition of law given in the same work, p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistent way. This does seem to imply a Kantian "kingdom of ends". But for Hobbes the Laws of Nature are not categorical imperatives. They are only means to self-preservation and felicity. As long as the individual is not regarded as a member of a real body politic (for example, a polis or Christendom), or of an artificial body politic, a commonwealth, his only imperatives are hypothetical imperatives, counsels, "laws", which, like the law of gravitation, are to be taken into account by a man because of their importance to himself. A categorical imperative—Kant aside—is a law to be obeyed because the originating will has a real or artificial right always to be obeyed quite apart from the goods which the subject may gain through obedience.

If God cannot be used as a superior will, there is no real categorical imperative in Hobbes's theory; that is, there is no "moral obligation" before the creation of an artificial body politic. Nevertheless, something is to be gained from the analyses made by Warrender and Taylor. They misstate Hobbes's theory, and thus give undue emphasis to parts of it; yet what they thus push out of the shadows is what is easily, although not inevitably, ignored when one treats of the importance given by him to "Will and Artifice".

In assigning a place to Hobbes, Professor Oakeshott recognizes three traditions in the history of political philosophy, each with its own "master-conceptions".[21] The first is based on "Reason and Nature". The second centers on "Will and Artifice". And the third tries to combine the truths of the first two by the concept of the "Rational Will". Plato's *Republic* represents the first tradition. Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* represents the third. In another place Oakeshott holds that in politics "the enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel" on "a boundless and bottomless sea," and that politics is "the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people" by developing "the intimations of a tradition of behavior."[22] It is understandable, considering some aspects of Hobbes's theory, that Oakeshott should see *Leviathan* as "the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English lan-

[21] Oakeshott, *op. cit.*, pp. xi-xii and lii-liv.

[22] Michael Oakeshott, *Political Education* (Cambridge, 1951).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guage," and that he should pronounce that work " the head and crown " of the tradition of " Will and Artifice ". But is it not true that some of the most striking similarities between the legal and political philosophies of Hobbes and Hegel are to be found precisely in the passages, the many passages, wherein they set forth the characteristics of the good social and political order? [23] Hobbes, as well as Hegel, does not depict the social and political order as an order to be created by the will of the government. Now, if this be true, or true to a considerable degree, we then must ask if the whole truth, or even all the important part of the truth, about Hobbes is accommodated within the tradition of " Will and Artifice ".

For Hobbes the moral order is indeed the product of compromising wills. And his government is to shape and reshape the moral order, the order of propriety, not because the government has infallible knowledge of an architectonic moral order, but because unless there is one order the separate plans for survival of each man will be frustrated by those of other men, and because unless that one order is adjusted to the changing times the ship of state may be broached and swamped. Yet in an age when many like to call Hobbes a " totalitarian ", there is a need for a strong reminder that for Hobbes will and artifice are only the means by which equal individuals may achieve their common ends. The Laws of Nature, in which Hobbes's individualism and egalitarianism are enunciated, never cease to define the boundary between rational policy and its irrational opposite, covert or overt violence. Both Professor Taylor and Mr. Warrender make clear the constant relevance of the Laws of Nature in Hobbes's system.

Hobbes was a man of his century. In his day the problem of obligation, although as old as political philosophy, had taken on new practical importance as a result of the religious,

[23] There are major differences, but compare, for example, the following passages in *The Philosophy of Right* and in *Leviathan*:

(a) Hegel, #3 —Hobbes, p. 67 (custom no measure of justice);
(b) Hegel, #127—Hobbes, p. 197 (human need superior to property);
(c) Hegel, #221—Hobbes, pp. 120 and 194 (equality of subjects);
(d) Hegel, #246—Hobbes, p. 227 (unemployment);
(e) Hegel, #270—Hobbes, pp. 343, 357 and 456 (religion);
(f) Hegel, #291—Hobbes, p. 230 (the public service); and
(g) Hegel, #301—Hobbes, p. 153 (popular assemblies).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intellectual and political changes at the end of the Middle Ages. Hobbes, understandably, began by assuming that equal individuals, conscious of themselves, and self-dependent, are the only real persons. All societies are artificial. A commonwealth is only an institute, a mere "visible" union in matters mundane and religious, created to produce circumstances in which men can live. Its task is, in Saint Augustine's words, to provide "the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life."

The rôle given by Hobbes's science of commonwealth to the sovereign will determines its characteristics and circumscribes its conduct. First, it is to be a *government*. Its aim is to be the good of all subjects, not the benefit of the ruler(s), for otherwise there would be no explanation of the general utility of obedience. Second, it is to be *the* government. Its commands, and not those of barons, churches, or other factions, are the law of the land, while its coercive power, and not that of dukes, zealots, or highwaymen, alone is legitimate. Third, it is *to govern*. It is to try to influence the deliberation, and thus the future acts, of its subjects by laws. This means, first, that the laws are to be duly made and promulgated; second, that "laws" made *ex post facto* are logically impossible; and, third, that penalties inflicted as revenge, not as deterrents, are "acts of hostility", not acts of governance. Besides, Hobbes insists, the laws are not to exceed what is "needful", and are to be applied equally to nobles, ecclesiastics, the obscure and the rich alike by disinterested judges. Customs and prescriptions are not to overrule right reason either in the trial of equity cases or in legislation.[24] A civil religion is required by right reasoning, but since it would be "against the law of nature" to hold inquisition on a man's opinions, or to require him to believe as religious truth that which God has not vouchsafed to him, this will be only a "visible" church. In short, the general task of governments is to preserve individuals, and to prosper commodious living.[25] Hobbes was not a laissez-faire theorist, but this does not mean that he did not advocate a *Rechtsstaat*.

[24] *The Elements of Law*, p. 93, and *Leviathan*, pp. 67 and 182.

[25] *Leviathan*, pp. 227-228, *De Cive*, p. 142, and *The Elements of Law*, p. 180.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For him the chief data of the science of politics are that all men desire their own happiness and are virtually equal. Among such men two kinds of relationships are possible. One is war; but this is not a political solution, for, like Alexander's destruction of the Gordian knot, it overcomes the problem by destroying it, not by solving it. The other is the establishment and maintenance of a compromise, that is, a commonwealth. By its nature as an institution, existing by consent, a commonwealth is not a haphazard composition, but one that imposes rational limits on both ruler(s) and subjects. Hobbes believed that he had set forth the theorems of the science of natural justice so well "that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey." In judging his achievement, we must remember that Hobbes was writing *philosophy*, that he was not trying to pass a miracle. Whether the ruler(s) will heed, reason, and then rule well, and whether the subjects will heed, reason well, and be obedient—these are questions of fact. The theorems will guide only men who will learn. They will not influence the incorrigibly foolish. Hobbes hoped to diminish the folly of the public and its governors. He did not aspire to reveal a fool-proof constitution.

J. B. STEWART

BARNARD COLLEGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS OF 1958—UNSTABLE STABILITY IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD

IN A WORLD shaken by upheaval, the Italians went quietly to the polls on May 25-26, 1958 and voted without disturbance for a new Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The vote, favoring the mass parties of the Centre and Left, indicated small numerical change from that of the preceding parliamentary elections, held five years previously, but showed profound shifts in the alignments of the parties and above all in their internal composition. As in 1953, no party secured a clear majority, but in 1958 the new political orientation of the country and the new trends within the political parties had a profound effect on the jockeying for position to form a new government and on the government itself. The Cabinet formed as a result of the elections indicated a left-of-centre trend within the country but in external affairs stayed close to the path of Western alliance which Italy has trod steadily since she became a Republic in 1946.

The Background

The inner shift finds its causes in the changes within Italy and in the world at large, particularly since the last nation-wide local elections, in 1956.[1] The standard of living within Italy has continued to rise, though there are still great extremes of riches and poverty. Much of the misery-ridden South has shown marked improvement, thanks in large measure to the government efforts in the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (Fund for the South) and the land-reform program, to say nothing of the beginnings of Southern industrialization, as yet in its infancy but nevertheless apparent. State intervention in economic life or *statalismo* has become

[1] See Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "The Varying Seasons of Italian Politics, 1956-57", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LXXII, No. 2, June 1957, for discussion of the period leading to the local and provincial elections of 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so marked as to have become the subject of political strife. Both IRI (*Istituto Ricostruzione Industriale*), the great state holding company with interests in wide sections of the Italian economy, and ENI (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*), the vast government-controlled natural gas and oil industry, are now expanding their activities notably. For the first time in 1957, IRI, manufacturing steel and ships, motor cars and chocolates, and once regarded as a hospital for incurably depressed industries, began to show a profit. By that same year, ENI, under the dynamic leadership of Enrico Mattei, had developed its activities to include the manufacture of synthetic rubber and fertilizer and had begun construction of atomic energy plants; it had also extended its oil operations around the Mediterranean into Africa and the Middle East and had become a factor in foreign as well as domestic policy. The same year the IRI companies were separated from the *Confindustria* complex, the Italian version of the National Association of Manufacturers, which is also the bargaining agent for Italian industry in many negotiations with trade unions.

The internal political horizon of Italy had also shown important changes since the last elections. Under President Gronchi, the office of President of the Republic had been expanded from that of the figurehead contemplated by the Constitution so that the President had become an important force in Italian political life, to the occasional discomfiture of the Prime Ministers and also of the great elder statesman, Senator Don Luigi Sturzo, now aged 84, but still intensely active politically. He has "polemicized", as the Italians put it, in the press and in the halls of Parliament against both the growing power of the President and the increasing amount of *statalismo* inherent in IRI and especially ENI. In May 1957, the Right-wing Socialists, the Social Democrats, long at swords' points with the Liberals, advocates of practically unrestricted laissez faire, withdrew from the government Coalition in the hope of reunion with the Left-wing Socialists from whom they had split ten years previously. The withdrawal of the Social Democrats caused the fall of the government of Prime Minister Segni after twenty-two months in office, and left the Christian Democrats, the mass Catholic party of the Centre, no course other than to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

go it alone as a minority or *monocolore* government—one which lasted, however, under the leadership of Prime Minister Zoli until the 1958 elections.

Events in the outside world also found their reflection in the changing mirror of Italian politics between 1956 and 1958. The government has been a staunch supporter of the West but all the Italian people have not agreed, and currents of desire for a middle course between East and West, of neo-Atlanticism and even of neutralism have made themselves felt. The Suez crisis affected Italian oil supplies, and the subsequent growing strength of Nasser caused Italians to view Egyptian developments with alarm, though some, sympathetic toward nationalism in the Middle East or else anxious for further Italian interests in Egypt, were less fearful of the trend. Italy's rôle in the whole Mediterranean world has been growing and this inevitably must affect her political outlook. The visit of President Gronchi to London just before the elections may have been prompted in part by a desire to reassure the West that Italy was continuing as one of its loyal allies, even at a time when it seemed that the lights of NATO were growing dim. But the outstanding invitation to President Nasser to visit Italy was not rescinded.

The appearance of the Sputniks in 1957-1958 caused a temporary ripple in Italian political life but the advent of Sputnik III just before the elections in the spring of 1958 went almost unnoticed. All the Sputniks, however, had served to call attention to scientific progress in the U.S.S.R. at a time when the apparent vagaries of American foreign policy were making American achievements in general appear less important than formerly. The proposal of the Russians on the eve of the elections for a pact of friendship and non-agression with Italy was too obviously a political gesture to have any real effect. The American recession was detected only by a slight fall in the rate of increase of Italian exports, but the Italians watched the American situation with more than casual interest. The calamities of France in mid-May not only knocked the Italian electoral campaign off the front pages of the Italian press on almost the eve of election but left so profound an impression of *malaise* on Italian voters as actually to have affected the voting—by driving those whose fear of Fascism was great into the camps of the Communists

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or Left-wing Socialists, where the most vocal opponents of Fascism have long been found, and by pushing those whose prime interest was stability into the camp of the Christian Democrats. During the post-election days when negotiations were being carried forward for the formation of a new Italian Cabinet, the strife in Lebanon caused profound fears for the future of all Western policy in the Middle East, and the Hungarian holocaust of executions caused deep resentment and had immediate political effects among those whose tie to the Left in Italy was primarily intellectual.

The varying trends have affected all political elections in Italy since the Second World War. The country had cast the first votes under the Republic in 1946 for a Constituent Assembly to establish a framework for their parliamentary government, and at that time the effects of war hung like a dark cloud over the whole proceeding. The next vote, the first for the Senate and Chamber, came in 1948 when Italy was just beginning to emerge from the chaos of post-war problems and was faced with the immediate threat of communism, and so the electoral battle was fought primarily on that issue. By the time of the second parliamentary elections in 1953, the country had reached a degree of prosperity but its fruits were far from shared. Many voters, furthermore, looked back at what was to them the still verdant past and vaguely longed for a return of the monarchy and even of Fascism. The election campaign of that year was fought not only under the shadow of those issues but under the incubus of an unpopular electoral law which would have given 65 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the party or group of parties polling half the total vote. In that election, victory went to the extremes of the Right and Left. By 1958 Italy found herself in a situation where the issues were no longer as simple as those on which the battle against communism had been fought in 1948 or against the "50-65" election law in 1953.

In the 1948 and 1953 parliamentary elections, the Centre was formed of a coalition consisting of the Christian Democrats and their three supporting minor party allies, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Republicans. The group had been held together by little else than its anti-communism and the three supporting parties only by their anticlerical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outlook. They had split during the intervening years, in part at least because of the fundamental differences of opinion between the Liberals and Social Democrats and because of the intransigence of the Republicans.

In their coöperative effort in the anti-communist battle of 1948, the four parties of the Centre together had secured nearly two thirds of the total vote, while the Left obtained slightly less than a third and the Right only a small fraction. By the time of the next election five years later, bickerings and disagreements had grown within the Centre coalition and within the parties themselves. These combined with the unpopular electoral law to reduce the Centre vote to just under half—49.85 per cent—and so to cause it to fail of a majority by a hair's breadth.[2] The Left increased its vote and the Right rose so much as to make it appear as a strong force in Italian politics. The 1958 elections, with slight numerical changes, saw the decline of the Right, the rise of the Left-wing Socialists under Pietro Nenni, the growth of the Christian Democrats, and the decimation of the minor lay parties, while the Communists did slightly better than maintain their *status quo*.[3] More important were the geo-

2 There were nearly 1½ million spoiled votes. A recount indicated that these contained more than enough Centre votes to have reached over 50 per cent, but the balance of political forces and the strength of the extremes made it appear politically unwise to attempt any change. See Carey and Carey, *loc. cit.*, p. 201, note 2.

3 In the vote for the Constituent Assembly, the four parties of the Centre received 47.7 per cent of the total and 276 out of 556 seats.

The number of seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate depends on the working of the electoral law. The Centre parties in general have had a more favorable position in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies, so it is necessary to pay attention primarily to the Chamber numbers where it is difficult to form a majority. The following figures refer to the Chamber only.

In 1948 the Centre obtained 62.2 per cent and a majority, 367 out of the 574 seats in the Chamber, while the Left, with 31.4 per cent of the votes, secured 183 seats. The Right obtained 4.8 per cent and 20 seats, with a scattering of 4 seats held by independents. In 1953 the Centre, with a vote of 49.85 per cent, secured 300 out of the total of 590 seats. The Communists and Left-wing Socialists, voting separate lists, together increased their total vote to 36.8 per cent and their number of seats to 216. The Right vote of 12.7 per cent netted them 69 seats. In 1958, the Centre, consisting of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republican-Radicals, received 48.4 per cent of the vote and 306 out of 596 seats. The Liberals, now a party of the Right opposition, received 3.5 per cent of the vote and 16 seats. The other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

graphical shifts in the pattern of voting, the serious differences between the parties, their alignments and their own inner composition.

The strengthening of the three mass parties was one of the important results of the election, but it was not the same in all sections of the country. In the areas least advanced economically, notably the poverty-stricken South, formerly the stronghold of the Monarchists, all three made their most spectacular gains. In the prosperous industrial triangle of the North, whose workers were the former mainstay of communism, the minor lay parties increased their numbers.

Issues in 1958

The chief issues in the 1958 campaign were those of church versus state; *statalismo;* the record of Centre accomplishment in the two preceding Parliaments; and the perennial but important question of democracy versus communism. Not one of the issues had real popular appeal. The Liberal party under its talented leader Giovanni Malagodi fought so determined a campaign against all forms of government intervention in the country's economy and so bitter a battle against their former allies of the Centre, especially the Christian Democrats, as to move the party out of the Centre and into the Right. In a country where having a job is more important than who provides it, whether government or private industry, the issue of *statalismo* had little political importance save in the halls of Parliament and of *Confindustria.* In an Italy which is a Catholic if not a deeply religious country, many people hesitated to vote against the interests of the Church. The fight against communism had been too long-continuing to make a great impression as it had ten years previously. Last of all, it was difficult as in any other country to stand on the party record after many years in office.

Since the days of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the Italians have been divided into those who fear and hate the temporal

members of the Right, consisting of two Monarchist parties and the neo-Fascists, secured only 9.5 per cent all together, and 48 seats. Even if the Liberals are added to the Right, it is still weaker than in 1953, holding 64 instead of 69 seats.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power of the Church and those who believe it should control the government; since the time of the *Risorgimento*, the Italian government has been built on the idea of separation of church and state. The 1929 Concordat between the Vatican and the Italian government, now embodied in the Constitution of Italy, lays down the principle of separation. Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, Italy's first Prime Minister after World War II, devout Catholic and believer in his Christian Democratic party as primarily a *Catholic* party, nevertheless realized the importance of the anticlerical tradition and formed a government based on coöperation between Catholic and lay parties. So ably did the great Prime Minister navigate the ship of state during the first years of the Centre Coalition that even the Vatican came to respect the strength of the government. With De Gasperi's death and the succession of Amintore Fanfani to the political secretaryship of the Christian Democratic party, the power of the Church in government and party affairs began to grow. It was reported in the 1958 campaign that the only way for a man to secure employment in the still unemployment-ridden South was through the intervention of a priest, a petty local government official, or a deputy in the Chamber and that no one was able to run for election anywhere in the country on the Christian Democratic ticket without Church approval.

The Left-wing parties have taken comparatively little part in the argument, as both Left-wing Socialists and Communists have tried to play down their anticlerical slant in an effort to attract observing Catholics to their folds. The Communists had been among those voting to include the Vatican Concordat in the Constitution, merely to show for political reasons that they did not believe religion to be an opiate for the people—at least in Italy. Despite the fact that membership in the Communist party has been at least theoretical grounds for excommunication, the Communists include many good Catholics in their ranks and the excommunication has been more noted in the breach than in the observance.

Events in the winter and spring of 1957-1958 augmented the fear of many Italians of all political complexions as to increasing interference of the Church in government affairs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and made the anticlericalism of the minor lay parties all the more pronounced. Matters came to a head when a civil court sentenced the Bishop of Prato for his violent objection to a civil rather than a religious ceremony for two of his parishoners, though either is valid under Italian law. After the sentence, the Pope canceled a celebration and Cardinal Lercaro of Bologna ordered mourning in all the churches of his diocese, including Prato. The second difficulty occurred early in May when the College of Bishops issued an appeal to all Catholics to vote, also to vote in a way "not to compromise their religion" and "not to waste their votes". All of this presumably implied a vote for the Christian Democrats, rather than for the small minor lay parties or those of the Left or even the Right. This was spelled out by the statements of Catholic Action, the auxiliary Christian Democratic organization, through its newspaper *Il Quotidiano*. To many people, this was another indication that the Church had overstepped the boundaries, but to others it was merely an announcement that the Church realized that the time had come to call a halt to the growing anti-Church feeling of the country. The lay parties not only used the issue with full force in the election campaign of 1958 but the small Republican party even lodged a formal complaint with Prime Minister Zoli concerning the statements. The minor parties' anticlerical campaign served them little immediate purpose, judging by the small size of their vote, but was important enough so that after the election Amintore Fanfani, in his Senate speech appealing for support for him to form a government, implied that it would be a task of the new government to keep church and state separate.

The Christian Democrats

The Christian Democratic party ran its 1958 campaign without the aid of its former allies and was even attacked by them, especially by the Liberals. Under the slogan of "progress without hazards", the Christian Democrats campaigned on their record of what Fanfani called in his campaign speeches "difficult if not sterile years", and reported on their far from negligible record of social and economic progress during the first two parliaments—land reform, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upbuilding of the South, better housing for the poor, stabilization of the currency and the country's economic position, and the development of a generally more prosperous Italy. Nor did the Christian Democrats fail to dwell on the bitter cruelties of communism in Communist-dominated countries, especially Hungary. The party campaign tried to be all things to all men, for it was designed to appeal to the multifarious types of non-Communist people traditionally attracted to the Christian Democrats and including landowners and industrialists, professional men, artisans and petty bourgeois generally, industrial workers and small individual peasants.

The campaign program had been worked out by a "Committee of 102", which in point of fact did little more than ratify the program ably prepared by Fanfani. The whole campaign was run under his personal direction and once more proved his brilliant organizing ability. Placing less emphasis than formerly on outdoor political meetings and availing himself of a lesson learned from Communist leaders, he developed a cellular plan of organizing young militants, one young man, one woman and one cell chief in each community to carry on a door-to-door campaign and to talk to individuals in the *trattorie* and as they walked in the hour of the evening *passaggiata*. He had used the Sicilian regional elections of 1955 as a trial balloon for this type of organization, generally referred to as capillary, then carried it on with considerable success in the local elections of 1956, and developed it to a higher point in 1958. He met difficulties in various places and was less than successful in Southern villages where local organizers were lacking and where it was necessary to send in Northern activists. There were, furthermore, many among the Christian Democrats who objected to the Fanfani emphasis on organization, for they believed it formed an entrenched party bureaucracy and took away the character of the party as an organ of opinion.

Those who had seen or taken part in the accomplishments or machinery of the Centre voted for the Christian Democrats, as did those who believed them to be the only continuing bulwark against communism, those who favored the party as the vehicle of stability, particularly in the face of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the French crisis of the spring, those Catholics who heeded the Church appeal as to the direction of their votes, not to mention the many individuals who had secured personal profit or advantage during the years the Christian Democrats had been in office. As a result, the total vote of the Christian Democrats rose more than that of any other party,[4] despite the electoral law favoring the smaller parties.

While some of the increase in the party vote merely recouped the losses of 1953 due to the unfortunate electoral law of that year, the rest was part of the marked trend in 1958 toward all the mass parties. The Christian Democratic gains were less notable in the provincial capitals and in the economically advanced sections of the country than in the South.

The Christian Democratic gain was a personal victory for Fanfani, who is clearly in command of the team, for his personal friends and followers secured the largest number of the party seats in Parliament. The team is not one, however, that plays as a unit. Not only are there groups and currents within the party, far different from the ones when Prime Minister de Gasperi had led it, but it has become primarily a congeries of different followers of different leaders. The party trends have also changed even since the days when the dedicated young men of the group of leftward-oriented *Iniziative Democratica* under Fanfani's leadership took over the helm at the Naples Congress of the party in 1954 and then assumed the dominant place in the government. They no longer have the fine flair of reforming zeal which was then their chief characteristic but now are chiefly interested in a disciplined, well-organized party. Certain of the *Iniziative*, especially some of the "notables" who held office in the Segni government, are far from content with the new direction.

[4] With a vote of 15.2 per cent of the total for the Constituent Assembly, the Christian Democrats then shot up to 48.7 per cent in 1948, receded to 40.1 per cent in 1953, then crept up in 1958 to 42.4 per cent. The number of Christian Democratic seats was 207 out of 556 in the Constituent Assembly, 305 out of 574 in 1948, 263 out of 590 in 1953 and 273 out of 596 in 1958. Under the complicated system of proportional representation in the 1958 law, the Christian Democrats would have had to get 4 million more votes to assure an absolute majority and a million more votes than in 1953 to get even the same number of seats in the Chamber as in that year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other groups have supplanted the *Iniziative* as exponents of the party leftward trend. The *Forze Sociali*, the political arm of the Catholic trade union, *Confederazione Italiana dei Sindicati Lavoratori* (CISL), under its long-continuing leader, Giulio Pastore, had become important enough by 1958 to warrant a Cabinet seat for him in the first government after the elections. Another leftist group is that of the *Gronchiani*, those who had been close to President Gronchi when he was still in Parliament and who have followed him in the belief in an increase in the power of the presidency.

These groups, however, are less important today than the increasingly strong *Base* of Milan, backed by Enrico Mattei, head of ENI, and under the leadership of the publicist Luigi Granella of Milan. Causing trepidation among those who fear its leftward orientation, the *Base* has pushed forward in Christian Democratic party councils with a program of nationalization of the sources of energy, steel and credit, greater state control of business and industry, an antitrust law, more land reform and greater development of the South, and more emphasis on carrying out the Vanoni plan for stabilization against unemployment—a program with much in common with that of the Social Democrats. It was at least partly because of the strength of this group that the Christian Democrats were able to find common ground with the Social Democrats to form a government after the 1958 elections.

The Christian Democratic Right is much less organized than its Left, and former currents such as the *Vespa* of 1953 have entirely disappeared. One of the most important leaders of the Right today is Minister Andreotti, the head of the small, charmingly named current of *primavera* or "springtime". Strongly entrenched in Lazio, the district around Rome, Andreotti was returned to Parliament in the 1958 elections by such a large vote as to assure him a Cabinet post again. He was accordingly given the important assignment of Minister of the Treasury in the post-election Fanfani Cabinet—a reassuring sign to those who feared the strength of the leftward trend in that Cabinet might imperil Italy's stable finances. The other strong men of the Right came off less well in 1958, for the able former Prime Minister Scelba refused to take part in the Cabinet and former Foreign Minister Pella was not included in the roster.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Christian Democratic party is numerically smaller than that of its great auxiliaries, such as Catholic Action, the trade union CISL, the workers' welfare organization, *Associazione Cattolica dei Lavoratori Italiani* (ACLI), and the organization of small farmer-peasants, the *Coltivatori Diretti*. Catholic Action, the most powerful of the organizations, is reported to have some three million members as compared to the estimated one million—undoubtedly a high estimate—members of the party itself. Under the political leadership of Luigi Gedda, Catholic Action with its sub-organization, the Civic Committees, is suspicious of democracy and is the descendant of nineteenth-century reactionary political Catholicism. It is reported that Gedda and Fanfani do not see eye to eye and that Fanfani refused to accept the candidates proposed by the Civic Committees in the 1958 elections. It was thought by some observers that the Church no longer primarily deals indirectly through Catholic Action but is taking a more direct part in Christian Democratic politics. This, however, should not lead one to minimize the Action's continuing importance as a conservative and even reactionary force among the Christian Democrats.

The Communists

The Communists, second in numbers only to the Christian Democrats in Italy and the largest Communist party in Western Europe, managed to do slightly more than hold their own in the 1958 elections, increasing their vote over that in 1953 by a tenth of one per cent. It had been thought that defections from party membership after the Hungarian tragedy, amounting to roughly some 300,000, might indicate that there would be a real Communist loss at the polls. The administrative elections of 1956 in which the Communists had lost markedly were regarded as a harbinger of events to come in 1958, and there were continuing signs of strife within the party ranks. The membership had declined, primarily among the intellectual élite of the party and among the comparatively prosperous workers in the industrial triangle of the North. In 1958, however, the losses were more than counterbalanced by a gain among the still abysmally poor peasants and landless agricultural day laborers—the *braccianti*, those who work with their arms—especially in the South,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and among the young new voters whose allegiance the Communists had striven ceaselessly to capture. As a whole the rank and file of the voters whom the Communists attracted were little disturbed by events outside their own particular circle of misery, whether in Calabria, Naples or the Po Delta, and were ready to follow those who promised them surcease.

With the gains and losses balanced, the Communists received approximately a fifth of all the votes cast in Italy in 1958, as they have consistently done in all Italian post-war elections.[5] The position of the party has changed, however. It lost in the North but gained notably in the South; it lost votes in the urban centers but won them in the rural areas; it lost among the middle classes and the more prosperous workers and gained among the peasants, especially in the South and the poorer agricultural sections of the North. The Communist party today is increasingly composed of poor Southern peasants—a far different group from that of the industrial workers of the Northern cities among whom its strength formerly lay.

The party is entirely aware of its changing composition and has encouraged it. The 1958 campaign of the Communists had been waged by fighting for the uncommitted sections of the leftward-oriented populace, especially in the South. The leaders talked less of their version of "democracy" and less of foreign affairs than they had in 1953 and more of local scandals and dishonesty in government. Their campaign concentrated little of its fire on the zones of "red Emilia", Tuscany and Umbria where their votes and organization are secure and where they regularly get large numbers of voters among the sharecroppers known as *mezzadri* and among the *braccianti*.

[5] In the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the Communists secured 19 per cent of the votes (4,342,722) and 104 of the seats; in 1948 they won, together with the Left-wing Socialists, 31.1 per cent of the vote and 183 seats; in the 1951-52 local elections, the Communist vote alone was 20.2 per cent (4,495,681); in the 1953 parliamentary elections, the Communist vote was 22.6 per cent (6,120,709) which netted 153 seats; in the provincial elections of 1956, their vote was 19 per cent (4,336,686); in 1958 the 22.7 per cent of the total won by the Communists represented a vote of 6,700,812 and gave them 140 seats in the Chamber. The absolute numbers in all cases should be thought of in the context of the rising size of the electorate and numbers of valid votes cast. The exact number of votes is given in the case of the Communists because of special concern about this party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The leadership of the Communist party has been in a state of continuing crisis since the Hungarian uprising. At the time this occurred, a number of important intellectuals, such as Antonio Giolitti, grandson of the famous Giolitti, left the party and others such as Senator Eugenio Reale and Deputy Onofri were expelled. Giolitti, turning from the Communists early in 1957, joined the Left-wing Socialists and won election as their candidate in Turin in 1958, carrying with him into the Socialist camp a large number of his former Communist followers.

The great division in Communist ranks is over the question of revisionism, which in the last analysis means whether or not to be followers of the line of Moscow or to pursue a more independent path. There are large, possibly increasing, numbers of Italian Communists who prefer their communism à la Tito instead of à la Khrushchev. There are, furthermore, differences between the young Communists and the old guard, the hard-bitten fighters of pre-war days who have followed the Russian revolutionary line through thick and thin; between those who have come to have a vested interest in the *apparato* or party machine; and between the Left and Right of the party, for the latter is anxious to return to a " popular front " with the Left-wing Socialists.

The position of Palmiro Togliatti as party leader has changed, certainly in part because of his own ill-health. Shot in 1948 by a young Sicilian Fascist, and later injured in an automobile accident, he has had bouts of illness since then, so serious as to necessitate his withdrawal from the 1958 campaign for all but the most crucial speeches—as, for example, the windup two days before the election when, addressing a crowd of some 250,000 people in the great square in front of the Church of St. John Lateran in Rome, he appeared to have lost none of his old oratorial fire. His political line as well as his health has been seriously questioned in these latter days. An intellectual, a man of culture and education, not a revolutionary by temperament, admittedly fond of the ladies, Togliatti has led the party since 1926 and has always kept a middle course between extremes. Trained in the U.S.S.R. and close friend of Stalin, Togliatti was clearly amazed at the policy of de-Stalinization which he followed with difficulty. He was not one of those who ruthlessly wel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comed the Russians in Budapest and tried to justify Russian intervention there only as "a necessity, if a hard one".

In view of Togliatti's illness and the growing extent of revisionism within the Communist ranks, the question of a successor has become one of cardinal importance. The most likely heir apparent is Luigi Longo. Relied on in general by Moscow, Longo is not an intellectual or even a good negotiating politician, but a driver, fighter and organizer of ability and a man of greater ruthlessness than Togliatti. Next to him in importance come Amendola, Pajeta and Ingrao, all tending toward the revisionist position and all members of the Communist party Secretariat of twelve members. This is now the controlling organ of the party instead of the Directorate of twenty-one members which has become secondary in importance. Old Stalinists like Secchia and Scoccimarro have been relegated either to a vague General Commission of Control, with little power, or to minor jobs of various kinds, while the brilliant logician and parliamentarian Terracino seems to be playing a kind of lone parliamentary wolf.

From Left to Right

The Left-wing Socialist party of Pietro Nenni was the other real victor beside the Christian Democrats in the 1958 elections. So steady has been the Socialists' advance in the last years [6] as to make them a factor of prime importance in the Italian political future. Important as were their gains in 1958, they included, nevertheless, the largest number of the votes of the two splinter Socialist parties, the Popular Unity and the Union of Independent Socialists.

Like the Communists and the Christian Democrats, the Left-wing Socialists made their most notable gains in the South, but, unlike the Communists, they made greater progress in the cities than the countryside. This incipient urbanization of the Socialists in the future may be one way in

[6] The Left-wing Socialists ran ahead of the Communists in the vote for the Constituent Assembly, with a vote of 20.7 per cent, and won 115 seats, but that was before the split in 1947. In 1948 the Socialists ran joint lists with the Communists. In the 1953 elections, the Socialists, running alone, secured 12.7 per cent and got 75 seats. In 1958 they won 14.2 per cent and increased their number of seats to 84.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which they may grow apart from the increasingly agrarian Communists.

The Left-wing Socialists are somewhat smaller in numbers than the Communists, however. Before the Russian Revolution, they had both been part of the same party as had the Social Democrats. As the united party could not make up its collective mind whether to follow the path of reform or revolution, it split and the Italian Communists founded their own party in 1921. When the Socialists entered unity of action pacts with the Communists in 1934 and 1945, there was another split, and in 1947 many of the leaders followed Giuseppe Saragat in founding the Social Democratic party. The larger number of the rank and file of the Socialists stayed with Nenni and were aided by the Communists in ways other than by mere moral backing. By the next parliamentary elections, in 1953, the Socialists had become strong enough to stand on their own feet, at least to the extent of running separate electoral lists, as they did again in 1958.

The Left-wing Socialists have always attracted those who are not willing to go as far as the Communists, particularly in following the vagaries of the Russian party line; the Social Democrats have attracted middle-class rather than working-class adherents and those who will have no trek with the Communists. Fighting for house cleaning in the city and regional governments, the Left-wing Socialists emerged in a position of some power in the local and provincial elections of 1956. The Social Democrats also made something of a comeback that year after the bad *débâcle* they had suffered in 1953. So the desire for unification, latent in both parties, came to the fore with their new upsurge of power. They had not forgotten that before the split of 1947, the Socialists had showed themselves stronger than the Communists; but the Socialists have been in the position in relation to the Communists of the girl who wouldn't say yes and wouldn't say no. Instead of continuing to work for Socialist reunification, the Left-wing Socialists have recently come to regard the Social Democrats as small potatoes and have been looking hopefully toward the Christian Democrats.

Within his own party, Pietro Nenni is one of the many *autonomisti* who wish a break with the Communists, but who also fear losing their support. The Socialists also have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among their number many *carristi* who, as their name implies, were even in favor of Russian tanks in the streets of Budapest. This group was too strong for Nenni at the Party Congress in Venice early in 1957, when he issued a call for independence, but failed in the attempt. After the 1958 elections, Nenni, horrified by the Hungarian executions of June 1958, made it clear that he objected "not to an individual but a system" and secured support of the Party Directorate for his immediate refusal of a new unity of action pact between the two parties. Nenni, nevertheless, still continues in a position of ambivalence, for he is unwilling to cut his bark absolutely free of Communist mooring ropes.

There was little talk of Socialist reunification during the 1958 campaign but the issue was not forgotten. The Social Democrats, still under Giuseppe Saragat, are far from united in their own wishes. Starting their career as an independent political party in the national elections of 1948, they have always been a small but vital group of Right-wing Socialists advocating a program somewhat akin to that of the Labor party in England and adhering to the Socialist International. They fought their own electoral battle in 1948 and became part of the government, with Saragat coming to occupy the rôle of Deputy Prime Minister. Always undecided as to whether to fight the Socialist battle in or outside the government, the Social Democrats suffered even heavier defeat in 1953 than the other minor parties as they had to pay for their support of the government. Withdrawing from it in 1957 to pursue the will-o'-the wisp of Socialist reunification, the Social Democrats precipitated the fall of the Segni government of which they had been a part. By 1958 they had come back out of their 1953 slough of despond enough to increase their vote.[7] This was another straw to show that the wind of the country was blowing slightly left of centre.

The disunity in their own ranks is the greatest liability of the Social Democrats. The party Left, consisting of Matteotti, son of the martyred Socialist, Deputy Zagari and to a lesser extent their trade-union leaders, Tremelloni, Vigorelli

[7] In their first election fought in 1948, they received 7.1 per cent and 33 seats; in 1953, their percentage dropped to 4.5, with 19 seats; in 1958, they received a slightly larger vote, with 4.6 per cent of the total and received 23 seats.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Della Chiesa, has been interested in Socialist reunification above all else and has opposed Saragat and his followers such as Preti and Tanassi in their willingness to take part in a Centre government. When the 1958 vote and the left-of-centre trend of the country, especially within the Christian Democratic party, had made the position of the Social Democrats a determining one, those who were ready to join a Centre government headed by Fanfani won the day, but at a price. The Fanfani Cabinet contained four Social Democrats and the twenty points of program agreed to by the two parties contained the entering wedges of the socialization advocated by the Social Democrats and of the Christian Democratic forces of the *Base*.

The Republicans, somewhat akin in interest in social reform to the Social Democrats, have a tradition dating back to Mazzini and have had many strong post-war leaders among them. A party made up for the most part of intellectuals, they have had small popular appeal and have contented themselves for the most part with the rôle of the gadfly. They had been outside the government for the five years preceding the 1958 elections, having decided in an entirely intellectual manner that the pitifully small number of five deputies to which their 1953 vote had entitled them gave them no moral right to take a part. At first they supported the government "from outside" but their refusal to give a vote of confidence to Prime Minister Scelba in 1955 caused the fall of that government. Increasingly at odds with the next government, that of Antonio Segni, the Republicans in 1957 broke off any attempt at parliamentary collaboration with the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Liberals and joined the opposition.

During the 1958 election campaign, the Republicans joined with another group of intellectuals who had formed the Radical party after the break among the Liberals in 1955, and with whom they had much in common in opposition to church intervention in state affairs, opposition to the great private but not government monopolies, and support of social reforms on an increasing scale. Together the two parties formed a kind of Ivy League—the Republican symbol is the ivy leaf—which became the most vocal opponent of clerical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests in government. The Republicans once more had failed to secure the vote-getting issues and the 1958 elections reduced their strength even more than before.[8] Despite their decreased vote, they won seven seats in the Chamber, for the arrangements of the electoral law had been designed to favor the small parties.

The seven seats were not to be minimized in importance, however, for if the Republican-Radicals had been willing to give their votes to the Fanfani government of 1958, there would have been smoother sailing for it. The Republicans are important, however, for the men among them rather than their number of seats. The pro-Western orientation of the government is in no small measure due to the influence of the Republican Pacciardi, while another of their strong men, Ugo La Malfa, continues to exert influence on various levels of thinking in and out of the government.

The Liberals, a minor lay party which fell into a decline in the 1953 elections, hoped to make a comeback in 1958 but accomplished far less than had been anticipated. They have a long and honorable tradition dating back to the *Risorgimento*, but after the end of the Second World War had become so diffuse in program and following that they were unable to hold their line in the succeeding parliamentary elections, much less gain many new adherents. When their Left wing of individualists, special pleaders for freedom of speech and the press, and vitriolic opponents of the great monopolies and of church intervention in state affairs sloughed off in 1955 to form the Radical party, the Liberals no longer had to try to be all things to all men. Under the leadership of Giovanni Malagodi and with the backing of *Confindustria*, the Liberals then began to be a coherent group of economic conservatives, while still keeping a number of their followers who had long been Liberals by tradition. Attracting not only Christian Democrats to whom the reforming zeal of their Left had become antipathetic but also Monarchists whose own program was too vague and lacking in clarity, the Liberals waged their 1958 campaign on the basis of anti-

[8] In the vote for the Constituent Assembly, the Republicans secured 4.4 per cent and 23 seats; in 1948, 2.5 per cent and 9 seats; in 1953, 1.6 per cent and 5 seats; in 1958, the Republican-Radicals secured 1.4 per cent and 7 seats because of the working of the electoral law.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clericalism, almost complete economic laissez faire, opposition to *statalismo* and support of pro-Western foreign policy. Bitterly attacking their former Christian Democratic allies, the Liberals became a party of the Right, though not close enough to other parties of the far Right to make attempts at coöperation successful as yet.

Even though the Liberals overplayed their hand in the 1958 campaign, particularly in relation to advocacy of extreme laissez faire, they did slightly better than in 1953,[9] especially in the industrial North. In Milan their vote more than doubled, for they succeeded in their appeal to small industrialists and business men who are numerous in that section.

During the years the Liberals were in the same Centre Cabinet with the Social Democrats, they began to differ so sharply over economic policies and state intervention that they could finally no longer continue to live together. Advocates of unrestricted private enterprise are strange bedfellows for Socialists, even Right-wing ones, with a limited program of gradual nationalization. When the Social Democrats withdrew from the government in 1957, the Liberals temporarily breathed a sigh of relief, even though the fall of the government had been precipitated and though the Liberals themselves found no place in the new one-party government of Prime Minister Zoli. When, however, the Christian Democrats decided to ask the Social Democrats to help them form a government after the 1958 elections, there was increased bitterness among the Liberals. As they had sowed in the elections, so they were forced to reap. Since then, they have been members of the opposition, voting against the new government of Prime Minister Fanfani.

In 1953, Trieste was still occupied and a sore subject with Italian nationalists, and fascist and monarchist days had not yet receded into the background of consciousness. The Right, consisting of the Monarchists and neo-Fascists, made

[9] With a vote of 20.7 per cent, the Liberals secured 115 seats in the Constituent Assembly, but declined to 3.8 per cent in 1948, securing 18 seats. Many who might otherwise have voted Liberal turned to the Christian Democrats as the strongest opponents of communism. In 1953 the Liberals secured only 3 per cent of the vote and 13 seats. They did better in the 1956 provincial elections, with a vote of 4.2 per cent, so they took new hope. In 1958, however, they secured 3.6 per cent and 16 seats.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great gains in that year of extremes when dissatisfaction was still rife in the country and when the Centre program appeared lacking in coherency. Before the 1958 elections, however, past "glories" had been dimmed, Trieste was no longer occupied, and only the position of the German minority in the Alto Adige—the Italian name for their portion of the Tyrol and the province of Trent—remained to call forth expressions of violent nationalism. The Monarchists, furthermore, had split into two competing parties since the last parliamentary elections, the Popular Monarchists and the National Monarchists, largely on the basis of the personalities of their leaders, Achille Lauro and Alfredo Covelli. The former leaned slightly more toward the Christian Democratic Centre than the latter, especially in foreign affairs.

The star of the colorful Popular Monarchist, Achille Lauro, shot high, only to fall again rapidly. Spending freely of his own vast shipping fortune for free spaghetti and football if not bread and circuses, Lauro had been elected Mayor of Naples in 1952. Running the city heavily into debt for such construction projects as a skyscraper jutting out fantastically from the beautiful Naples skyline, and for a large football stadium instead of popular housing, Lauro ran for reëlection in 1956. He secured so large a vote as to save the Monarchists from virtual annhilation in the local elections throughout the country. The South had long been the especial haven of the Right and Lauro acquired delusions of grandeur after his Neapolitan triumph, thinking he could organize the whole *Mezzogiorno* into a great Rightist party, with vague ideas of monarchy, an even vaguer economic program, and reliance on the long-standing antipathy between North and South. In the latter part of 1957, when the accumulated debts and corruption of Naples could no longer be borne, Lauro was forced from office by the central government in Rome. Nothing daunted, he campaigned for a Senate seat in 1958 in a campaign which was nothing if not flamboyant. Even his own Naples rejected him. Extremists by tradition and history, the Neapolitans turned from his electrically lighted fountains and even from the streets which he had really improved, at least in the central sections of the city. Instead they espoused the promises of the Communists as solaces for their poverty, for in the South of Italy the jump

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the Right of a vague monarchism to the Left of the promises of communism is not so far as might be supposed.

In the country as a whole in 1958, both Monarchist parties went down to almost complete oblivion. The neo-Fascists, having gathered to themselves only those who look backward rather than face the problems of the day and those to whom violent nationalism is attractive, also came off badly.[10] The more serious Monarchist conservatives turned to the Liberals.

A Centre-Left Combination

When the chips were down, it was seen that the Christian Democrats, for all their increased winnings, did not have enough to secure a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.[11] There were various ways in which the requisite number might have been obtained. The first would have been that of pulling together the former Centre coalition, which by adding to the Christian Democratic votes those of the Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals would have given a majority to the Centre. This arrangement would have been far from easy, not to say impossible immediately after the elections, for too much water had flowed over the dam and too much bitterness had been engendered. A second possible combination would have been a Centre-Right majority with the Christian Democrats, Liberals, the two Monarchist

[10] The neo-Fascists or *Missini* (so called from the initials of their name, the *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, MSI) were not allowed to run for election in the Constituent Assembly, when the Monarchist and other Rightist groups secured 8.1 per cent and 46 seats. In 1948 the total Right-wing vote was 4.8 per cent, of which the Monarchists' share was 2.8 per cent and 14 seats, while the neo-Fascists obtained 2 per cent and 6 seats. In 1953 the total Right won 12.7 per cent and 69 seats, of which the Monarchists secured 6.9 per cent and 40 seats and the neo-Fascists 5.8 per cent and 29 seats. In 1958 the Popular Monarchists secured 2.6 per cent and 13 seats, the National Monarchists 2.2 per cent and 10 seats, while the neo-Fascists, with a vote of 4.7 per cent, secured 25 seats.

[11] In the Chamber of Deputies, with a total of 596 seats, 299 are necessary for a majority, of which the Christian Democrats secured 273. In the Senate, with 253 members, the Christian Democrats secured 131 seats and so found it much less difficult to form a majority than in the Chamber. When the vote was taken in the Senate on July 13, 1958, of the 241 votes cast (there were 12 absences, including 5 of the Life Senators), the 128 Christian Democrats present voted en bloc for the government, together with the 5 Social Democrats, so the government had a majority. There were 2 abstentions (1 from the Alto Adige, with the second Alto Adige member absent, and 1 from the Val d'Aosta) and 111 votes against the government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parties and the neo-Fascists, which would have given an even larger numerical majority. At a time when the Right had suffered severe losses at the polls and the preferences in Christian Democratic voting had shown the party to be oriented clearly left of centre, the trend of public opinion would have been against such a government, to say nothing of the thinking of the Christian Democratic leaders for the most part. A third possibility would have been a Centre-Left majority of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans which would have a somewhat smaller majority than a Centre-Right combination but was more clearly in line with the thinking of the country. The Republicans, however, refused to commit themselves until after their party convention to be held in the late autumn of 1958 and preferred a policy of "benevolent abstention". The Social Democrats, though seriously divided as to the wisdom of their action, agreed to join the government—but at a price, for they secured four seats in the Cabinet. The *Süd Tiroler Volkspartei,* a kind of Tyrolean Christian Democratic group with separatist tendencies, with three votes, refused to go along with its Italian-speaking larger sister because of the strong German minority feeling in the Alto Adige and preferred a policy of abstention, as did the one representative of the Val d'Aosta, the primarily French-speaking section of the northwest of Italy. In view of the razor-thin edge of the majority, the vote of Adriano Olivetti, brilliant, socially-minded industrialist, elected as the sole representative of his *Communità* party, became of crucial importance. He decided to go along with the government, realizing that his program of more social reform in the South, of increased importance for the workers and peasants, and of regional and city planning would be helped thereby.

The extraordinary organizer and strong man of the Christian Democrats today, Amintore Fanfani, aged 50, was made Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Once before, in 1954, he had been appointed Prime Minister but had failed to secure a vote of confidence, largely because of the weakness of his party after the 1953 elections and because he, as a man of the Left, formed a Cabinet primarily of the Right and so succeeded in pleasing no one. Today the Christian Democrats are not only stronger in numbers but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the party is better organized and the cards are being played better. There are weaknesses in the Cabinet, however. None of the party "notables", including the former Prime Ministers Pella, Scelba or Zoli, are included and only at the last minute was former Prime Minister Segni made Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Nor is Giuseppe Saragat again in the government, preferring to try to steer his troubled Social Democratic ship among the shoals of its internal dissensions.

If the Fanfani government fails, there still remains the possibility of a one-party *monocolore* government such as there was under Prime Minister Zoli. In no case could there be a lack of any government such as had been the situation in France under the Fourth Republic when attempts to form a government had failed, for in Italy a Cabinet holds on after its fall until a new one is secured. Although any Italian Cabinet must spend too much of its time trying to keep in the saddle, Italian governments have not fallen with great regularity, for there have been only five since the days of De Gasperi until the present Fanfani government. The important facts in the situation today are that, no matter which way the pawns are shifted, Italy shows no signs of deserting the path of democracy and of Western alliance, although internally it is clearly moving toward a modified socialism.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY
ANDREW GALBRAITH CAREY

NEW YORK, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEWS

Dilemmas of Politics. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958.—x, 390 pp. $7.50.

Dilemmas of Politics is a just title for this book of essays which, moving from questions as to the nature and methods of political science, through the whole range of problems of politics, government and international relations in our time, to ultimate issues of man, history, politics and fate, is fraught with the serious sadness of the unanswerable. Professor Morgenthau is a superb critic of wrong attitudes, wrong approaches, wrong posings of alternatives, wrong commitments, wrong answers, by scholars, statesmen and public opinion. He justly indicts wrong conceptions of what may be accomplished and effectively sought in the relations of nations, wrong views of the powers and duties of statesmen and of the instrumentalities of statecraft, wrong ideas of the proper nexus of leaders and people, wrong conceits as to context, as to the choices available under conditions of time, space, history and human nature, and, above all, wrong views as to the scope of social science and the function in politics of ethical norms.

Morgenthau has sympathetic understanding of those who have sought to provide general answers to the whole issue of man, who, spiritual and moral in aspiration, is yet inescapably political, inevitably selfish, and eager to possess and use power, itself necessary to any accomplishment, yet forever tainted with the guilt which is the corollary of individuation. Aware of *that* dilemma, Morgenthau is forced to stress the failures and limitations of even the greatest and most valuable insights. He insists that neither the use of imagination and the perception of a needful religious attitude in Toynbee nor the emphasis on the need for the objective standards of a public philosophy by Walter Lippmann, singly or in combination, gives us the security and clear direction of adequate answers as to destiny and duty.

Conscious of our tragic lot, we can strive to escape the sin of pride, and not least the positivist pride of a facile scientism. Likewise, we can avoid the delusions of a utopia of misplaced moral idealism. Further deponent sayeth not, nor can say. For, while individuals may attain, what they need, a religious attitude

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward life, a shared commitment to a specific religion is unattainable; and it is by no means certain that a new Age of Religion would mean a better civilization. Likewise, while a public philosophy grounded in natural law would be greatly valuable, the danger as well as the difficulty of natural law teaching is its tendency to identify particular established ways with eternal truth, and thereby actually to hamper the effective search for principled, yet empirically relevant, adjustment and adaptation to changing conditions and needs.

A swift and complex age demands relevant positive action based on a realistic awareness of its facts, its trends and its possibilities. These must be assessed with knowledge of the tradition of human experience. Yet certainties are not available; and the noblest constructions of the destinies of man, and of the duties, potentialities and limitations of the political order, though they may inspire, enlighten and correct, cannot properly convince. They constitute an inadequate guide to action. Philosophers cannot become kings, without abandoning their high rôle through immersion in the contingent. Yet by the same token the statesman, however much he needs enlightenment and perspective, cannot and should not become a philosopher. The statesman must indeed assess rationally his own rôle, not less than the situation, but he must not lose his energy and the fingertip feeling by which it is geared and steered. The political philosopher, appreciative of the requirements, and the metes and bounds, of political action, must also be a rational critic of policy, prospectively where possible, and retrospectively always. Yet a gap remains. "Here, in this inescapable tension between reason and experience, between theoretical and practical knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and the twilight of political action, is indeed the ultimate dilemma of politics."

That chastening sentence, which concludes the book, has a balanced air, and appears just. Yet if, for all the contingency of life itself and the mixed nature of politics as the art of ordering for reasoned purposes creatures inherently ambivalent, there are indeed eternal verities, at once the imperative limitations and the liberating enablings of meaningful existence, then surely the rational task, shared by political philosopher and statesman, is the creation, and the re-creation anew for each age, of a buckle which joins that reason and that experience. Mediating principles, tested and criticized, as well as formulated, in the light of ultimates, and themselves used as criteria, and again thereby tested, in coping with immediacies, are the common ground. The political philosopher must yet strive to provide a positive doctrine for his age.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For our own time, Professor Morgenthau has performed a ground-clearing service. He has attacked and undermined false approaches and wrongly posed issues. Thereby he rationally creates what one may call a negative frame of reference, a basis for consensus on what is unsound, wherefrom the political philosopher may proceed to the afore-mentioned task of construction. That task he has himself not undertaken. Indeed, while he serves as needful precursor, his own position, whatever his intent, seems finally to be the futility of the attempt. Yet there are counter-indications, which are even pleas for more positive construction.

Further accomplishment at his hands will, in my judgment, necessitate further probing into the concept of power, the relation of ethics to politics, and the nature and limits of possible change in human affairs by willed action and purposive conviction; for, just concepts of human limitations sometimes get perverted by Professor Morgenthau into jaundiced negativism. Thus (and I acknowledge the wrenching out of context, which does not change the inherent rashness of the judgment) "The national interest of great powers and, in good measure, the methods by which it is to be secured are impervious to ideological or institutional changes" (p. 271). That statement, surely, is the obituary of reason and experience, and of persons, who are Professor Morgenthau's lasting and sincere concern.

THOMAS I. COOK

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Political Power and the Governmental Process. By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957. —ix, 442 pp. $6.00.

In the lectures that comprise this volume of thoughtful generalization the author has drawn together strands from his many essays in the past. The pattern forecasts the design of a projected, more ambitious and fully documented treatise on comparative political institutions. The real value of the present study is not helped, I think, by its claim of methodological novelty in avoiding alike a country-by-country and a "functional" treatment and in being "a pioneering attempt to establish what lately has come to be spoken of as a 'conceptual framework.'" But this pretentiousness, if such it be, is offset by the modest and troubled prescience with which the author poses the question on which he ends the book. I shall hasten to return to this aspect of his analysis, for I believe it is hardly an overstatement to say that the question "will constitute the major prob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lem of statecraft in the second half of the twentieth century," at least in societies that maintain plural bases of power.

The author takes power for granted as the element of paramount sociopolitical significance in the "mysterious triad" that includes love and faith. Their inner reality is obscure; they are knowable in their manifestations. In his stress on power the author frankly shares a preoccupation of our age and hour. His approach is institutional, not behavioral in today's special sense of the word. In this respect his study is to be commended as an example of the continued vitality and usefulness of a method of institutional comparison and appraisal. The reader, to be sure, is constantly reminded of the existence of a sociopolitical infrastructure and of the extent to which the vogue of the unconscious is a factor in contemporary concern with the phenomena of power. The author himself is skeptical about the possibility of getting at the realities "by measuring the degree and intensity of reciprocal interactions in the various sociopolitical configurations—roughly circumscribed as the 'leader-followers' issue," for he is impressed by the number of elusive variables including those that lie in what he calls the collective unconscious.

His own conceptual framework to simplify and deepen the comparison of institutional forms and techniques is summarized in a question: "Is power concentrated in the hands of a single power holder or state organ, or is it mutually shared and reciprocally controlled by several power holders or state organs?" The criterion of shared or concentrated power must be applied at all stages of the governmental process. Such a touchstone for assaying the main alternative types is not less pertinent and fundamental because it is familiar.

The analysis advances from the introductory discussion of the political process and governmental patterns through two parts that deal, first, with "horizontal" power controls exercised within and between various organs—electoral, legislative, executive, judicial—and, second, "vertical" controls in the sense of federalism (viewed as unworkable in anything like pure form for modern national states), guarantees of individual liberties, and pluralism. The essence of the last-mentioned control "is the multitude of plural groups, which collectively represent the infinite variety of the interests of the members of the state community." It is this aspect of control that leads the author to what I find the most arresting point in the book—the incomplete prescription for the future with which it closes.

The problem that is involved is almost a dilemma. Its setting is implicit in the sympathy for balance that is present in the volume as a whole. "In the modern demo-constitutional state,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the author early remarks in drawing a main distinction, "the essence of the power process consists in the attempt to establish an equilibrium between the various competitive plural forces within the state society, with due regard to the free unfolding of the human personality." In the same spirit he finds the essence of constitutional democracy in "the unfettered participation of the most diversified plural groups in the political process." Nevertheless, in spite of their importance for the reality of the process, "the plural groups still lack commensurate legal institutionalization, let alone constitutionalization." If things go on as they are, one danger is deadlock; the delicate mechanism of interdependent but self-regarding and competitive elements may stall. Another hazard is the submergence of the individual in the regimen of the group. The author sensibly does not suggest, in the spirit of French Revolutionary thought, that the dissolution of groups is the proper and only answer. Rather, he believes in their regulation as the path to a wider constitutionalism. It is his considered opinion "that one of the crucial issues confronting the state society in the mid-twentieth century is that of overcoming the untrammeled laissez faire pluralism of our age by integrating the plural groups, parties as well as interest groups, into the political process through effective and socially enforcible legal arrangements." The author confesses that the way in which this fundamental reform can be worked out is beyond his knowledge and even his imagination. Only its direction is clear to him: "a supreme arbiter between the competing plural forces that dominate the power process and choke the individual must move in, and this can be none other than the State itself."

I think the author is correct in his focal concern and his sense of direction. The solution must respect the rôle of independently structured interests in free societies. Part of the corrective—probably more important than any other—lies in the rôle of political parties of wide membership in a system of competitive politics, able to mobilize voters in fluent combinations for majority decisions which are then administered responsibly and matured by acceptance as phases of the cumulative, moving consensus of public policy. From this standpoint, the author does not sufficiently show how political parties differ from other groups. A guiding principle for the regulation of parties—as indeed in the case of entities like labor unions—is that legal control is consistent with autonomy when it conserves and enhances the inner vitality which is the strength of voluntarism. In general, the author soundly warns us against a new mystique that might come from too much confidence in the automatic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

play of various forms of countervailing power. He properly stresses the need for institutional inventiveness. The arbitrament of mandatory action at key points through the political process must be supplemented by administrative and other devices which in various ways promote adjustment and agreement in advance of decisions and after they have been established in law and which beyond the realm of law help to carry this mood and method throughout the society.

I have shown that I concur with the author in his sense of direction. The distance to be traveled is another matter. Here the author draws the veil; argument is thus precluded. But, in truth, a discussion of the extent to which the state's arbitrament and influence may become necessary is inappropriate in societies which are engaged in the momentous experiment of providing a fair degree of economic regularity and increasing abundance while retaining their resilient pluralism.

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective. By CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958.—x, 253 pp. $4.75.

This masterly little volume is the best survey we now possess of the leading ideas in legal philosophy from their beginnings to the present day. The account extends from the law of the Old Testament to the current effort at a revival of natural law, together with a final excursus by way of systematic analysis. The emphasis is on philosophers and political theorists, and is focused upon the central propositions of their writings. It is here that Professor Friedrich's volume is particularly useful. Notwithstanding the wide divergence of positions represented and his own special sympathies, the summaries are detached and scrupulously accurate. The general perspective is from the point of view of the Continent and England. The American position of the past few years is exactly but only briefly touched upon and then only in relation to Continental ideas. The ferment in Latin-American thought is omitted altogether, perhaps because its assumptions are largely European. Professor Friedrich's volume is thus the obverse of Roscoe Pound's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* which is an analysis in terms of the main juridical concepts of the West. The present study is a search for the principal ideas behind legal speculation, their philosophical basis, and their implications for the legal order.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Professor Friedrich defines his own position as a "philosophy of experience", and, more specifically, as the "general view of the world which stresses problems" in the original Greek sense of an obstacle in our path. He thus distinguishes it from pragmatism in which problems originate in conjunction with the method employed. His approach gives him a latitude of scope and a freedom from bias in the handling of the contradictory ideas he has encountered in his survey. It also has the support of the circumstance that most inquiry takes its point of departure from a problematic situation. But problems are not formulated in a vacuum; they derive from presuppositions, and we are thus driven back to Professor Friedrich's idea of experience. He is aware, as he indicates, that to define it as broadly as he does is actually to make it almost a meaningless notion. His task, which is an inescapable one in legal analysis, is to account for both the insights of the speculative approach and the data of practical life. To say that we "experience" the results of both deprives a useful word of its legitimate meaning.

In an admirable conclusion Professor Friedrich contributes his own thoughts to some of the recurrent problems of the philosophy of law—justice and its relationship to law, authority and legitimacy, breach of law and the legal order, constitutional law as the basis of legal systems, and peace and the world community of law. He regards justice in relation to law as the problem of central importance but he rejects Hobbes's attempt to identify justice with the law, and the notion of Cicero and the Middle Ages that an unjust law is not a law. He conceives of justice as an ideal which the law approximates but never fully realizes. He holds also that it is "an objective reality, transpersonal, and not subjective," but nevertheless a "changing reality" in the sense that it must be forever realized anew. It is clear that some such idea is a necessity of legal speculation not only to direct our efforts to proper ends but to save us from the illusion that our momentary grasp of things is final. Altogether Professor Friedrich attempts no easy solutions and his hopes are kept to a minimum. What he has to say is bottomed on principles which have been the life of the West notwithstanding the follies and setbacks which have occurred. At all times he keeps a balance between dialectic and the concrete, and his unremitting search is for standards beyond that of the judgment of the particular man at the particular moment.

HUNTINGTON CAIRNS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812-1918. By Sir Lewis Namier. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1958.—x, 179 pp. $3.75.

"For forty years", Sir Lewis tells us in the introduction to this first volume of his collected essays, "I have wanted to write a history of Europe 1812-1918". One can only regret that intervening diversions have prevented the realization of a project for which the present essays must serve as substitute. They have been published before, but, brought together, they constitute a skeletal framework and furnish an idea of what Sir Lewis' history might have been.

Some brief sketches dealing with important personalities of the early part of the nineteenth century introduce two significant essays, one on the events of 1848, the other a discussion of "nationality and liberty". With 1848 Sir Lewis has dealt at length elsewhere; his characterization of that year as "seed-plot of history" is apt, as is his emphasis on the importance of developments in the Central European, particularly the Germanic, world in that crucial year. The failure of the revolution was no less important than its success might have been, for it served to orient the evolution of this Germanic world into paths that were to be ultimately disastrous for all Europe. This failure was due to the insufficiently broad basis on which the would-be reformers rested their action as well as to an unresolved duality in their approach to nationality: for too many of them the claims of the German brand had a different status from those of the Hungarian, Polish or Czech.

Bismarck was clearer in his unhampered beliefs and far abler in manipulating power. Yet Bismarck's work, his impressive achievement in the creation, then the guidance for another twenty years, of the Second Reich, was not free of a fundamental vice. There was a basic inconsistency in attaching the fortunes of the vigorous and growing German nation to those of the declining and decaying Habsburg state: the strength of the nationalistic virus could not be expected to be encouraged in one case and simultaneously suppressed in the other. Moreover, the leadership of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg states, Bismarck once gone, was markedly deficient in quality. It is mercilessly dissected in the essay "Men Who Floundered into the War". Tisza alone was endowed with real intelligence, but the consequently unduly large Hungarian influence was also retrograde and based on insufficient numbers. "The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy", the longest essay in the collection,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adequately disposes of the view that this outcome was brought about by other than internal forces.

The nineteenth century thus appears as the unfolding of a process that the French Revolution had launched. The simultaneous displacement of the existing ruling classes—the democratic process—and the assertion of the ethnic principle as the proper foundation of the state logically led to the European map of 1919. The rôle of Central Europe, especially Germany, asserting claims that she denied to others, lies at the heart of Europe's ills. It is well to have such an interpretation presented, for all that these are controversial views, a good reminder that history is the most evanescent of arts, forever changing its understanding of the past in the shifting context of the preoccupations of the present.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

Amerikas Deutschlandpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg: Kriegs- und Friedensziele, 1941-1945. By GÜNTER MOLTMANN. (Beihefte zum *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 3. Heft.) Heidelberg, Carl Winter—Universitätsverlag, 1958.—192 pp. DM 18.—.

American scholars unfamiliar with recent German writing on American foreign policy may be pleasantly surprised with the high quality of this work. If it is at all typical, the new generation of German scholars should soon recapture the high reputation for objectivity and good judgment which the older German scholarship once deservedly enjoyed.

Although the difficulty of obtaining English and American sources must have been formidable, the author appears to have consulted all the relevant published materials. His treatment is a broad one, and even well-read Americans will find instructive his comparison of the approaches of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt to the problems of peace-making, and his outstanding analysis of the idea of partitioning Germany. Other high points are his discussion of the changing material and psychological conditions affecting American policy through the war, and his finding of Soviet responsibility for both the rejection of partition and for the final fixing of the German-Polish border. The significance of the Atlantic Charter, unconditional surrender, and other "standard" topics receive equally perceptive treatment.

Moltmann himself recognizes that he was no more able to see all of the relevant documents than American writers on this same subject were. The omission is not important except for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the short period immediately preceding President Roosevelt's death, in the spring of 1945.

The most important of the missing documents all date from the month of March 1945. They are: (1) James A. Perkins' report for the Foreign Economic Administration, "Planning the Economic Control of Germany", dated March 3; (2) the State Department Directive on Germany, dated March 10; and (3) the important statement by the Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), "U. S. Policy Relating to Germany in the Initial Post-Defeat Period", dated March 23. It should be noted that President Roosevelt approved both (2) and (3), and that they provide the latest clues to the nature of his own thinking on German policy. The Perkins report, a very acute analysis of the state of our economic planning, obviously does not rank with the other two as a major policy document.

Both the State Department and IPCOG documents stated that the Control Council in Germany was to function as a central German government, with paramount authority throughout the zones. This seemed to rule out either an explicit partition, or a degree of zonal independence hardly distinguishable from partition—contrary to Mr. Morgenthau's often-stated views. Although both documents said little about reparations—this subject was to be decided later by the Reparations Commission—two principles were recognized as limiting the extent of reparations. These were the need for maintaining a minimum German standard of living, and the need for a viable German economy which would not be a heavy drain on the occupying Powers. On the latter point, for example, the IPCOG statement was that the first charge on all exports for reparations or otherwise shall be a sum necessary to pay for imports. Mr. Morgenthau had never recognized such limitations, and his opposition to them reached a high point precisely at this time. Finally, both documents recognized a large degree of Allied responsibility for the functioning of the German economy, even though the Germans were to assume responsibility for the administration of economic controls. Here again, Mr. Morgenthau's views suffered a heavy setback.

The above points, as well as others which cannot be mentioned here, indicate that just prior to his death President Roosevelt had lost much of the sympathy which he had shown for Mr. Morgenthau's proposals at Quebec. And although Mr. Morgenthau objected strenuously to the new plans, he apparently fought an unsuccessful rear-guard action, at least so far as President Roosevelt was concerned. What happened later, in the Reparations Commission and at Potsdam, is another story.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The relevance of the above will be apparent in a moment. In discussing the development of United States policy, Moltmann traces a direct connection between Mr. Morgenthau's proposals at Quebec, the economic policy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, and the economic policy of the Potsdam agreements. Similarities there certainly are, as has been pointed out by many, including Mr. Morgenthau himself. But the important fact to note is that in the State Department and IPCOG documents President Roosevelt had twice disavowed the more radical aspects of Mr. Morgenthau's economic proposals. How Mr. Morgenthau's supporters were able to conceal this fact is a major mystery story which can never be completely solved until all the relevant documents have been made available to the general public—a step which by now is surely long overdue.

Students of American wartime policy will find much of interest in Moltmann's book, for, to date, it is by far the best treatment of the subject to appear in any language.

JOHN L. CHASE

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics. By W. PHILLIPS DAVISON. A RAND Corporation Research Study. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958.—xiv, 423 pp. $7.50.

This is a splendid example of the very best in contemporary social science literature. The author has done his dramatic and important subject ample justice and has succeeded admirably in the difficult task of drawing together many and diverse data to present us with a well-written, fast moving narrative as well as an astute analysis of the Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949. Evidently the product of many years of intensive work, Davison's study is of great interest, not only as a "study in cold war politics", but also as an account of the peaceful employment of airpower for political ends. Above all, the book is a remarkable case study of the fight of two and a-half million Berliners for political and economic survival.

When the Soviet leaders imposed the blockade, the logic of the situation appeared to guarantee the success of their plan. This was to force upon the three Western Powers in Berlin the choice of either abandoning the city, or acceding to Soviet demands which would have given the Russian leaders a veto over the political and economic restoration of Western Germany and an opportunity to gain control of all of Germany. The Soviet plan, as Davison points out, was well considered and seemed fool-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proof—the amazing thing was that it failed. The margin of defeat was fantastically small. We cannot really blame either the Soviet initiators for overestimating their chances of success or the many Western leaders who underestimated the potentialities of the airlift, the morale of the Berliners, and the determination of their leaders to keep Berlin free.

In a very real sense, this book is a tribute—a tribute to the men who organized and operated the airlift and who successfully matched their skill for rapid and remarkable improvisation against the calculating determination of their Soviet opponent, and a tribute to the people of West Berlin and their leaders. It was largely because of these men and women that the Soviet plan backfired. When the blockade ended, the West was in a far stronger position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than when it began. Its defeat not only frustrated Soviet attempts to halt the economic and political recovery of Western Germany, but raised Western prestige and greatly reduced Soviet influence in Western Europe in general and in Western Germany in particular. It promoted the identification of Western Germany and West Berlin with the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization and converted West Berlin from a tenuous toe hold into a militant outpost of the West behind the Iron Curtain.

Considered as a study of a great city fighting for survival, Davison's book provides a wealth of material for the historian tracing the development of Berlin from the holocaust of the mid-forties to the anti-Communist uprising of the mid-fifties; it should be of great interest to the political scientist studying the interaction between public opinion and policy-makers, to the sociologist interested in community development, and to the student of tension and crisis psychology. In more ways than one, the reader detects a curious parallel between the reactions of the people of Berlin and those of the population of another great metropolitan center in an earlier, if graver, crisis—the London *Blitz*. To this reviewer, one of the most interesting by-products of the blockade was its apparent cathartic effect on the people of Hitler's former capital. Their staunch resistance to the new totalitarian threat seems to have been felt by many of them as a form of atonement for the sins of the past. As one Berliner later wrote: "The city in the shadow of Stalin showed that the German is better than his reputation; that he knows how to fight stubbornly and well for a cause when he is convinced of the righteousness of his task."

LEWIS J. EDINGER

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy in Western Germany. By RICHARD HISCOCKS. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1957.—ix, 324 pp. $7.50.

Most of the all but countless array of books on Western Germany, published in the past eight years, have passed on to an early oblivion partly because of the rapidly changing perspective in the international scene and partly because a sizable majority of them were written as *reportage* by foreign press correspondents. Norbert Muhlen's *The Return of Germany* (1953) survived the Paris treaties of 1955 as an original study owing to the remarkable insight of the author and his exceptional knowledge of the subject. Alfred Grosser's *L'Allemagne de l'occident* (1953) survived because of its scrupulous documentation and scholarship and its comprehensive scope. Neither as original as Muhlen's book nor as comprehensive as that of Grosser, Richard Hiscocks' excellent study is not less important because it confines itself to the examination of a single pivotal problem in all its aspects. In this volume the reader will find very little about the economic recovery which has made Western Germany the largest creditor in the European Payments Union or about the introduction of the Federal Republic into the Western community of nations. Hiscocks' overriding purpose is rather a critical and reflective examination of the problem of democracy in Western Germany, a task which he has executed with a lucidity, historical accuracy and exceptionally good judgment that make his volume one of enduring value.

Being a political scientist, Professor Hiscocks' study is in the first instance an institutional analysis of the Federal Republic, its Basic Law, its political parties, the federal and *Laender* governments, the civil service, and the trade unions. If his approach is primarily one of functional analysis, it should be said that he always has one eye cocked on historical perspective. The upshot of his argument is that, while solid democratic foundations have been laid, Western Germany cannot yet be considered a mature democracy. He acknowledges that Chancellor Adenauer has shown to his people that Germany can be governed efficiently under a democratic constitution, that two great fundamentally democratic parties have established secure positions (though he is critical of German party discipline or *Fraktionszwang*) and that extreme groups on the Right and Left have had no real success. But, since he believes that it is doing a disservice to the cause of democracy to paint too favorable a picture or to underrate present difficulties, as he thinks Americans have been inclined to do, Hiscocks has written above

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all a critique. In the opinion of this reviewer it is essentially fair.

He is particularly critical of what he calls—borrowing the phrase from Theodor Eschenburg—"Chancellor-Democracy". By this he means Dr. Adenauer's failure to develop democratic habits and conventions, his handling of the Cabinet as an instrument of government rather than as a team of colleagues with collective responsibility, and the employment of his state-secretary, Globke, as a kind of chief of staff "whose great influence is upsetting the balance of the constitution", much to the disadvantage of the deputy-chancellor Blücher. While generally critical of German federal politics, Hiscocks finds a more genuinely democratic spirit in the administration of the *Laender* where the antagonism between government and opposition is less rigid and parliamentary proceedings are less formal and more alive. Yet, he deplores Adenauer's frequent intervention in *Laender* elections in his effort to obtain the same majority in the *Bundesrat* which he possesses in the *Bundestag,* a fact that has led to a confusion of federal and *Land* politics and tended to discredit the federal system. The very existence of the *Bundesrat,* however, provokes such intervention. In his discussion of the civil service Hiscocks rightly criticizes the Civil Service Law of 1951 which, by reinstating in office the officials ousted after 1945 because of their Nazi connections, was responsible for the enormity of favoring collaborator civil servants at the expense of the heroic minority who resisted the Nazi régime. In the present circumstances everything depends on the younger generation to which Professor Hiscocks has dedicated his book. While admitting that German youth is still affected by apathy and cynicism, he is at pains to emphasize that it has shown a vitality, a freedom from prejudice and a modern international outlook which comprise one of the more promising features of life in Western Germany.

WALTER L. DORN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The House Without Windows: France Selects a President. By CONSTANTIN MELNIK and NATHAN LEITES. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Evanston and White Plains, Row, Peterson and Company, 1958, for the RAND Corporation.—358 pp. $6.25.

In this detailed blow-by-blow account of the French presidential election of December 1953, the authors' interest is more psychological than political, and not at all historical. Though

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they naturally tell us a great deal about what happened, their real subject is not the facts but "the sentiments, beliefs and calculations they reveal", as illustrating how political élites behave and reach decisions.

This approach is interesting and fruitful, but also dangerous. The searcher for hidden motives easily assumes that no one acts on the reasons avowed, and is then tempted to impose his own subjective judgments on his material. Assessments of men's unconscious motives (pp. 45, 91, 117, 162, 169, 178, 186, 240, 268-70, etc.) cannot be verified.

Further, this subjectivity makes it easy to view evidence in the light of the theory. M. Queuille's familiar remark on page 98 is taken out of context and misinterpreted to make him of all people "an adept of self-glorification". M. Pinay's unexpected election as premier in 1952 is cited as showing that the deputies wished to demonstrate their freedom of action by defying the prophets (p. 85), a motive which can hardly have influenced more than a dozen members. "The passion for power well-nigh compels a defeated premier to nourish a special hatred for his successor" (p. 192); this inference from 1953 ignores the eight successive premiers (1947-51) who served under their successors. The historical record is often thus carelessly handled; for instance, M. Brune was not the first senatorial, nor M. Bougenot the first non-parliamentary, cabinet minister of the Fourth Republic (p. 297); M. Corniglion-Molinier was not on M. Médecin's electoral list in 1951 (p. 163); M. Barangé did not seek reëlection in 1956 (p. 296); the *Groupe Indépendant d'Action Républicaine et Sociale* was not in M. Pinay's government (p. 296); M. Reynaud stood unsuccessfully for the premiership only once (p. 317); M. Mitterand (spelled with one "r") is not the ex-minister mentioned on pages 80, 308, 310, 356, etc., but a fellow-traveling journalist.

The authors' approach has more important consequences. They legitimately exclude the Communists as having different aims and attitudes from the rest, but when the Socialists too are treated as untypical (p. 54), and given much less attention than the other groups, is not the field of study being narrowed to fit an initial hypothesis? When "from our point of view the stories people make up are as significant as the truth" (p. 5), the whole corpus of evidence is unbalanced. Do the charges brought by one party or candidate against another even show how the accuser really thinks his rivals behave? By equating canards (said to show what is thought plausible) with facts, and even more by the assumption of superior discernment implied in their whole approach, the authors have determined in advance the character

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of their picture: one which belittles and degrades the men they are observing. French politicians often behave discreditably; but what country's public men could stand scrutiny on these terms?

Nevertheless this is a most interesting book. There are clumsy phrases (for example, "the Parliament members") and ludicrously heavy-handed passages (for example, pp. 65-66, 134, 189 on political jokes). But it is generally readable, and full of acute observations about, for instance, the atmosphere of the gathering, the differences not of policy but of psychology between the parties, the self-effacing tactics needed for success (Coty arrived without a tail coat on the morning of his election). Much light is here thrown on the behavior, mentality and ruling myths of closed-circuit politicians. Yet though this fascinating work deserves a warm welcome, it must be read with caution. It is a prosecutor's indictment rather than a judicial summing-up.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS

NUFFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD

Lost Statesman: The Strange Story of Pierre Mendès-France. By ALEXANDER WERTH. New York and London, Abelard-Schuman, 1958.—xx, 428 pp. $5.00.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading, its purpose and content being better described in the preface, for it really aims "to show Mendès-France against the background of French political life during the last 25 years, and to show just why this man of extraordinary knowledge, ability and experience has still proved, by and large, a failure and a misfit. And why, also, his Algerian policy was right from the start, and yet continued, irrationally, to be rejected by the bulk of French public opinion" (p. x). A very considerable amount of space is devoted to the discussion of the North African issue and its vicissitudes, part of it in connection with the reporting of a two-month visit by the author to North Africa in 1956. Allowing that the North African problem has played an important rôle in Mendès-France's career, the detailed and somewhat pedestrian retelling of the story of the French handling of that problem during the past three years contributes little to our knowledge. The interest of the book derives from what one is led to expect from the title.

It is part of the French paradox since the Second World War that the country has in some fundamental respects reversed hitherto prevalent trends, that it has thrown up, not least in politics, a not unimpressive collection of talent, but that all this has had little effect in improving the operation of its political machinery. Perhaps the best illustration of this condition is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unnecessarily disastrous record achieved in the imperial field. Mendès-France himself exemplifies this waste of good talent, emerging for a brief moment as an almost universally accepted hero—and not in France alone—for the essentially negative performance of negotiating the virtual abandonment of Indochina.

Yet Mendès-France stands out among French political leaders, for he has had an unusually small share in governmental participation. This fact, in combination with his acknowledged standing, raises a puzzling question. Unlike De Gaulle, another irregular product of French politics, Mendès-France has not tried to maintain a position above or outside the party system of France. He has clung to the Radical Socialist affiliation and shown himself quite capable of adapting himself to the requirements of local political life. But at the national level he has remained essentially alone.

Too young, for all his precociousness, to make a mark before the war, his eminently creditable record during the war combined with his ability gave him an opportunity to set the French financial position in order after the war. But his sensible plan was rejected and, like De Gaulle later, he withdrew. There followed a long period in the political wilderness until disaster in Indochina gave him another chance. His brilliant accomplishment raised his stock dangerously high and, partly for that very reason, his government was overthrown after it had endured a "normal" nine months. His subsequent attempt to capture the Radical Socialist party merely succeeded in disrupting the group and engendered much bitterness. His very high intelligence remains acknowledged and may explain his inability to suffer fools lightly and a tendency to be at times cavalier, not to say somewhat authoritarian, in dealing with opposition, a dubious asset in normal times.

Yet the political system of France has been unable to adjust itself satisfactorily to existing stresses and issues, hence recurrent crises, not only little-noticed falls of governments, but on occasion fundamental questionings of the régime itself. Some of France's outstanding leaders in recent times – Clemenceau for example—have not been popular men. Werth's characterization of Mendès-France seems apt that is contained in this appraisal: "Like de Gaulle, Mendès loved France, and, like de Gaulle, he had little love and respect for his countrymen. *'C'est un misanthrope,'* one of the people knowing best once told me, *'mais un misanthrope malgré lui'*" (p. xiii).

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism. By JAMES H. BILLINGTON. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958.—xvi, 217 pp. 30*s.* net; $4.80.

Until quite recently, Western students of Russian history seem to have been as obsessed with the radical and the extreme in the Russian past as are their Soviet counterparts. Mr. Billington's biography of N. K. Mikhailovsky represents the latest contribution to a most welcome tendency to break from this fixation and give attention to the long-neglected moderates. In a relatively short span of pages, Mr. Billington reviews the eventful career of one of Russia's most prominent nineteenth-century publicists and social critics. The chronological narrative follows Mikhailovsky from his student days in St. Petersburg during the dynamic 'sixties, through his brilliant years as a leading editor of the highly influential opposition journal *Annals of the Fatherland,* to his years of disillusionment during the — for Mikhailovsky — depressing 'eighties and Marxist 'nineties. In writing of each of these decades, the author skillfully moves between imaginative description of the dominant political tendencies of the period and Mikhailovsky's relationship to them.

Although a large number of articles and several books on Mikhailovsky were published in Russia before the Revolution, this is the first major work on the subject to appear in a Western language. Considering the importance of Mikhailovsky to Russian intellectual and social history, it is most unfortunate that this first full-length study accessible to Western readers should suffer defects that often mar pioneer works. One such defect is that of compensating for an earlier neglect of a subject by exaggerating its significance. Throughout the book, Mr. Billington offers arguments and judgments that greatly enhance Mikhailovsky's rôle in various political and intellectual movements but for which evidence is either totally lacking or painfully inadequate. As examples, the author presents Mikhailovsky as a leader of radical students' demonstrations in his student days; as a dominant, if not the dominant, influence on the Chaikovtsy circles and on the "to the people" movement of 1874; as the one who "set the tone for the radical support of the Serbs" in 1876; as the leader of the attack against Loris-Melikov and the potential bridge between the Melikov government reformers and the People's Will terrorists before the assassination of 1881; and, finally, as a significant influence, either directly or indirectly, on Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Plekhanov, Struve and Miliukov, to name only the most prominent figures. If these and many similar arguments were adequately documented, the reader might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agree that the closing decades of the nineteenth century in Russia formed, as Mr. Billington states, "the age which Mikhailovsky dominated." Unfortunately, they are not thus documented.

A second shortcoming in the work, it seems to this reviewer, is the rather confusing picture of Mikhailovsky that emerges. Was he for or against terror? Did he support or oppose a liberal constitution? Was he a "critical" or an "uncritical" Populist in his view of the *narod* (the masses)? At times, Mikhailovsky seems simultaneously to argue contradictory positions, and the problems this poses are not dealt with by the author. For example, with regard to Mikhailovsky's view of the *narod,* a particularly important criterion for distinguishing between various Populist factions, Mr. Billington states that, at the end of the 'seventies, Mikhailovsky changed from an uncritical to a critical Populist and no longer idolized the *narod* or regarded it as "a kind of divine will active in history." Elsewhere, however, the reader learns that Mikhailovsky continued to idolize the people "to some extent" and that his articles of 1878 (that is, at the end of the 'seventies) show a "partial acceptance of the anti-intellectual attitude" that characterized the uncritical Populists. At one point, the author states that Mikhailovsky "even expressed on occasion a longing for self-annihilation in the super-reason of the *narod,*" but he derives this, *non sequitur,* from Mikhailovsky's famous expression of his desire to dissolve himself in the *narod,* "preserving only that spark of truth and ideal which [he] succeeded in acquiring."

One reason for this lack of clarity may lie in the author's reluctance to concentrate on Mikhailovsky's world-view apart from the background narrative. Perhaps the absence of such analysis stems from Mr. Billington's expressed desire to avoid the "speculative peaks of private theories"; but it would seem that a meaningful biography of a man of thought can hardly do without such theories. Moreover, Mr. Billington in one chapter does argue the necessity of looking "within the collective psyche of the intelligentsia," although he does so in an effort to find the peculiarly Russian religious roots for the quite ordinary phenomena of social-consciousness among materially comfortable intellectuals and a support for Christian ethics among self-styled "free thinking" socialists.

ARTHUR P. MENDEL

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Factory and Manager in the USSR. By JOSEPH S. BERLINER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.—xv, 386 pp. $7.50.

This is a first-rate book on a most important subject. It describes and analyzes critical operating characteristics of industrial management under the soviet system. Owing to emigration from the USSR after World War II, many men with extensive experience in managerial posts became accessible to scholars of soviet society. Berliner carried out intensive interviewing of such men in which they detailed many aspects of their own occupational experience. This information was skillfully analyzed by him, and the regularities of his informants' responses form the principal chapters of the book.

Political analysts may have varying estimates of the importance of production decision-making as a causal factor in political affairs. There is rather wide agreement, however, that major disparities between formal political policies and the going style of industrial decision-making are bound to be a source of social turbulence. From this standpoint Berliner's study of soviet management is an invaluable source book for the evaluation of soviet society. To be sure, this subject requires continuous study for proper understanding of a system in motion. The methods and the data of this volume are a useful base line for the extension of this knowledge.

The scope of the book encompasses major elements of managerial practice (with appropriate contrasts in relation to formal policy). The operating goals of management take the form of explicit striving for salary bonuses (premiums) which have depended on the fulfillment of production plans. Successes in this sphere, and in maximizing the profit of the enterprise, have been important yardsticks of the relative capability of soviet managers. Therefore, such factors have played a large rôle in the competitive striving of managers to rise in the soviet managerial hierarchy.

An array of social arrangements has grown up to serve these ends, which also comprehend the fulfillment of production plans. Managers have developed intricate devices of creating unofficial inventories as safety factors against failures in the planning system. The product mix of enterprises has been manipulated to show a better production result. Quality of products, notably lower priority products, has been loosely regulated in the interest of showing a successful record of goods shipped. Records of operations, accounting and other things have been manipulated to serve the occupational needs of enterprise managers. Finally, there has grown up in the soviet system an elaborate and un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planned system of influence-peddling (*blat*) and expediting (the *tolkach*) which has served to smooth over the variances between planned and actual enterprise performance.

This is a fascinating book—well written, and bearing the stamp of able scholarship.

SEYMOUR MELMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. By J. G. A. POCOCK. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1957.—x, 262 pp. $5.50.

Few subjects in history are more difficult or important than past assumptions. To find them out requires great learning and intuition; to present them demands great art. Not only has Dr. Pocock ventured into this treacherous field; he has brought all three requirements to it.

He is concerned with a historiographical problem, with the relation of the historical outlook of seventeenth-century Englishmen to the study of law, a relation which held on the Continent as well. But English isolation and ignorance of other forms of law helped to produce the peculiar amalgam of the common-law mind, with Sir Edward Coke as its most important and vocal representative. In the early seventeenth century almost no one disputed the lawyers' central assumption that the common law and the constitution were immemorial. Coke, on one side, could appeal to it, but so could the Royalists; disagreement came not on the appeal to antiquity itself but on the balance of power in the ancient constitution which provides half the title of this book.

Continental writers were led to undermine this wildly unhistorical but powerful conviction in their own history by their studies of Roman and feudal law. As a result, they were able to conceive societies differently organized from their own; they could grasp notions of institutional change and development. In England, where such subjects of study were lacking at least since Maitland's "Gothic Revival" in the last half of the sixteenth century, the challenge to the traditional view was posed rather by the Norman Conquest. If it was truly a conquest, then the ancient constitution was nonsense, and the laws and institutions of England, having once been imposed by a king, could presumably be revoked by his successors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The common lawyers went on reading the past in their own terms, taking literally the Conqueror's promise to govern by the laws of King Edward. Only Sir Henry Spelman, starting as an antiquarian rather than as a lawyer, approached a real understanding of the catastrophe of the Conquest and of the true nature of feudalism. He was able to see the *feudum* as the form of precarious tenure it was rather than as the heritable tenure described by Littleton, whose definition stood with the lawyers. But Spelman's work was scattered or incomplete or unpublished, and the writings of mid-century—Dr. Pocock is especially suggestive on Harrington and Hobbes—illustrate the difficulties into which the critics of the dominant view fell because they were without Spelman's discovery. Effective use of Spelman was made only after the Restoration and then in defense of the Royalist position. Well argued though the case was by Robert Brady and others, it was too tarred with the Filmerian brush, and the Revolution of 1688 had as a side result the rude dismissal of a true historical view. And when the traditional theory, narrowed to an assertion of the antiquity of parliament, proved dubiously tenable, the men of 1688 could only abandon bad history for non-history in the contract theory.

Dr. Pocock has kept his eye firmly on the central issue. He has not strayed away into the use made of the theory in the political struggles of the time; he has not—thank heaven—given us a catalogue of what everyone said on the subject; nor has he followed up the many bypaths into which his readers must be continually tempted. One hopes, for instance, that he has only postponed the troubling question (the existence of which he recognizes) of why or how the belief was held and used in the sixteenth century, when Coke was a defender of the prerogative. Possibly, had he considered such other matters, he would have made his argument less persuasive; he could, in other words, be accused of pressing a thesis too hard. But he made the right choice. History is not a matter of all-embracing or unanswerable explanations, and what Dr. Pocock has offered is a brilliantly demonstrated interpretation of a fundamental historical truth. If his thesis does not answer all of the questions in seventeenth-century constitutional history and theory, it is safe to say that none of the questions can ever be answered without consideration of what he has to say.

R. K. WEBB

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

British Pressure Groups: Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons. By J. D. Stewart. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958.—xii, 273 pp. 30*s.*; $4.80.

This book will dispose of the view — if further evidence is needed — that pressure groups do not flourish in Britain. Dr. Stewart offers interpretations as well as facts. But in the first place every student of British politics must thank him for amassing a vast sum of information about this important subject.

The relation of pressure groups to the House of Commons is indeed the rôle about which one can most readily get information. It is not the most important. As Dr. Stewart himself continually observes, the main lines of influence run, not to Parliament or the public, but to civil servants and ministers. As a result there is a slight air of unreality about his story. The main action is usually going on off stage. He tells us, for instance, how the National Farmers Union stirred up Parliament against the government in 1943-44 over an allegedly broken pledge and how since the war it has worked through the party agriculture committees on both sides of the House. The annual price review is not examined. Yet it is in that process of bargaining that each year the agriculture subsidy—which has equaled the total net profit of the industry—is negotiated out between the government and the Union.

Given the self-imposed limits of his design, however, Dr. Stewart's execution is admirable. With a sure and sophisticated touch, he describes in what is perhaps his best chapter how even those groups that enjoy cordial relations with departments will make a "discreet" use of the House of Commons. Through friendly M.P.'s—who may themselves be members of the organization and perhaps even in receipt of a subsidy or retainer from it—amendments to legislation can be initiated and supported in Standing Committee or at the report stage. This does not mean that the group challenges the government to open parliamentary combat. It is, rather, indulging in a gentle and accepted ploy to induce officials and the minister to reconsider proposals that have been turned down in consultation or simply left undecided.

From this subtle byplay between groups and governments, we must distinguish those exceptional times when consultation has broken down. Then the group resorts to a campaign of appeal to parliamentary opinion, stirring up its contacts in the House, calling on its branches to put pressure on M.P.'s and perhaps attempting to arouse some of the public at large. Such campaigns may succeed, as the National Union of Teachers has shown.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But, originating in a breakdown of consultation, sooner or later they probably lead to a resumption of the normal relationship. Only those organizations that have not won the right of consultation—for instance, the anti-vivisectionists, the temperance societies, the Lord's Day Observance Society—follow a continuously active parliamentary tactic. The sharp contrast with the American pattern of pressure politics is what one would expect from the distribution of power in the two countries.

Dr. Stewart sets forth the orthodox view that party discipline and party principle enable governments to respond to group demands in the light of some view of the national interest. His pages illustrate profusely how party commitments have enabled and obliged governments to narrow their concessions to group demands or resist them altogether. Yet he is by no means satisfied with the orthodox view. While he skirts the argument that party policies have tended to converge, he suggests that in recent years group demands have brought forward questions to which party thought has provided no response. "Over a large field of political activity", he asserts, "there is no party viewpoint." In this field, he believes, there is real danger that overly self-interested and inadequately enlightened views may prevail.

SAMUEL H. BEER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

An African Survey, Revised 1956: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. By LORD HAILEY. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1957, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.—xxviii, 1676 pp. $16.80.

To anyone familiar with the literature on Africa south of the Sahara, the first edition of *An African Survey* (1938) has long stood out as a landmark of scholarship. This new edition, almost completely rewritten and brought up to date, occupies a place fully as preëminent as did the earlier volume. In the flood of books on Africa which have been published since 1945, no other single source brings together as ably such a mass of factual material accompanied by so perceptive an interpretation.

Lord Hailey acknowledges in his preface the help he has received from many other scholars in the field but the work as a whole bears his own stamp. His deep knowledge of administration in British Africa is unmatched and, where material has been supplied to him on the non-British territories, he has been able to integrate it through his own experience to produce a rounded account of each topic. Almost half the book is devoted to gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment and administration. It includes discussions of the political objectives of the colonial Powers, the governmental systems they have created and the various approaches that have been taken to the administration of African affairs. The balance of the volume is given over to chapters on social and economic problems, such as land tenure, health, education, labor and the development of natural resources.

It is inevitable that in an encyclopedic volume of this kind errors of fact will creep in. The present *Survey* has its share—such, for example, as the statement that the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* of French West Africa began as an affiliate of the *Rassemblement Populaire Français* or that the Moslem population of Algeria numbers two and one-half millions. But perhaps the most serious fault of the book is that, despite its title, it is not a survey of Africa but of colonial Africa. The independent states, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Liberia, are mentioned only incidentally and no attempt is made to deal with their rôle in contemporary Africa. Although Lord Hailey discusses in some detail the rise of nationalism (which he terms "Africanism"), the reader cannot help but feel that the *Survey* would have been improved by some treatment of those countries whose independent status is of long standing.

In forming his opinion of the volume the specialist will be inclined to look first at those chapters whose subject matter he knows best. With these he will in all probability be disappointed; there is no space for the detailed analysis which he may deem necessary to a full understanding of the topic. But at the same time the student of one aspect of African affairs can learn much from the parts of the book which treat those subjects about which he knows less. For the general reader the *Survey* is an excellent reference work but few will attempt to read it from cover to cover.

In all probability this will, for a number of reasons, be the last edition of the *African Survey*. Quite apart from the prohibitive cost of a volume of this size today, the usefulness of the *Survey* is lessened by the change in the state of knowledge about Africa over the past twenty years. When it first appeared very little material on tropical Africa was available. Today specialized works exist on almost every aspect of the subjects covered in it. Within a very few years it will no longer be possible to present all the most important aspects of, say, African education in one chapter. Political and economic change is taking place so rapidly that already some of the material in the *Survey* is no longer correct; within five years the substance of much of the discussion of political objectives may be of historical interest but will be of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little help to the student seeking enlightenment on contemporary African politics. This does not, of course, in any way detract from the present value of the volume. Rather it signifies that Africa is no longer a subject for surveys but for research and study in depth. The foundations for the knowledge of Africa have been laid (and the *African Survey* contributed much to this preliminary process); the need is now for the bricks and mortar of detailed knowledge to complete the structure.

L. GRAY COWAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Politics of Inequality: South Africa since 1948. By GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.—535 pp. $7.50.

This volume is absolutely indispensable to any serious student of affairs in the Union of South Africa. Professor Carter has made two trips to the Union in the last decade. The second, when she was there for over a year, ended late in 1953. She was able to interview leaders of government and of the opposition parties as well as leading social scientists, educators and clergymen. Her exploration of documentary sources was all but phenomenal in its thoroughness, as is attested by the nearly 900 footnotes which precede the appendices.

The first chapter is a remarkable summary of the development of the Union and of the situation existing when the Nationalists took over the government in 1948.

Part II in three chapters details the steps by which the Nationalist or Afrikaner pattern is being imposed on the nation. The various laws that have spelled out *apartheid* are analyzed and the pro and con arguments given. This section includes a discussion of the long constitutional crises which resulted in the recent removal of the Cape Colored from the voters' roll.

Part III shows why the Nationalists won the 1953 election, though receiving less than half the votes. This is followed by three chapters in Part IV that describe the National party at work and the supporting organizations. This section includes a description of the secret, highly disciplined *Broederbond*. This reviewer knows of no comparable material about this strategic organization.

Part V discusses the opposition parties and organizations. The final part considers the international relations of the Union and where South Africa is going. The appendices present valuable source material. The bibliography of nearly 30 pages is well organized and, so far as this reviewer can determine, omits no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

title of importance whether published in the Union, Great Britain or North America.

The volume is characterized by objectivity and impartiality, but also by frankness. Professor Carter never fails to explain the reasons for the actions of the Nationalist government in its own terms and with sympathy. She withholds criticism save as expressed in the words of the Opposition and of the press. But she confronts claims with facts, often drawn from the government's own publications.

One's attitudes toward the present policies of the Union of South Africa are, of course, determined by one's values. To this reviewer the calm, factual presentation of policies and actions, including the justifications for them from the mouths and writings of the Nationalist cabinet members, constitutes a terrible indictment of the travesty on democracy which characterizes government today in the Union of South Africa. But anyone who holds different values, who believes that behind a façade of democracy the effort of the Nationalist minority to force their will and their culture on English, African, Colored and Indian alike is justified, will find the arguments and justifications for this position fairly stated. This is the great value of this scholarly, well-written work which can be commended without qualification.

EDMUND DES. BRUNNER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

African Economic Development. By WILLIAM A. HANCE. New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958.—x, 307 pp. $4.95.

Professor Hance presents in this volume a series of useful and informative studies, each introducing a representative aspect of contemporary economic development in tropical Africa. Each self-contained essay investigates an important problem of economic growth, describes a typical development project, or summarizes the economic setting of a territorial development program. Drawing on the joint disciplines of geography and economics, Professor Hance emphasizes the physical background of growth and the evolving patterns of resource use in Africa today.

His study of the Gezira scheme, an ambitious program to establish intensive cotton cultivation in the Nile flood-plain, stresses the unique opportunities — geographical and administrative — which led to success in the Sudan. An instructive list of other large-scale agricultural projects patterned on this pioneering enterprise, but with records of indifferent accomplishment or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outright failure, underscores the intractibility of African agrarian problems to transplanted solutions. The Volta River project for multi-purpose development of a key area in Ghana, unhappily so long delayed in initiation, is described as a case study in planned industrial development. A somewhat longer essay on "Transport in Tropical Africa" is an admirable treatment of a critical barrier to rapid economic change in that continent; exercising his special authority in this field, Professor Hance effectively illustrates both the enormous variety of physical impediments found in Africa and the magnitude of the effort that will be required to surmount them.

Four additional studies are concerned with contrasting geographical areas. A paper on Central Africa investigates the astonishing rate at which the uniquely endowed Federation has been growing since World War II. A chapter on Liberia—if not precisely a study in contrasts when viewed with Central Africa—contains an appraisal of the rôle played by American investors in a country peculiarly associated with the United States. East Africa — Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika — is seen through the eyes of a Royal Commission whose report on land, population and development policy is presented in summary. Ever judicious, Professor Hance also cites defensive counter-arguments by the East African Governors to the sweeping and iconoclastic proposals of the Commissioners. The final area study, of Madagascar, is of special interest, both in view of Professor Hance's authority in matters concerning the island and because of the paucity of available information about the distinctively Malgache developments.

An introductory chapter and a concluding chapter are, in fact, independent essays. They serve the unifying function of restating the chief themes: through all the variety of local conditions, tropical Africa is characterized everywhere by shortages of fuel and power, undeveloped transport, a restricted scope of market-oriented activity, and the base poverty which results from ignorance, isolation, neglect and unproductive custom. But the closing essay goes beyond a summary; it also provides an agenda for a companion volume to treat additional aspects of African economic development. Such a companion study—to deal, for example, with the growth of monetary institutions and capital markets, the integration of Africa into the world-wide system of trade and payments, the problems of African urban labor, the reorientation of African consumption, and experience with government stabilization policies and fiscal controls—would usefully supplement Professor Hance's greater concentration on Africa's physical environment and socio-industrial structure.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The present volume provides an excellent introduction to economic problems of Africa. Its careful marshaling of facts and balanced assessments will be found informative by those who have a professional concern with tropical Africa. This is a valuable addition to a growing, but too often inaccessible, literature on an area of emerging importance.

ROBERT L. WEST

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace. By MAMORU SHIGEMITSU. Edited by F. S. G. Piggott. Translated by Oswald White. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958.—392 pp. $6.50.

Herein for the second time a wartime Japanese Foreign Minister has presented from his country's point of view an explanation of the diplomatic events leading to belligerency and defeat in the Second World War. Togo Shigenori undertook a similar task in the diplomatic memoirs which he wrote during his confinement in Sugamo Prison from 1948 to 1950, and which were published in English translation under the title *The Cause of Japan* (New York, 1956). Togo and Shigemitsu were contemporaries in the foreign service, and their careers bore many points of similarity. Both had been ambassadors to China and to the Soviet Union. Both stood for a "diplomatic" approach to problems of foreign relations, especially as those related to Japanese continental interests. That is, they felt that Japan's aspirations could best be realized by peaceful means, and that they were not ultimately attainable by acts or threats of military aggression. Equally important, both men deplored the train of events in domestic politics by which more and more of the normal prerogatives of a civilian government—including the formulation of foreign policy—had fallen by the late 1930's into the hands of immoderate elements in the military services.

When Togo became Foreign Minister in October 1941, he was charged with the impossible task of pursuing policies designed to prevent war with the United States, when these policies had already been repudiated by the Army General Staff. When Shigemitsu took the same post in April 1943, there was almost nothing that the diplomatic service could do to affect the course of the war or the nature of the subsequent peace. The following were some of the main programs which Shigemitsu attempted to further while Foreign Minister: a new policy of conciliation with the Wang Ching-wei government in Nanking; encourage-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of the Indian independence movement under Chandra Bose; the attempt to prevent Russian belligerency in the Pacific War. Whether or not they were in any sense temporarily successful, all such programs seem curiously inconsequential in historical retrospect, as though to symbolize the minimal state of effectiveness to which military control had by then brought the civilian agencies for foreign policy decision. These developments had dire consequences for Japan and the world, and for men like Togo and Shigemitsu they were a source of deep personal frustration as well. The value of their diplomatic memoirs lies in the documentation afforded of the impotence of such highly placed officials as they were in the face of national and international forces beyond their control.

I emphasize the parallels between Togo and Shigemitsu, since a comparison with *The Cause of Japan* helps to illustrate the principal defect in *Japan and Her Destiny*. Of the two books, that of Togo seems to me to be more consistently interesting and more valuable historically. This judgment has nothing to do with the success with which either author defends his own actions. On that score Shigemitsu seems if anything to have made a better job of it, though his book does not dwell so exclusively as Togo's on personal history. But it is precisely the autobiographical focus of *The Cause of Japan* that gives it a value as a primary historical source that *Japan and Her Destiny* has only in certain sections. The former is first and last an apology for Togo's own career, and Togo himself is the central figure throughout its length. *Japan and Her Destiny,* on the other hand, is something of a hybrid. Outwardly a history of the period from roughly 1931 to 1945, it relates in some detail the entire train of events that led Japan to war, concentrating only in the latter half on events of which Shigemitsu had sufficiently intimate knowledge to make his description an authoritative first-hand account. Much of the book, then, is secondary history, and neither fuller nor better organized than half a dozen other histories previously available. Only in the latter half does Shigemitsu's narrative come to life. There his appraisals of wartime leaders—Konoye, Tojo, Matsuoka, and an assortment of high Army or Navy officials—make valuable reading, as does his detailed documentation of the incredible lack of coördination among all the organs of the wartime Japanese state. These parts of the book justify its publication.

HERSCHEL WEBB

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958. By RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1958.—xv, 584 pp. $7.50.

Professor Fifield has followed his excellent *Diplomacy of the Shantung Question,* which received the 1953 American Historical Association's George Louis Beer Prize, with another foray into the diplomatic history field. This time he has chosen a subject which twenty years ago would have rated scarce attention, let alone the type of exhaustive survey which the author has now presented. Whatever Southeast Asian diplomacy did exist in the pre-war era was the exclusive property of the foreign or colonial offices in London, Paris, Tokyo, Washington and The Hague, while the views and aspirations of the people in the area usually held only secondary importance to the policies of the metropolitan Powers. This detailed consideration of the diplomatic history of Southeast Asia during the past thirteen years vividly delineates the radical changes which have occurred both in the control of foreign relations and in the assessment of the area's importance by the major Powers. The increased interest in this once all but unknown part of the globe is brought to the reader as the author carefully describes such issues as the Bandung and Geneva conferences, the West Irian question, SEATO and the other events which have become important pieces in the kaleidoscope of world politics.

The treatment of a number of countries presents difficult problems of organization which Professor Fifield has met by initially outlining the general historical, geographical and bureaucratic milieu in which foreign affairs operate and then following with a country-by-country analysis of almost every diplomatic event in the recent history of the eight independent states and British Borneo. These chapters describe important multi-nation issues within the context of the nation most concerned. The author has deliberately chosen this method as against a discussion of forces such as nationalism and communism, and, in fact, the interplay of these factors with foreign policy is not discussed in detail. However, the author has not chosen to make speculations, establish pet theories or be a political pundit but has been content to present a first-rate descriptive survey of Southeast Asian diplomacy.

The last chapters are particularly interesting in their treatment of regionalism and the United Nations. Professor Fifield has attempted to relate the partially successful efforts toward regional economic and political self-help and to provide a valuable compendium of the voting habits of the Southeast Asian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members of the Afro-Asian bloc in regard to major questions before the United Nations. Completing this exhaustive study is what the publisher claims to be the most extensive bibliography in existence on the diplomacy of Southeast Asia.

The only regret this reviewer has is that the author did not seek to present his own assessment as well as the personal views of the some 275 political, educational and scholarly leaders with whom he had contact (including Magsaysay, Sukarno, Hatta, Nu, Songgram, Rahman and Ngo Dinh Diem). It must be admitted that private conversations are difficult to use and document and the author's reliance upon public addresses probably represents the national policy of states better. But the author himself states in his preface, "In many cases these leaders are the living embodiment of the spirit of the times in their part of the world," and as such it would be worth while giving further assessments of their characters and views. It is also true that there are periods when these leaders are prisoners of the "spirit of the times", particularly nationalism, and have personal opinions in contravention to their publicly voiced sentiments. However, these points might await another type of book, and, meanwhile, both the scholar and layman will find that Professor Fifield's volume has met a great need in supplying the field with a carefully written, comprehensive description of the formative years of Southeast Asian diplomacy.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

A History of Modern Burma. By JOHN F. CADY. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.—xiii, 682 pp. $7.50.

Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948-1956. By FRANK N. TRAGER. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958.—x, 118 pp. $4.00.

My Burma: The Autobiography of a President. By U BA U. With a Foreword by J. S. Furnivall. New York, Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1958.—xi, 210 pp. $4.50.

In answer to a question about publishing plans, Dr. Htin Aung, Chairman of the Burma Historical Commission and Rector of Rangoon University, last August told members of the Association of Asian Studies that his Commission had yet to write anything and was, in fact, waiting for Dr. Cady's book, and others, before undertaking a Burmanized Burmese history. The delay is in itself unfortunate, but, if Burmese historians had to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wait before striking out on their own, John F. Cady's *A History of Modern Burma* should be of inestimable assistance. They, and other students of contemporary Burma, are fortunate, too, that two other works, Frank N. Trager's *Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948-1956* and U Ba U's *My Burma: The Autobiography of a President,* have appeared at this same time to give further insight into the character of the country.

Prior to the publication last year of Hugh Tinker's excellent book, *The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence,* almost all the leading works on Burma were written in the pre-war period or, at least, with a pre-war frame of reference. Tinker undertook to provide a sequel to John L. Christian's master work, *Burma and the Japanese Invader* (1945), compensating immediately in his opening chapters for Christian's blindness on pre-war Burmese nationalism. Professor Cady, at one time an associate of Christian's as professor of history at Judson College in Rangoon University, assumes the ambitious task of reassessing all of modern Burmese history—and Christian—with a full-scale study centered on modern Burmese nationalism. Dr. Trager's book is an account of the economic and social programs under way in Burma since independence, evaluated in the light of his years as director of the United States technical coöperation mission to Burma and as a close follower of Burmese affairs. Dr. Ba U, loyal servant of the British Crown as lawyer, judge and Knight Bachelor and loyal servant of independent Burma as chief justice and president, has written a highly personalized and informal narrative of the transitional years from colonial to national Burma.

John Cady's book is particularly impressive, for, working from essentially the same sources as previous scholars (almost all European and "one-sided", as he himself points out), he has provided the systematic, and sympathetic, analysis of the growth of Burmese nationalism which has long been lacking. Under his skillful hand the chaotic and centrifugal politics of the twenties and thirties take on an understandable pattern. The goals of such disparate persons as U Ottama, J. A. Maung Gyi, Ba Maw, U Saw and Chit Hlaing emerge as compatible—as different approaches to self-rule in Burma. For the period up to independence the book is consistently excellent as a result of intensive research and the author's close association with the Burmese scene. It portrays with objectivity both the constructive and disruptive aspects of British rule and shows the natural transfer of nationalist leadership from the moderates of the religiously oriented Young Men's Buddhist Association of 1906 to the radical *Thakins* of the 1930s who are today's political leaders in Burma.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the post-independence period, which Cady summarizes in two brief chapters, Tinker's book continues to be the best source.

If Dr. Htin Aung's Historical Commission has a bone to pick with Cady, it will probably be over his emphasis upon the early emergence of Karen nationalism as a separate and essentially anti-Burman movement. Though Karen nationalists have been at the root of much of Burma's post-independence insurgency, Karens today serve loyally in the government, and Burma's current President, U Win Maung, is a Karen.

Dr. Ba U, knighted for his services to the Crown, represents the best of the old and the new in Burma. *My Burma* is not a political biography in the usual sense but, rather, the personal reminiscences of a distinguished jurist. Mainly by indirection, he illustrates both the close harmony and the superior aloofness which marked Anglo-Burmese relations in the government service of the pre-war period. Perhaps the most impressive quality of Ba U's work lies in its portrayal of his deep sense of loyalty which was undiminished by the fact that it ran both to Burma and to the Crown. As it was with so many others in Burma's civil service, he was able to hold a position under the puppet government of Ba Maw without in any way losing his personal identity with the British. He took on his tasks, as did U Nu in the puppet cabinet and Sir Paw Tun in the government-in-exile in Simla, for the betterment of Burma. Throughout the difficult period of pre-independence negotiations he served Britain and Burma well—and since 1948 he has served outstandingly as Burma's chief justice of the Supreme Court and drafter of the judicial section of the constitution. His concern for law and the individual have had so marked an impact that Justice Douglas has cited the Burmese Supreme Court records as the repository for some of the finest decisions on civil liberties in the world today. Ba U brought dignity with him to the presidency.

The Rangoon *Nation,* reviewing Ba U's book, called it a "treasure", noting that the author had avoided the "trick of getting someone else to polish his words for him, thereby preserving the full flavour of a diction that we can only describe as Burmese-English. It is good, grammatical English, but such as no Englishman would write, and no other racial group could imitate. . . ." A reviewer of this book could only wish, however, that certain parenthetical notes—concerning the age of U Nu in 1940, the number of directors of the Turf Club or the total number of senators in the pre-war legislature, for examples—which had obviously been inserted by the author for future checking, had been verified or removed by the publisher.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trager's *Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948-1956* provides an epilogue to both Cady and Ba U, and points the direction of Burma's projected agricultural and industrial development. He has updated his original report on Burma's economic development programs, which was prepared for the 1954 Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, taking into account the shortfalls in the overambitious governmental plans. He points, especially in his "Postscript", to the modifications of governing ideologies among the Burmese leaders from an early radical Left-wing socialism to the present advocacy of a moderately socialist mixed economy. Dr. Trager's enthusiasm and optimism for Burma's economic future are well balanced by the recognition that Burma has undertaken too much too fast and that her goals can be reached better in decades than in years.

JOHN SEABURY THOMSON

CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND

Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington. By ALEXANDER DECONDE. Durham, Duke University Press, 1958.—xvi, 536 pp. $7.50.

Not since William H. Trescot published his *Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams* in 1857 has anyone attempted a full-length study of Federalist diplomacy. This book, which wisely includes politics as well as diplomacy during Washington's administrations, thus is assured of a warm welcome from students of Federalism. It is a straightforward, heavily documented account which successfully encompasses a vast mass of monographic and periodical literature and the most important primary sources. It does not, however, add much that is significant or original; its value is more that of an encyclopedia of events and comments relating to foreign relations during Washington's presidency than of a new contribution to historical knowledge.

This book is essentially a biography of the Franco-American Alliance of 1778 in its declining years. Professor DeConde's aim has been to explain why and how that alliance, "the cornerstone of American foreign policy" at the beginning of Washington's administration, was "practically dead" a mere eight years later. He has adopted what he calls the "problem-analysis" approach, dealing first with the status of Franco-American relations at the institution of the new federal government and then with the Hamiltonian system on which that government's domestic and foreign policies, under Washington, were based. There fol-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

low two chapters on Anglo-American relations, including the all-important Jay Treaty of November 1794, after which the reader is transported back to 1789 to begin a more or less chronological exploration of relations with France.

While there is much to be said for a topical treatment, in this instance it has led to a fragmented approach to significant episodes which tends to confuse and frustrate the reader. The outstanding example is the Jay Treaty, which is dealt with piecemeal throughout the book and never as a whole in all its ramifications. The same methodology accounts for a detailed investigation of the background and results of Jay's mission in chapter IV, while "Citizen" Genet does not receive systematic consideration until chapter VII nor Gouverneur Morris, who assumed his functions at Paris before Genet's mission commenced, until chapter X. Unavoidably, this is a major cause of the multiple repetitions which often add unnecessarily to the book's length. These difficulties are rendered even more serious by the inadequacy of the index.

The author has for the most part avoided the strong Federalist bias of many earlier writers and of most of the letters and diaries he has exploited. In his evaluation of men and policies, however, he appears to be seeking objectivity through a balancing of the aims and motives of contending influences which results in a quantitative, if not qualitative, equality. Thus, he seems to view Jefferson's efforts to restrain the volatile Genet in the same light as Hamilton's disclosures to the British minister, Hammond, and he compensates for an unfavorable verdict on Morris by belittling Monroe. Similarly, he demonstrates that Washington's (Hamilton's) policy was British-oriented; the Jeffersonian opposition perforce was subservient to France. Such an analysis leaves no room for an independent American interest, a conclusion which this reviewer cannot accept and which the burden of Professor DeConde's evidence does not support.

Despite these major criticisms, this volume is a valuable synthesis of Hamiltonian politics and diplomacy. The controlling purpose of the Federalist leadership, to break the American connection in favor of an entente with Britain, is convincingly illustrated. DeConde concludes that "the French alliance was doomed from the beginning of the new national government, because of its capture by Washington and Hamilton." The latter inevitably is the central figure in the story; Washington, the reader is finally not surprised to learn, "as President . . . is not seen at his best."

ALBERT H. BOWMAN

TENNESSEE WESLEYAN COLLEGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1835-1864. By Charles Grove Haines and Foster H. Sherwood. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1957.—x, 533 pp. $7.50.

The publication in 1944 of Charles Grove Haines's *The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1789-1835* gave ample basis for eager anticipation of further volumes of constitutional history by an often iconoclastic, unreconstructed Jeffersonian. The 1944 volume, though admittedly a partisan account designed to counterbalance "conservative and nationalist" histories, was a most stimulating and provocative book, carefully organized and well presented. Unfortunately, Professor Haines had completed only three chapters of a second installment at his death in 1948. His associate, Foster H. Sherwood, undertook to transform Haines's "more or less completed case studies and interpretative essays" into nine additional chapters and to add a concluding chapter.

This volume is a curiously disappointing and pervasively defective work. Its weaknesses stem not from its subject matter or its broadly stated themes, but from the manner of execution. The period covered is indeed less dramatic than that marking the origins of the Court and the contributions of John Marshall; the Taney Court, unlike Marshall's, did not write on a blank slate. The period was one of doctrinal modifications and changes in emphasis rather than constitutional revolution. Yet these changes offer much that is worthy of careful analysis, not the least because of the political crisis that formed the backdrop for the work of the Taney Court.

It is the analysis of these changes in the body of the book, rather than the general assessments offered in the opening and closing chapters, that invites major criticism. Most of the eleven intervening chapters make poor reading, in part because of the selection and handling of the raw materials. Curiously, in view of Haines's well-known emphasis on political forces and personal predilections, data relevant to these factors receive little attention. Rather, the study is primarily based on the contents of the *United States Reports* and the writings of a variety of commentators. This reviewer is not one to condemn the extensive use of the *Reports,* but fruitful utilization of these materials requires more than laborious, heavy-handed summaries of their contents. The task of handling lengthy opinions enmeshed in common law technicalities is not an easy one. Yet more is possible than statements of cases which emphasize and obscure rather than elucidate the technicalities. And meaningful treatment of opinions re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quires more than paraphrases which preserve nineteenth-century circumlocutions and excerpts which focus on the cliché rather than the jugular. Nor is the extensive use of secondary authorities to be scorned. It is disturbing, however, when such comments are offered indiscriminately, either without any evaluation or with seeming endorsement of contradictory views. And the vice of this habit is accentuated by the nature of the authors' own assessments—some sparse and unilluminating, others of questionable relevance and perception.

The handling of the dominant themes—protection of property rights, expansion of national over state powers, and development of judicial supremacy—provides ample illustrations of the book's defects. To note only a few, the awkward summaries, puzzling organization and questionable comments which mark the chapter on the Contracts Clause make it unsatisfactory even as a recital of the leading decisions. A series of cases allegedly revealing little concern for the protection of property, for example, is contrasted with another group in which the Court supposedly granted "a maximum of protection"—yet each decision in the latter group upheld state action and rejected property claims. Again, in the discussion of corporate rights (closely related to the Contracts Clause material, though separated from it by five chapters), the confused presentation implies that the major case, *Bank of Augusta v. Earle,* evidences Taney's "Federalist leanings" and acceptance of the Court's rôle as "guardian of property rights"—although Taney flatly rejected the Bank's constitutional contention.

The materials on national-state relations suffer from equally distressing faults. To select at random, there are the obscuring treatment of the still significant *Cooley* case, concerning state regulation of commerce; the brushing aside, in one uninformative page, of the *Dobbins* case on intergovernmental tax immunities; and, at the other extreme, the tedious twenty pages which manage to sap the drama and much of the meaning from the *Booth* litigation, in a presentation which gives the appearance of unedited case studies. And so it is with the third major theme, judicial supremacy. The chapter devoted to it suffers from poor internal organization and fails to refer to relevant materials scattered elsewhere in the book. It begins with a general evaluation of judicial review, viewing it as a "guardian of conservatism" and as a form of "censorship over the wisdom and expediency" of "regulation of economic and social affairs"—a judgment taken from a well-known essay written by Haines in 1936, but hardly appropriate in 1958. Few readers will derive from the brief and obscure discussion of *Cary v. Curtis* any sense of its significance to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congressional control over federal court jurisdiction—as, indeed, the chapter as a whole conveys little of the Taney Court's recognition of limitations on judicial power. A section on "Federal Judicial Power in Its Relation to the States" includes only *Swift v. Tyson* and *Luther v. Borden*—a grouping which reveals loose organization at best; and the facts of *Swift*, as presented here, are likely to be incomprehensible even to the student of commercial law.

There are occasional bright spots, as in the essay on early exercises of the Court's original jurisdiction in settling boundary disputes between the states and in the material on Lincoln and the Court. Far more often, however, the distracting faults in execution effectively obstruct perception of whatever valid insights may lurk beneath the morass. It is indeed saddening that the last publication to bear the name of Charles Grove Haines appears to be the weakest. If Sherwood's aim was to preserve the writings left by Haines, separate publication of the remnants might have been preferable. If he sought to continue Haines's work effectively, a less inhibiting goal than "to preserve [Haines's] own point of view, whenever it was known to me, and to exclude my own" might have produced a stronger collaboration.

GERALD GUNTHER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Republican Era: 1869-1901. A Study in Administrative History. By LEONARD D. WHITE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1958.—ix, 406 pp. $6.00.

This volume concludes the remarkable series of studies in American administrative history which Leonard D. White began in 1948 with the publication of *The Federalists: 1789-1801,* followed by *The Jeffersonians: 1801-1829* and by *The Jacksonians: 1829-1861.* Together, these four studies provide a unique and valuable story of the evolution of administrative institutions in the national government from the inauguration of George Washington to that of Theodore Roosevelt. The administrative developments of more than a century are thus now illuminated by the rich illustrative materials which Professor White's indefatigable scholarship assembled from a multitude of original and secondary sources and which he appraised with characteristic balance and wisdom. These four volumes are a fitting memorial to the scholar who was for three decades the outstanding student of American public administration—from the appearance of his *Introduction to Public Administration* in 1926 to his death on the eve of the publication of *The Republican Era.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The three decades from 1869 to 1901 were not productive years for the executive branch. "Considering the state of administrative doctrine from 1870 to 1900", the author sums up, "we must conclude that these were years of stagnation". The three main redeeming features of the era were, in his view, the gradual restoration of the presidency ("nearly wrecked by the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and the abnegation of Ulysses S. Grant"), the slow emergence of the merit system for the civil service against the stubborn opposition of the patronage system, and the equally halting growth of a positive rôle and function for the national government despite the dominance of laissez-faire doctrines. These struggles provided controversy, excitement and political drama for the closing decades of the nineteenth century, but White finds them to be years of preparation rather than a time of great accomplishment in administration.

Yet when he turns from these great issues of administration to consider in detail the growth of executive agencies, and their practices and personnel, White finds much to admire in both men and methods. In the Treasury Department, in War and Navy, in Interior, Agriculture, even in the Post Office, he discovers many patient, diligent and able men working to improve their administrative arrangements or to equip the executive branch with the capacity to perform important new functions. Some of these men were Cabinet Secretaries (Fish, Bristow, Cox and Schurz, for example); some were scientific and professional men (as in the new agricultural bureaus and in such functions as the census and the geological survey); and some were the permanent assistant secretaries in the departments (Hunter and Adee in the State Department being outstanding examples). These men and their work provided important foundations for the sudden and unparalleled advances in administrative theory and practice which were to begin in the decade after 1901. Professor White's special hero for the period, however, is a member of Congress, James A. Garfield, whose interest in and grasp of the administrative difficulties and needs of the executive branch exceeded those of any president from Grant to Roosevelt.

The civil service reform movement receives the most detailed attention of any administrative question between 1870 and 1900. This emphasis not only reflects the intrinsic importance of the issue as seen by the leaders of the period, but it reveals also the author's long devotion to the study of its twentieth-century manifestations. The origins of the first civil service legislation are carefully explored and the struggle for existence by the first Civil Service Commissions before the ultimate acceptance of the institution at the end of the century is painstakingly related. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

efforts to achieve political neutrality in the permanent civil service are sympatheticaly told, and "the emergence of a new personnel system" is optimistically described, as is also the gradual rise of public service ethics toward the close of the century. In all these personnel developments Professor White understandably sees important antecedents to an administrative system adequate for the burdens which subsequent decades would place upon the executive branch.

Historians and political scientists alike will find *The Republican Era,* as well as the earlier volumes in the series, both a rich source of information about American administrative institutions and a useful model for the continuing study of public administration.

WALLACE S. SAYRE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Southern Race Progress: The Wavering Color Line. By THOMAS J. WOOFTER. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1957. —xii, 180 pp. $3.50.

For this critical period of the South, Thomas J. Woofter writes a timely autobiography as well as a summary history of race relations. Southern born, reared and educated, he draws on his experience as a teacher and federal official to explain the traditions and customs of Southerners against a background of regional and national change. His experience in the North and in the South, his connection with the New Deal, and his interest in mankind give his narrative perception and warmth. He writes with a purpose: by using the past to explain the present, he hopes to stimulate racial coöperation on a regional basis. He sees Southern progress and Negro progress as inextricably intertwined, and finds racial coöperation, though temporarily obscured by controversy, vital and enduring. Since the South alone would aid the Negro but slowly, the author believes the stimulus of outside criticism essential. On the basis of past coöperation, a more educated citizenry, economic betterment and humanist religion, Woofter is optimistic.

His hopefulness stems from half a century of recollections and a century of historical perspective. As a child in Georgia and as a student at the University of Georgia, Woofter recalls that the etiquette of race relations in a segregated society was complex, often confusing, consisting of patterns which followed no natural reactions but were learned as one did the alphabet or the multiplication table. He traces economic change from Reconstruction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the great depression and emphasizes the importance of Negro movement from farm to southern and northern cities. In the latter the Negroes found sufficient discrimination to justify the comment that they were better off in the hands of their Southern oppressors than in those of their Northern liberators. The New Deal with its jobs, minimum wages, social security and assistance grants gave the Negro masses both relative affluence and security. Although poorly prepared for defense work, the Negro with the aid of federal legislation found new opportunity. His military record in World War II together with the consequent desegregation within the armed forces contributed to his economic advance. Education also prepared the masses for the complexities of industrial civilization. The author traces Negro education from its beginnings by the Freedman's Bureau and northern philanthropies to the realization by the majority of Southern whites that the educated Negro was a more productive and better citizen. But educational institutions failed to prevent or to eliminate the caste system which segregated the minority economically, socially and politically.

The author reaches some provoking conclusions. In his opinion the Southern demagogue is a more dominant influence in the creation of race prejudice than memories of Reconstruction are. These demagogues or "political juvenile delinquents" shaped the mentality of "black belts" and, aided by laws which gave political control to rural machines, established a rule of the most ignorant. Present-day pleaders for the rights of states are mostly hypocrites, for those who raise the loudest cries deny county rights against state interference. Negro civil liberties are essentially voting rights, for all other rights in a democracy depend on political power. It is imperative, Woofter concludes, that moderates wrest control of race relations from extremists and he urges the younger business and professional men, teachers and ministers who are less bound by tradition and more tolerant than their elders to solve race problems through voluntary coöperation.

Neither segregationist nor integrationist will be entirely satisfied with this book, but the latter will accept it as a calm and judicious treatment of race relations. More attention to organization, fewer forced anecdotes and more emphasizing of the ideas presented, better paragraph transition, and more careful composition would enhance the writing. Yet the author's sincerity and his ideas command respect.

REMBERT W. PATRICK

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trujillo — Little Caesar of the Caribbean. By German Ornes. New York, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1958.—338 pp. $5.00.

In recent years Latin America has had many examples of brutal personal dictatorships. Juan Vicente Gomez of Venezuela, Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, among others, have written their names in blood across the history of their respective countries. Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina is probably the most tyrannical and most egocentric of all of the dictators Latin America has seen in the present century.

In the present book, Dr. German Ornes, a one-time close collaborator with Trujillo, and now an exile in the United States, presents a comprehensive picture of how Trujillo came to power, and how he has run the Dominican Republic since achieving absolute power more than twenty-eight years ago. Dr. Ornes discusses the régime from a variety of angles: its one-party state, its secret police, the concentration of the country's wealth in the hands of the dictator and members of his family, his treatment of the armed forces, the subjugation of the press, Trujillo's relations with the Nazis, Franquistas and Communists. In his last chapter the author gives a long résumé of the Galindez-Murphy case. About the only important aspects of the Trujillo phenomenon which he does not touch upon are the dictator's relations with the Church and with the labor movement.

In spite of the fact that he was personally involved in much of what he describes, Ornes writes with admirable objectivity. He does not speak of what he has not been able to verify. He gives credit where credit is due to the dictator. At the same time, Ornes' one-time association with the régime gives him many insights into its operations which an outsider would not possess.

He makes clear that Trujillo was a by-product of the occupation of the Dominican Republic by the United States Marines. Trujillo got his first opportunity in the army built up by the Marines, and particularly learned a lesson from them which has been a cornerstone of his rule since 1930: keep all arms out of the hands of civilians. He has kept in touch over the years with many of his associates from the Marine Corps days.

Shortly after the Marines left, Trujillo became commander of the army they left behind. It was from this post that he first moved into the presidency in an election in which supporters of his opponent were jailed, assassinated or just "disappeared" long before polling day. Once the election was over, Trujillo systematically set about the physical elimination of his remaining

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opponents. So successful was this purge that only occasionally since that time has Trujillo had to resort to mass arrests and killings. He soon organized a secret police which had eyes and ears everywhere, keeping close track not only of potential enemies, but of those whom the police classify officially as "indifferent".

Ornes' story indicates that megalomania is the characteristic feature of the Trujillo régime. No one can make a public speech in the Dominican Republic on any subject without praising the "Benefactor". He not only has renamed the oldest Spanish city in America after himself, but has rechristened innumerable provinces, towns, plazas and public institutions after himself and members of his family. The newspapers are filled with the most fulsome and groveling praise of *el Jefe*.

Along with the semi-deification of Trujillo have gone the humiliation and denigration of virtually everyone else active in Dominican public life, from the puppet President down. Ornes presents innumerable examples of this. Laudatory reference to anyone else is regarded by Trujillo as implicit attack upon himself—unless it is made clear that the individual's chief merit is that he is a faithful servant of the Generalissimo.

This volume could have stood closer editing. It was written in English by Dr. Ornes. Occasionally, there have slipped through transliterations of Spanish words into English which do not always make good sense in our language. However, this is a minor inconvenience. This is one of the best books about Latin America to appear for some time.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800–1900. By RICHARD D. ALTICK. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957.—ix, 430 pp. $6.00.

In the course of the nineteenth century the English reading public increased in size. The type of education the "average" reader obtained, what he read, and how much he read are subjects detailed in Professor Altick's book. This volume explores the forces that hindered and those that encouraged the enlargement of the reading public. Years ago Mrs. Leavis considered fiction and the reading public; recently R. K. Webb has directed his attention to a careful study of the British working-class reader in the first half of the century. Professor Altick attempts the far more ambitious task of dealing not only with fiction but all read-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing matter, throughout the entire century. He defines the "average" or "mass" reader in negative rather than positive terms; this reader is anyone who is not a member of the small English intellectual élite. In telling his story, Professor Altick disdains neither the anecdote nor the statistic—though he tends to be freer with the latter than with the former. Despite the abundance of statistics the book is readable.

The possibilities of a mass reading public arose with Caxton's printing press in the fifteenth century. Yet the years from Caxton to the start of the eighteenth century saw little growth of the reading public. The size of this public varied with the vicissitudes of popular education; but it was not large; most men were still illiterate. In the eighteenth century it was in the middle class rather than in the working class that the habit of reading spread. Circulating libraries appeared on the scene. In that century cheap reprint series began, and James Lackington started the hitherto unheard of practice of selling books below list price. The lower classes for the first time became readers when in the turbulence of the 1790's Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* filtered into almost every village, and radical literature was ubiquitous.

By the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century both the evangelicals and the utilitarians were working to widen the reading audience. The former aimed to point to the kingdom of God, the latter, "to insure the greater glory of the workshop of the world." They looked forward to the spiritual and intellectual enrichment of the mass of men. Their opponents argued that the enlargement of the reading public would result in a disaffected, revolutionary population.

The expansion of educational facilities, the cheapening of books, the development of public libraries and the extension of circulating libraries, the growth of leisure (especially enforced leisure on railway trains), and the elimination of "taxes on knowledge" during the course of the nineteenth century, all contributed to more widespread reading. Literacy rates rose steadily, and by 1900 the English reading public had attained substantially the size and character it possesses today. The consequence of the increased number of readers was not what had been expected. No significant revolutionary sentiment grew up with the increase of reading. No great cultural improvement was evident. Instead, the result was a new audience for scandal, adventure, household trash, and other pabulum.

Professor Altick covers the course of these developments. He is at his best when he deals with public libraries and with the book trade. His volume is weakest in its treatment of daily newspapers. A. P. Wadsworth's address to the Manchester Statistical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Society, which is an excellent compilation of statistical details on English newspaper circulation for this period, is completely overlooked. Professor Altick deals too summarily with the growth of the halfpenny evening newspapers. These journals, with the sporting papers, were by the nineties the main source of London workingmen's reading. A serious neglect in the section "Mechanic Institutes and After" is any mention of Ruskin Hall, founded in 1899. Likewise, in his discussion of the self-made working-class reader more could have been said of the socialist reader. Professor Altick complains that few working-class memoirs exist, yet he has not referred to autobiographies of such Socialists as Tom Mann or George Lansbury, for example; nor has he consulted any data on John Burns or Keir Hardie. In his listing of best-sellers, Professor Altick once again can be criticized: he leaves out Robert Blatchford's *Merrie England* (1894). This book had the exceptional circulation of 750,000 copies—far greater than most of the books that Professor Altick does list.

Despite such omissions, *The English Common Reader* is a useful book. It collates a wide range of hitherto disparate information; it does work that will not have to be redone; and it gives hints for future writing. It is in fact well worth the considerable effort that its author has put into it.

M. S. WILKINS

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role. By NEAL GROSS, WARD S. MASON, and ALEXANDER W. MCEACHERN. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., London, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1958.—xiv, 379 pp. $8.75.

This book sets out to investigate three problem areas: the degree of consensus regarding the delineation of the rôles of the superintendency and school board members; conformity to the rôle expectations; and, finally, some aspects of rôle conflict. The sample includes 105 superintendents and their corresponding school boards with 517 school board members (of whom 98 per cent were actually interviewed) in the state of Massachussets.

This reviewer finds the volume an unusually rich contribution to the behavioral sciences—to sociology in particular. For one, an important methodological contribution has been made. The authors have managed to reconceptualize the crucial, yet difficult, notion of *social rôle*. Their instrument, whereby the expectations associated with the superintendency were measured, is both in keeping with the best traditions of questionnaire design and imaginatively novel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet even more impressive are the attempt at deriving highly meaningful hypotheses (within the problem areas indicated) from theoretical considerations, and the manner in which, from a substantive viewpoint, this ambitious undertaking was carried out. As a by-product, the hypotheses are genuinely non-trivial, a charge which often must be leveled against various research inquiries. Because of their preoccupation with the theoretical relevancy, the authors are never caught in announcing, for instance, that "superintendents and school board members will differ" as a hypothesis. (This the reviewer would consider a trivial hypothesis.) Rather, the hypotheses are specific and directional; for example, "Incumbents of both superordinate and subordinate positions will assign relatively greater responsibility to the subordinate for actions requiring greater technical competence than for actions requiring less technical competence" (p. 126). Furthermore, the reader is provided with the reasoning leading to the hypothesis in the first place. Nor do we mean to say that this reasoning amounts to rationalizing but rather that the hypotheses emerge out of assumptions underlying them. Indeed, although one could quarrel over detail here and there, the line of attack chosen by the authors approaches the ideal of what is needed in behavioral research.

This reviewer's praise is, nonetheless, punctuated by two qualifications. If it appears correct to say that the hypotheses are theoretically grounded, it does not seem always to follow that the instrument had been designed in order to provide tests of the specific hypotheses. Thus one senses, on occasions (for instance, hypothesis 8–3, pp. 128 *et seq.*), that the hypothesis may have been derived *after* the instrument had been constructed, necessitating the use of items only second-best for the task on hand. This inference has been drawn by this reader from statements such as: "In order to test the hypothesis, items from the Superintendents and School Board Members Performances Instruments were used which *could be interpreted as dealing* with obligations" (p. 129; emphasis mine). Had the hypothesis been formulated *ex ante,* the authors would have undoubtedly included in their instrument items which *specifically*—and without the need for subsequent interpretation—provide evidence required in the test. The whole book stands as a testimony that they would have been able to do so.

If this is how the volume may fall short of the ideal in research, there appears also an instance wherein the authors fail to display their otherwise excellent sense of proportions: statistical tests of significance are carried out table by table, item by item, not inappropriately but often quite uselessly. The impression of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a rather elaborate (and time-consuming) ritual is left with this reader mainly because the results of the significance tests have seldom any bearing on the substantive meaning of the material. A correlation of .29 (p. 197) may be highly significant statistically, but it remains uninteresting. Elsewhere (for example, p. 302), a t-test may be conducted between the proportion of correct predictions and the proportion expected by chance, and it turns out highly significant. But the significance level, and the value of the t-statistic, contribute nothing since the authors' success at predicting is self-evident from the data provided.

All said and done, this is an outstanding book.

JIRI NEHNEVAJSA

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Story of Advertising. By JAMES PLAYSTED WOOD. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1958.—viii, 512 pp. $6.50.

I feel professionally disqualified to assess this volume in view of the author's caveat: "Inevitably the self-conscious artist and the scholar detest advertising. The expression of an individual talent or the free play of a questioning mind is essentially antagonistic to a force which makes for the erasure of individual differences, the standardization of taste, and, literally, the vulgarization of all its touches. Understandably, advertising is an abomination in the sight of the Lord's nicest children, a stench in their nostrils, and a discord in their ears" (p. 496). Since a cat may look at a king, perhaps a professorial reviewer can at least describe what the present book is about and how it differs from Frank S. Presbrey's *The History and Development of Advertising* (1928) upon which we academic deviants have largely relied hitherto to provide a thread for "the advertising story". In organization and emphasis there is considerable resemblance. Though both begin with the English background, they focus primarily upon much the same personalities and events in the history of American advertising. Wood has the advantage of being up to date—radio, World War II, television.

In the volume here under scrutiny advertising is set in the broad context of national history. The resulting absence of pinpoint analysis is unfortunate; instead, as might be expected, a *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* relationship emerges. In one or two instances chronology is inverted; in others advertising is given a key rôle it does not deserve. For instance, one wonders whether it is worth while for historians to continue debating whether Wilson could have saved the Versailles Treaty by a greater political and personal flexibility in view of the fact that the Republican

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

high command had already hired the dynamic Albert D. Lasker to rebuild their party by discrediting Wilsonian internationalism. In addition to providing a general background, Wood deals at length with the biographies of famous advertisers such as Barnum, Lipton and Ford and with the history of the media, press and periodicals, utilized by advertisers. While these sidelights are often informative and always diverting, they lengthen the book and consequently diminish its utility for the serious user. Every writer on advertising seems called upon to write a defense of it. Though Wood establishes a necessary rôle for this service in our economy, he sometimes gives the impression of trying to score mere debater's points against the critics of advertising. Along with the generality of the analysis this habit really weakens his case. Besides he ends up, as most apologists for the mass media do, believing that people get the sort of advertising they want, if not deserve.

Probably the book's greatest usefulness is its description of the evolution of the business organization of advertising. Wood brings together much scattered material and makes it lively and intelligible. In its style, reminiscent of the winged adjectives of advertising copy, and in its methods of documenting advertising with full quotation, the volume is clearly aimed at a popular audience. Luckily the study will gravely mislead very few; for the generation which has to watch its caloric intake the volume will set stirring the sort of nostalgia usually produced by hearing an old popular song. At least this was the reaction of one of the "Lord's nicest children". Brother, when you say that, smile!

EDWARD C. KIRKLAND

THETFORD, VERMONT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK NOTES

With the awareness of South Africa increasing in many areas, the publication of a second edition of a South African compendium—*State of the Union: Economic, Financial and Statistical Year-Book for the Union of South Africa, 1958* (Cape Town, Culemborg Publishers, 1958; 452 pp.)—may be noted with interest. While no book of 452 pages could more than skim over the highlights of the Union, this year-book is of value for preliminary reference and because it includes statistics from a wide number of sources. A brief listing of important historical dates, the opening chapter, and a four-page summary of the physical background, a chapter which could profitably be lengthened and submitted to professionals for revision, are followed by about 22 pages devoted mainly to politics and government. The chapter on the Union's foreign policy (pp. 41-43) is interesting only for the selection of subjects included: the Union's unhappiness with its treatment in the United Nations, the policy of non-involvement in Suez, the intention of coöperating with Ghana, and an expression of the desired goal of serving as a link between other African nations and Western countries, a good example of what outside areas might regard as one of the totally unrealistic features of South African policy. Chapters 10-27 (pp. 53-121) are concerned with the population and peoples of South Africa. Examples of self-delusion are seen on page 53, where it is stated that the policy which has guided the White population ever since the earliest days has been to keep on friendly terms with the non-White groups, and on page 84, where this sentence is found: "Being devout Christians, White South Africans have always approached the racial question in a spirit of tolerance." The existence of some human problems is only hinted at by such cryptic statements as "the Prime Minister pleaded for co-operation between Afrikaaners and English-speaking sections" (p. 59). While chapter 19 (pp. 48-85) is entitled "Co-existence of Black and White" it is made quite clear that this implies co-existence on a segregated basis, though it is interesting to note that the word *apartheid* seldom appears in the volume. The chapters on Mining (pp. 122-163), Agriculture and Forestry (pp. 164-234), Transport (pp. 235-266), Finance and Trade (pp. 267-310), and Industry (pp. 311-427) are altogether more valuable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Concisely presented and supported by statistics which have in most cases been brought forward to 1956 or 1957, these portions of the book permit one to value some of the undoubtedly impressive economic achievements of the Union. Finally, there are brief chapters on Southwest Africa and the three High Commission Territories.—William A. Hance, Columbia University.

Marianne is undoubtedly the most studied, the most investigated, and the most written about lady in the world. Every facet of her multisided existence has been the object of many books and hardly does one get a little out of date than another comes to take its place. Among the most recent of American works to be devoted to a study of the economic aspects of French life is *The French Economy and the State* by Warren C. Baum (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958; xvi, 391 pp. $7.50), which is a research study of the RAND Corporation. This is a factual account of the institutions by which the French state has intervened in the economic affairs of the nation during recent years. It is a kind of travel guide through the highways and byways of those French government agencies which plan the way the economy should operate and try to carry their blueprints to the point of execution. It is not unlike a volume prepared by the American Mission to France in the first years of the Marshall Plan—entitled *France–1948*—for it is largely descriptive rather than analytic and it is careful not to pass judgment on French policies and foibles. As a general reference work the book before us should be useful, especially to those who do not read French and therefore have closed to them a vast body of similar literature—for example, J. M. Jeanneney, *Force et faiblesse de l'économie française* (Paris, 1958). Yet its utility might have been increased if its tables had been brought up to date instead of stopping in 1953 or 1954; if its index had been detailed and specific enough to indicate the sections where various institutions are discussed; and if its bibliography had included more references to works in English, notably articles which have appeared in this Quarterly. Yet the work has merit and provides ample evidence of what can be done in the field of research with the resources of the RAND Corporation.—Shepard B. Clough, Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROGRESS WORKS HERE

One of the most important and basic reasons for good telephone service is research. The many advances in speed, clarity, distance and convenience would not have been possible without it.

They would not have been possible either, in the same degree or as economically, without one central research organization such as the Bell Telephone Laboratories.

This is the research division of the Bell System. It has grown as the needs of the nation have grown.

The work of its hundreds of scientists and engineers covers many fields and goes exploring and developing in many directions. But it is aimed primarily at the betterment of communications and the finding of ways to provide better service at the lowest cost to the customer.

Not just recently, but long ago the Bell System recognized the business and national need for basic research and it has devoted a considerable part of its laboratories program to this field.

The "search for new knowledge—the effort to increase our understanding of nature—the probing into the unknown"—has brought substantial benefits beyond their particular application to communications.

An outstanding example was the invention of the Transistor, one of the big breakthroughs in science that come only at rare intervals.

These amazing amplifiers, though little larger than a pea, can amplify electric signals up to 100,000 times. They can do many of the things a vacuum tube can do—and more besides! They have opened the way to new products and improved others.

There is no doubt that the Transistor has been one of the leading factors in an electronic boom and has helped to create business and jobs in many industries. More than 50,000,000 transistors will be made this year.

The research and manufacturing skills of the Bell System, already organized and at hand, are placed fully at the service of the U. S. Government whenever we are called upon for projects for which we are specially qualified.

Among many present defense assignments is the development of guidance systems for intercontinental missiles.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



sign of outstanding banking service

why don't you talk to the people at Chase Manhattan—they're ready to provide a complete range of banking services.

100 CONVENIENT OFFICES IN GREATER NEW YORK

THE
CHASE
MANHATTAN
BANK
Chartered 1799
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946

CHARLES B. McLANE, in exploring the pattern of Soviet Russian policy toward the Communist movement in China from 1931 to 1946, gives documented information on the events of those years that were material to relations between Moscow and Yenan. *$5.50*

Pattern for Soviet Youth

A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954

RALPH TALCOTT FISHER, Jr., in this study of the Komsomol, the chief instrument for the indoctrination and control of Soviet youth, traces the development of that organization from 1918 to 1954, using the official reports of the twelve congresses of the Komsomol. *$6.75*

North Atlantic Triangle

JOHN BARTLET BREBNER examines the historical interplay between the United States and Canada, in relation to the responses of each to Great Britain. "An original product of his own high capacity and a large contribution to the fuller understanding of past and present in North America."—*Yale Review* *$7.50*

Arms Control and Inspection in American Law

LOUIS HENKIN presents a study of international arms control and inspection in relation to the Constitution, the laws, and legal institutions of the United States and considers the constitutional issues which would be raised by the regulation of public and private activities. *Preface by Philip C. Jessup.* *$5.50*

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957

The most comprehensive record of the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the *Yearbook* presents United Nations events during the past year, including the important disarmament discussions, and the activities of each of the specialized agencies. *$12.50*

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS NEW YORK 27, NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1812

1958

First National City Bank
Monthly Letter
Business and Economic Conditions

General Business Conditions

THE business decline has form of a leveling out in the drop of new orders, ven modest improvement, in individual com- The significance of such re- ail of o

Up-to-date information on economic conditions

The First National City Bank of New York Monthly Letter—"must" reading for everyone interested in American business—is prepared by the Bank's own Economics Department. It is available on request to interested people and for use in connection with college classes.

Send your request for the Monthly Letter to:

The **FIRST**
NATIONAL CITY BANK
of New York

77 Branches in Greater New York 73 Overseas Branches, Offices and Affiliates

Head Office: 55 Wall Street, New York 15, N. Y.

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IMPORTANT NEW TEXTS FROM OXFORD

Principles and Problems of State and Local Government

John M. Swarthout, Portland State College,
and Ernest R. Bartley, University of Florida

Authors of PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition, *and editors of* MATERIALS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

A brief, clear-cut treatment of the development, functions, and problems of state and local governments. Special attention is given to the separation of powers from the federal government, the strengths and weaknesses of state legislatures, the significance of parties at the local level, and the financing of local government. Includes charts, figures, tables.

1958 369 pages paperbound $4.25

Readings in International Politics: *Concepts and Issues*

Charles Lerche, Emory University, and Margaret Lerche,
Georgia State College

A richly varied selection of readings, mostly contemporary, chosen on the basis of their lasting contribution to the Principles of International Relations. 1958 375 pages paperbound $2.75

The Nature and Function of International Organization

Stephen S. Goodspeed, University of California, Santa Barbara

Fully up to date, this comprehensive text, with emphasis on the U.N., provides a solid basis for courses in International Organization. It will also serve as a valuable supplement for classes in International Relations and International Law. Contains charts, suggested readings, U.N. Charter. *January 1959 app. 700 pages prob. $7.25*

The Politics of Aristotle

Translated by Sir Ernest Barker

An unabridged paperbound reprint of the original classic edition, with introduction and notes. 1958 477 pages $1.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, INC.
New York 16, New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL STUDIES

The Journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom

★

EDITORIAL BOARD

Sir Ernest Barker, Max Beloff, D. W. Brogan, D. N. Chester, G. D. H. Cole, Sir Keith Hancock, Wilfrid Harrison, W. J. M. Mackenzie, Michael Oakeshott, W. A. Robson, T. S. Simey, K. B. Smellie, E. C. S. Wade, K. C. Wheare, C. H. Wilson

EDITOR: WILFRID HARRISON

The journal publishes articles and notes on all the main aspects of politics—historical, institutional, theoretical and legal; it also contains a review section. Recent articles have included:—

The American Committee of Economic Advisers and Joint Committee on the Economic Report—*R. S. Milne*

Planning—A Case Study—*Harry Eckstein*

Administrative Theory in the United States: a Survey and a Retrospect—*Dwight Waldo*

Public Corporations and the Classification of Administrative Bodies—*D. N. Chester*

Civil Liberties and the American Supreme Court—*Loren P. Beth*

A Case Study of Administrative Autonomy: Controls and Tensions in French Administration—*Alfred Diamant*

Electoral Studies and Democratic Theory I: A British View—*John Plamenatz* II: A Continental View—*Giovanni Sartori*

Published three times a year. The prepaid subscription is 45s. ($6.50) post free, and the price of a single copy 18s. net ($2.50). Orders may be sent through a bookseller or direct to

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Amen House, Warwick Square, London, E.C.4

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

NOVEMBER 1958

This special issue is devoted to studies in political sociology

Includes the following papers:

A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics ..... DAVID E. APTER
The Power Elite—Reconsidered ..... DANIEL BELL
Party Organization in Primary Elections ..... PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT and PETER H. ROSSI
Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis J. LEIPER FREEMAN
The Local Community as an Ecology of Games ..... NORTON E. LONG
Religious and Socioeconomic Factors in the French Vote, 1946-56 DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.
Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy MARTIN TROW
Decision Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City ... DELBERT C. MILLER

Single Copy $1.75

Order from

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 Ellis Avenue **Chicago 37, Illinois**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Constitution and What It Means Today

12th Revised Edition

By EDWARD S. CORWIN

This is a completely revised edition of Mr. Corwin's classic handbook on the Constitution brought completely up to date as of January 1, 1958. Accordingly, this edition contains a full discussion of the historic Supreme Court decision outlawing racial segregation in public schools; discusses such important Supreme Court 1957 decisions as those in the Yates, Watkins, and Jencks cases; and covers the subject of presidential disability and the vice-president's duty and status in such an eventuality.

360 pages. $6.00

Conquest of Violence

The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict

By JOAN V. BONDURANT

An exciting study of Gandhi's technique of nonviolence, which he called satyagraha, and described as a "movement intended to replace methods of violence, based entirely upon truth." The distinguishing characteristics of the Gandhian technique, the relevance of continuing experiments in its refinement, and the far-reaching implications satyagraha has for social and political philosophy and the problem of conflict on all levels are explored here in terms familiar to the West. *200 pages. $5.00*

The French Economy and the State

By WARREN C. BAUM

This book provides a full view of the French economy and how it affects France as a state. The author deals with government efforts to reconstruct the economic system and control inflation and recession cycles, and shows how the state acts as a regulator of private enterprise. He also discusses the state's traditional role of public financier and its less orthodox role as entrepreneur in a large part of the economy now under public ownership. *A RAND Corporation Research Study.*

404 pages. Tables. $7.50

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS,
Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DESEGREGATION:

Resistance and Readiness

By Melvin M. Tumin

Who is most ready for desegregation of the public schools and who is most resistant? What part does prejudice play and how important is it? Will the Supreme Court ruling become the working law of the land? This book, based on a field study of white adult male citizens of Guilford County, North Carolina, shows what attitudes exist toward desegregation, what factors bear upon these attitudes, and in what ways.

300 pages. $5.00

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, Princeton, N. J.

New D-G Map Series

1958 Publication

WORLD HISTORY

16 LARGE COLORED MAPS

Each 64 x 44 inches.

- Each map shows total world situation during the period of time it covers.
- Inset maps highlight important developments within limited areas throughout the time span of each map.
- Time lines on each map indicate the chronology of events portrayed.
- Series is correlated with material contained in up-to-date textbooks on world history.
- Relationship between history and geography is emphasized by means of a visual-relief monochrome presentation of lowlands and highlands.

Write for information

DENOYER-GEPPERT CO.

Scientific Map Makers

5235 RAVENSWOOD AVE., CHICAGO 40

Journal of International Affairs

Science and World Politics

Studies of the impact on international affairs of recent developments in science.

Articles by

Hugh Odishaw, Seymour Melman, Mark G. Field, Robert B. von Mehren, Warner R. Schilling, Albert C. Stillson and Christopher Wright

Winter 1959 Single copy: $1.00

The Spring 1959 issue will deal with current developments in the Middle East.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OXFORD books of exceptional interest

The Middle East—THIRD EDITION

A Political and Economic Survey

Edited by **Sir Reader Bullard**

This compact and highly useful reference work has been brought as up-to-date as the Suez crisis. It describes the geography, history, politics, religion, sociology, and economics of the countries of the Middle East—Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Persia, the Sudan, Syria, and Turkey. This third edition has been completely reset.

4 maps. $9.00

British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East

By **A Chatham House Study Group**

This report attempts an assessment of the real interests of the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean and Middle East and of the policies open to the United Kingdom to sustain these interests. After outlining the background and what are taken to be British interests, the report considers the interests of other countries both inside and outside the area, the relation of these to British interests, and British assets and disadvantages in dealing with the area. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs*) $2.00

Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs

Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change 1939-52

By **Nicholas Mansergh**

Part One of this study is the first detailed analysis of intra-Commonwealth co-operation during the Second World War to be published; Part Two deals with post-war changes in the composition and character of the Commonwealth and stresses the secession of Burma and the independent membership of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs*) $10.10

Political Studies

The Journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom. It contains articles and notes dealing with political questions on a wide front, including both institutional and theoretical political studies and studies of allied questions in the legal, historical, philosophical, sociological and other fields. Each number includes a book review section, and notes on the activities of the Political Studies Association and of the Political Science Association. Published three times a year.

Subscription $5.00

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The following volumes have recently been published.

●

#588—*Charles McLean Andrews: A Study in American Historical Writing.*
By A. S. EISENSTADT. Price, $5.00

#589—*Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?*
By JOHN WILLIAM CHAPMAN. Price, $3.25

#590—*Delinquent Saints: Disciplinary Action in the Early Congregational Churches of Massachusetts.*
By EMIL OBERHOLZER, JR. Price, $6.00

#591—*Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought.*
By PETER N. RIESENBERG. Price, $3.75

#592—*Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History.*
By WILLIAM KLUBACK. Price, $3.00

#593—*The Economics of the Fur Industry.*
By VICTOR R. FUCHS. Price, $5.00

#594—*The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui.*
By ALAN B. SPITZER. Price, $3.75

#595—*Joseph Reed: A Moderate in the American Revolution.*
By JOHN F. ROCHE. Price, $5.00

#596—*Background of Napoleonic Warfare.*
By ROBERT S. QUIMBY. Price, $6.75

#597—*Karaites in Byzantium: The Formative Years, 970-1100.*
By ZVI ANKORI. Price, $6.00

The entire list is published by the Columbia University Press, New York; and in Great Britain, Canada and India by the Oxford University Press, London and Bombay.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'wo Challenging and
ıuthoritative New Studies

HE SOVIET CRUCIBLE
oviet Government in Theory and Practice

y Samuel Hendel, Professor and Chairman, Department of Government, ıe City College of New York.

In this significant and unique book of readings, Professor Hendel brings together a wide nge of materials, including original sources, to represent varied positions of scholars and iters—many of great distinction—regarding the nature, development, and prospects of the viet system.

The choice of selections follows from the several major theses. The author believes that culiarly Russian history and circumstances considerably affected the form and substance of viet rule; he therefore gives considerable attention to the Czarist heritage. He believes that knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory is indispensable to an understanding of the U.S.S.R.; a ıgthy unit is devoted to various interpretations of the role played by theory. He further beves that the basis for the totalitarian character of Soviet institutions was largely set with ılin's triumph by the end of 1928; the readings therefore trace Soviet history only so far as c dictatorship of Stalin.

IE IMPACT OF AIR POWER:
ational Security and World Politics

y Eugene M. Emme, Operations Research Office, Office of Civilian and Dense Mobilization, former Professor of International Politics, Air University.

Designed for courses which focus upon the problems of national security and military licies of today and tomorrow, this comprehensive collection gathers together, for the first ne, *the authoritative writings on all aspects of air and space power. Drawn from the* eeches and writings of distinguished statesmen, airmen, scientists, historians, critics and other holars, the selections explore the full meaning and implications of air power. This book is, in *ny ways, a pioneering work comparable to Admiral Mahan's classic work on sea power.*

Essays by the author, prefacing each chapter, provide continuity of thought and outline the ok's contents. These chapter introductions serve as an excellent preview, and later review, *the contents. Each selection is also introduced by notes indicating the source and vintage* the selection and giving pertinent biographical information regarding the contributor.

oth of These Distinguished Studies
'ill be Ready in January

Van Nostrand 120 Alexander St. Princeton, N. J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MACMILLAN

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

by ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, Lehigh University

This book enables the reader to appreciate the significance of major issues facing the Supreme Court today. The 84 cases have been chosen to illustrate basic doctrines and the evolution of constitutional principles. Included are explanations of technical legal terms and a biographical sketch of each justice whose opinions appear in the book.

Coming January 1959

THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE

by ALAN F. WESTIN, Cornell University

"I have just finished using Westin's *Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case* in my course this summer. I am delighted with it. It is a first-rate piece of work and does more to give students an appreciation of how a case is decided than anything else I've used in the past."—Harold W. Chase, University of Minnesota.

1958, 183 pages, $1.60

THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

by GUNNAR HECKSCHER

"An exploration, based on a round table conference, of the methodological problems involved in the study of comparative government and politics."—*Foreign Affairs.*

1957, 172 pages, $4.25

THE GOVERNMENT AND MISGOVERNMENT OF LONDON

SECOND EDITION

by WILLIAM A. ROBSON *1958, 518 pages, $5.75*

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED